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Benjamin B. Ferencz
Former Prosecutor at the Nuremberg War Crimes Trial
As the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy celebrates
its thirtieth anniversary, we dedicate this issue to honor the
accomplishments of a man who has truly dedicated his life to the cause
of human rights and world peace, Benjamin B. Ferencz. Benjamin B.
Ferencz was a principal prosecutor at the Nuremberg war crimes trials
as a young man and is an ardent proponent of the International
Criminal Court. He is an inspiration to all of us to further the goal that
crimes against humanity should not go unpunished.
Benjamin B. Ferencz was born in 1920 in the Carpathian
Mountains of Transylvania. Before he was a year old his family
immigrated to America where he was raised in Manhattan. He joined
an anti-aircraft artillery battalion preparing for the invasion of France
after he graduated from Harvard Law School in 1943. As the Nazi
atrocities were uncovered, he was transferred to a newly created War
Crimes Branch of the Army to gather evidence of Nazi brutality and
apprehend criminals. After his honorable discharge on the day after
Christmas in 1945, he returned to New York to practice law, but was
soon recruited for the Nuremberg war crimes trials.
At the age of twenty-seven, in his very first case as an attorney,
Ferencz became the Chief Prosecutor for the United States at the
Nuremberg war crimes trial, which was referred to as the "biggest
murder trial in history." Twenty-two defendants were charged with
murdering over one million people. The United States had decided to
prosecute a broad cross-section of Nazi criminals, after the conclusion of
the trial against Hermann Goering and his henchmen. Overwhelming
evidence indicated German doctors, lawyers, judges, generals,
industrialists and others had played leading roles in perpetrating Nazi
brutalities.
All of the defendants were convicted and thirteen were sentenced to
death. Ferencz's primary objective had been to establish a legal
precedent that would encourage a more humane and secure world in
the future. He is quoted as saying:
Nuremberg taught me that creating a world of tolerance and
compassion would be a long and arduous task. And I also learned that
if we did not devote ourselves to developing effective world law, the
same cruel mentality that made the Holocaust possible might one day
destroy the entire human race.
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While watching the world sink deeper in the quagmire of Vietnam
in the 1970s, Ferencz began to withdraw from the private practice of
law and to dedicate himself to studying and writing about world peace.'
He believed that in order to properly denounce aggression, terrorism
and other crimes against humanity, an international criminal code
must first be accepted and enforced by an international criminal court.
On this topic he published DEFINING INTERNATIONAL AGRESSION--THE
SEARCH FOR WORLD PEACE in 1975 and a two volume documentary
history entitled AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT--A STEP TOWARD
WORLD PEACE in 1980.
The establishment of an International Criminal Court began to be
seriously explored at the end of the cold war. Since the adoption of the
Rome Statute in 1998, Ferencz has actively participated at Preparatory
Commission sessions for the ICC, monitoring and making available his
expertise on current efforts to define aggression. Ferencz's main goal is
to replace the "rule of force with the rule of law" and now that the
treaty creating the International Criminal Court has come into force,
this goal may finally be realized.
Ferencz strongly advocates the United States' ratification of the
treaty creating the International Criminal Court. He asserts that the
United States' position that a law may apply world-wide with the
exception of the United States weakens our international standing. "No
nation and no person has a sovereign right to commit crimes against
humanity with impunity. The best way to protect our military, and the
peace of the world, is through universal and equal enforcement of the
rule of law for everyone."
Benjamin B. Ferencz is a shining example of selfless service and
lifelong dedication to humanity. His insistence that the law should
apply equally to all resonates with the very fabric upon which our
society is based. We are privileged to have such a strong representative
of American ideals combating aggression and terrorism.
1. A list of articles and lectures written by Benjamin B. Ferencz is available at
http://www.benferencz.org/artis.htm
2. Benjamin B. Ferencz, Know The Truth About the International Criminal Court,
available at http://www.benferenz.org/julynews.htm
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TOWARD A NORMATIVE CONSENSUS
AGAINST CORRUPTION:
Legal Effects of the Principles to Combat
Corruption in Africa
ALHAJI B.M. MARONG*
INTRODUCTION
In February 1999, eleven African countries adopted a set of twenty-
five principles as a framework for combating corruption in Africa, and
in the continent's dealings with the outside world.' The negotiations
were held under the auspices of the Global Coalition for Africa (GCA), a
Washington-based intergovernmental policy forum dedicated to
building consensus on development policy and priorities among African
governments and their partners in development. The principles,
referred to here as the "Anti-corruption Principles," address corruption
in international business transactions, and in development assistance
to Africa.
The "Anti-corruption Principles" followed on the heels of anti-
corruption efforts in other regions of the world, particularly as they
relate to the international business transactions. Notable efforts in this
regard include the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption,
concluded by Member States of the Organization of American States in
1996, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
* LL.B (Hons.) Univ. of Sierra-Leone (1992), B.L Sierra-Leone Law School (1993), LL.M
McGill University (1997), D.C.L Candidate, McGill University. Formerly Senior State
Counsel at the Attorney-General's Chambers, Banjul The Gambia, and Legal Adviser to
the National Environment Agency of the Gambia. I would like to thank Stephen Toope,
Kwadwo Appiagyei-Atua, Karamo Sonko, and Aileen Marshall, all of whom read previous
drafts of this article and provided useful comments. Any errors, omissions and
shortcomings remain mine alone.
1. The eleven participants were: Benin, Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mali,
Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda. Some of Africa's partners in
development including Canada, Denmark, France, The Netherlands, Switzerland, United
Kingdom, the United States, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) were present during the negotiations. See Global Coalition for
Africa, Past Activities, 25 Principles to Combat Corruption, at http://www.gca-
cma.org/epastact.htm.
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International Business Transactions that was adopted in 1997.2
Earlier, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a Declaration
against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial
Transactions.3
In this paper, I argue that since the 1970s, the international
community has engaged in a discourse over corruption and its effects on
the international economy and national societies. In some regions of
the world, this discourse generated sufficient common understandings
of the relationship between economies and corruption, and gave rise to
legal norms to combat corruption. Both the OECD and Inter-American
Conventions are outcomes of this set of discursive processes. On the
other hand, except for their involvement with the processes within the
United Nations General Assembly and the Centre for Transnational
Corporations, African countries failed to take a regional initiative to
combat corruption before 1997. That year, the issue was addressed as
the main theme of the GCA Policy Forum in Maputo, Mozambique.4
Since then, a specific African discourse on corruption is identifiable,
taking place under the auspices of the GCA, and culminating in the
adoption of the Anti-corruption Principles. More recently, efforts to
fight corruption in Africa commenced at the sub-regional level. In May
2001, West African Ministers of Justice issued a Declaration in Accra,
Ghana, calling upon the Secretariat of the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS) to elaborate a comprehensive Protocol
on Corruption.5 The Ministerial Declaration recognized the significance
of the issue when it stated "corruption is not only a criminal issue but
2. Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724
[hereinafter OAS Convention]. The Convention was signed by 21 Latin American
Countries, as well as the United States and Canada in 1996. It entered into force on
March 20, 1997. See also the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 18 1997, Arg.-Braz.-Bulg.-Chile-
Slovk., 37 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter OECD Convention].
3. G.A. Res, 51/191, U.N. GAOR, 51' Sess., reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 1043 (1997). The
United Nations concern with corruption goes back to 1974 with the establishment of the
Center for Transnational Corporations (CTC), which was intended, inter alia, to negotiate
a Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations. As part of this process, an Ad Hoc
Intergovernmental Working Group on the Problem of Corrupt Practices was established
in 1976, and renamed in 1978 as the Committee on an International Agreement on Illicit
Payments. The Committee agreed on a draft International Agreement, which was
forwarded to ECOSOC and the CTC for inclusion in the Code of Conduct, but was not
adopted. The draft U.N. Code of Conduct on TNCs was also not adopted. See Draft U.N.
Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, U.N. Commission on Transnational
Corporations, 17' Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/6 (1982), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 192
(1983).
4. See 1997 Political Committee Meeting, Maputo, Mozambique, at http://www.gca-
cma.org/epoli.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2000). The issue had surfaced earlier in 1995 at
the Global Coalition for Africa Meeting in Maastricht, Switzerland.
5. The Guardian (Lagos), Ecowas Justice Ministers Move Against Corruption (June
5, 2001), at http://allafrica.com/stories/200106050180.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2000).
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also impacts on the dynamics of national and international development
that deserve collective solution ....
It is my argument that the discourse on corruption within the
United Nations, and the various regional organizations, has generated
shared understandings of the negative impacts of corruption on the
economic and development objectives of nations and people. It also
illustrates the emergence of an international normative consensus
against corruption. This consensus represents the emerging opinio
juris sive necessitatis of the international community, thus, the
beginning of the process of formation of a customary international law
on corruption. Remarkably, the processes associated with the
development of the African Anti-corruption Principles involved
participation by an array of actors including states, international
organizations, non-governmental organizations, and individuals.
Arguably, this inclusive process engendered a perception of legitimacy,
which, in turn, explains the increasing influence of the Anti-corruption
Principles.7
Thus, by adopting the Anti-corruption Principles, African countries
have joined the process of formation of an emergent customary norm.
The implication of this situation is that if African countries fail to
conclude a Convention Against Corruption as envisaged by Principle 25
of the Anti-corruption Principles, the current emerging opinio juris,
together with supporting State practice, could form the basis of a
regional customary law on corruption.8 As such, governments would be
under an obligation to take domestic measures to prevent their
nationals (including legal persons), from engaging in corrupt activities
in their dealings with officials of other countries.
Despite this argument, it is suggested that a regional convention on
corruption would be the preferable regulatory option for Africa. Yet,
6. The Guardian (Lagos), Ecowas Justice Ministers Move Against Corruption (June
5, 2001), at http://allafrica.conrstories/200106050180.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2000).
7. See discussion infra at notes 34-38 and accompanying text as well as notes 85-102
and accompanying text. The concepts of perceived legitimacy and process fairness are
borrowed from Thomas M. Franck. THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY
AMONG NATIONS 16 (1990); See also THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 25 (1995).
8. The International Court of Justice in the Asylum Case laid down the idea of a
regional custom. The Court stated the requirements of this type of custom as follows:
The Party which relies on a custom of this kind must prove that this
custom is established in such a manner that it has become binding on
the other Party .... The rule invoked... [must be] in accordance with a
constant and uniform usage practiced by the States in question, and that
this usage is the expression of a right appertaining to [one] State and a
duty incumbent on the[other] State.
Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 276 (Nov. 20). See also Rights of Passage over
Indian Territory (Port. v. India) 1960 I.C.J. 6 (Apr. 12), see infra note 451 and
accompanying text.
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even a convention would have little practical effect if African nations do
not put in place adequate institutional and legal mechanisms at the
domestic level to fight corruption. The lesson to be learned is that an
effective strategy against corruption would require linkages between
mutual operation of institutional and legal mechanisms at both the
regional and national levels. There is no doubt that much depends on
the effectiveness of domestic implementation measures such as: (1) the
reform of many criminal laws or the enactment of new legislation that
could be effectively enforced; (2) reform of public institutions to
introduce greater accountability in the public sector; (3) political
leadership that is more than rhetorically committed to fight corruption;
(4) a general public that is intolerant of fleece, an engaging civil society
to probe and reveal cases of corrupt practices; (5) an enabling
environment for the free expression of public opinion; and (6) an
independent judiciary. In effect, in many ways adherence to the rule of
law is crucial to effectively fight corruption.!
DEFINITION AND HYPOTHESIS
There is broad agreement that corruption is the "abuse of public
office for private gain."'0 This definition focuses on the public or
9. Edward Kwakwa, Regulating the International Economy: What Role for the
State?, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 227, 242 (Michael Byers ed., 2000).
10. Daniel Kaufmann, Corruption: The Facts, FOREIGN POL'Y, June 22, 107, 114
(1997); See also Shang-Jin Wei, Corruption in Economic Development: Beneficial Grease,
Minor Annoyance, or Major Obstacle?, at http://www.worldbank.orgwbi/governance/pdf/
wei.pdf. This definition is shared by many organizations, including the World Bank and
Transparency International. See WORLD BANK, HELPING COUNTRIES COMBAT
CORRUPTION: PROGRESS AT THE WORLD BANK SINCE 1997 16 (2000), available at
http'J/www.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/helpingcountries.pdf
(last visited Apr. 20, 2002); See also JEREMY POPE, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL
SOURCE BOOK 2000-CONFRONTING CORRUPTION: THE ELEMENTS OF A NATIONAL
INTEGRITY SYSTEM 13 (2000), available at http'//www.transparency.org/sourcebook/
sourcebook.pdf.zip (last visited Apr. 20, 2002). A similar definition is inferable from the
Global Coalition for Africa's 1997 policy statement on corruption. See Policy statement,
Global Coalition for Africa, Corruption and Development in Africa, GCA/PF/N.2/11/1997,
available at http'J/www.gca-cma.org/epfdoc97.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2002) [hereinafter
GCA]. The same definition is implied by the OECD and the OAS Conventions. See W.
PAATI OFOSU-AMAAH ET AL., COMBATING CORRUPTION: A COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF
SELECTED LEGAL ASPECTS OF STATE PRACTICE AND MAJOR INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES
70-75 (1999). W. Paati Ofosu-Amnmah and his coauthors offer a more elaborate, but less
inclusive, definition of corruption centered around the notion of bribery. Based on a study
of major legal systems of the world that address corruption, they conclude that an act of
corruption is consummated:
whenever a public officer or other agent accepts or solicits a bribe, or any
person gives or promises a bribe to such a public officer or other agent;
provided.., that the purpose of the bribe is to serve as a reward to the
public officer or agent for an act that he has done or refrained from doing in
the exercise of his functions, or as an inducement designed to ensure that the
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governmental sphere, particularly, on the extent to which government
involvement in the national economy provides opportunities for public
officials to engage in rent-seeking behavior, often at the expense of
government policy and public welfare. However, the definition does
convey the misleading impression that corruption is unidirectional,
rather than a two-way phenomenon. Every act of corruption involves at
least two parties. Public officials are in many cases on the demand side,
but their crime is no less than those, who pay bribes, or offer and induce
the acceptance of other special treatment."
The focus on the public sector corruption is nonetheless justified by
statistical evidence, which, inter alia, demonstrates a correlation
between the extent of the government involvement in the economy, and
the amount of corruption. For example, the results of a 1996 survey of
two thousand enterprises across forty-nine countries showed a higher
incidence of corrupt practices in countries with more regulatory and
bureaucratic requirements for business.' In addition, there is evidence
that the more administrative discretion officials enjoy in approving
regulatory requirements such as the issue of permits, licenses, or grants
of the fiscal exemptions to business, the more the likelihood of
corruption.1 3 According to Wei:
The more discretion government officials have over the operation of
business or lives of citizenry, the more likely corruption would occur
and flourish... labyrinthine government regulations create fertile
grounds for government officials to extract rents, whereas an economy
where government's role is minimal is less likely to breed corruption.
4
It is true that the exercise of official discretion could in many
respects be abused leading to corruption. Common sense, therefore,
dictates that public policy must seek to limit the extent of
administrative discretion officials enjoy, so as to reduce opportunities
for abuse. However, while this may provide a strong case for
streamlining the role of the state in the economy in certain cases, and
for the privatization of inefficient and monopolistic state enterprises,
the state continues to have important socio-economic roles to play in
poor developing countries, especially those in Africa.' 5 In the area of
public officer or agent does, or refrains from doing any act, in the exercise of
his functions.
OFOSU-AMAAH ETAL., supra note 10, at 63.
11. See infra text accompanying note 24 for a discussion of the role of the
international economic processes in increasing corruption in developing countries.
12. Kaufman, supra note 10, at 119. His calculations were based on data compiled by
the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report 1996.
13. See GCA, supra note 10.
14. See Wei, supra note 10, at 16.
15. See Kwakwa, supra note 9 (for a discussion on the continuing relevance of the
state in governing the international economy, especially in developing countries); See also
2002
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
corruption, the state, represented by political leadership and public
sector elite, continues to have a crucial leadership role to play. Thus,
instead of disengagement of the state from the economy, what Africa
needs are more responsible and accountable governments, and a public
sector committed to advancing the national socio-economic agenda.
Greater public-sector responsibility and accountability will contribute
not only to economic development, but also to the fight against
corruption.
Having said that, it must be noted that improper exercise of public
authority is not the only explanation for corruption in Africa. Other
factors include the structure of public services, particularly the systems
of recruitment, promotion, and compensation. In many African
countries, recruitment and promotion processes are distorted in favor of
friends, family, and political allies. There is little doubt that this has
had a negative effect on the quality and capacity of manpower that end
up in official positions. Moreover, the levels of remuneration are so
poor compared to the private sector, that many officials are tempted to
make up for the shortfall by demanding bribes before discharge of their
official functions, for the issue of regulatory permits, or for the offer of
government construction and procurement contracts. Inadequate or
inefficient legal structures for the investigation, detection and
prosecution of corrupt practices also contribute to the upsurge of this
menace.
Consequently, a meaningful anti-corruption strategy in Africa will
require a mix of administrative restructuring and legal reform
measures. These reforms could be complemented by honest political
leadership dedicated to the fight against corruption, and through
programs of public education so as to develop an "anti-corruption
sensibility" among the general population.1 6  Among other factors,
exemplary leadership and civil society pressure have been credited with
the success of anti-corruption efforts in Hong Kong, Singapore, Uganda
and Botswana.
1 7
In his study of the development problems in Nigeria, Umez
recognized that previous studies had proffered three main explanations
Oscar Schachter, The Erosion of State Authority and its Implications for Equitable
Development, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW WITH A HUMAN FACE 31 (Friedl Weiss et
al. eds., 1998).
16. On political leadership at the national level, see Augustine Ruzindana, The
Importance of Leadership in Fighting Corruption in Uganda, in CORRUPTION AND THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 133-145 (Kimberly Ann Elliot, ed., 1997). On the importance of
exemplary leadership at the local government level, see ROBERT KLITGAARD, ET AL.,
CORRUPT CITIES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO CURE AND PREVENTION (2000) (narrating.the
experiences of former Mayor Ronald Maclean-Abaroa of the city of La Paz, Bolivia). I use
the phrase 'anti-corruption sensibility' to describe a general aversion to corruption on the
part of the citizenry.
17. See GCA, supra note 10, at 22-24.
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for that country's lack of development: (1) the colonial legacy
explanation; (2) the corrupt leadership hypothesis; and (3) the
authoritarian regimes argument. 8  In his view, although these
explanations are part of the picture, they do not tell the whole story.
For Umez, a more profound and compelling explanation for Nigeria's
development problems is the prevalent value system, which "glorifies
and endorses corrupt and illegal means as necessary, normal, and
sufficient means to ends." 9 Consequently, that value system ought to
be addressed in any assessment of Nigeria's development problems, and
must be reflected in any sustainable strategy to address those
problems. The importance of public education to the eradication of the
"prevalent value system," and its replacement by anti-corruption
sensibility among the population, cannot be overemphasized.
The question of the prevalent value system in Nigeria raises the
broader issue of the relationship between traditional practices of
hospitality or gift giving and corruption. In many African cultures, gifts
are an integral part of norms of hospitality and represent symbols of
appreciation.2" This noble tradition of gift giving has unfortunately
been used as an excuse for corrupt payments to developing country
officials mainly by Northern business concerns on the pretext that it is
normal business practice within the recipient cultures.2 1 Nothing, of
course, is further from the truth. Corruption is not a part of any culture
anywhere, definitely not in Africa. General Olusegun Obasanjo, two-
time President of Nigeria, has drawn a fundamental distinction
between African cultural norms of hospitality and gift-giving on one
hand, and the deliberate manipulation of that practice for selfish
personal enrichment. 2  Thus, while it is true that in many African
18. BEDFORD N. UMEZ, THE TRAGEDY OF A VALUE SYSTEM IN NIGERIA: THEORIES AND
SOLUTIONS (1999).
19. Id. at 37-45.
20. See GCA, supra note 10, at 6.
21. See Jeremy Pope, Containing Corruption in International Transactions-The
Challenge of the 1990s, in ISSUES IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: PAPERS WRITTEN FOR THE
COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 71 (1995).
... Now when you're talking about kickbacks, you're talking about
something that's illegal in this country, and that, of course, you wouldn't
dream of doing .... But there are parts of the world I've been to where we
all know it happens. And if you want to be in business, you have to do - not
something that is morally wrong .... In many countries in the world the
only way in which money trickles down is from the head of the country who
owns everything. Now that's not immoral or corrupt. It is very different from
our practice. Id. (quoting the views of former British Cabinet Minister Lord
Young over BBC radio).
22. Id. at 72 (quoting a Letter from Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo to the Financial Times
of London (Oct. 14 1994)):
In the African concept of appreciation and hospitality, a gift is a token; it is
not demanded; the value is in the spirit of the giving, not the material worth.
The gift is made in the open for all to see, never in secret. Where a gift is
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countries wealth and social status are uncritically accepted, even in
situations where the persons' earnings are demonstrably inconsistent
with their lifestyle, there is no basis for the assertion that corruption is
morally or legally permissible in these societies.
In addition to the domestic factors, the international economic
processes have also played a role in the increasing corruption in
developing countries. The globalization of the international economy
has facilitated greater movement of persons and capital across borders.
Multinational investors, mainly from developed countries, frequently
pay bribes to officials of developing countries in order to win
government contracts, licenses, permits, and concessions. They argue
that such bribes are necessary to speed approval processes, and in some
cases, to secure market presence, which would otherwise be secured by
the less efficient and less scrupulous competitors.2 What is more, home
states of multinational investors have bought these arguments. Except
for the United States, which outlawed bribery of foreign officials since
1977, other OECD countries not only allowed illicit payments by
investors, but also made such payments tax deductible.2 There is little
doubt that this state of affairs encouraged investors to pay, and
developing country officials to demand and receive bribes."5 In light of
the above, the ratification and implementation of the 1997 OECD
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, is significant.26
excessive it becomes an embarrassment, and is returned.... If anything,
corruption -as practiced by exporters from the North as well as by officials in
the South- has perverted positive aspects of this age-old tradition.
23. See Kaufmann, supra note 10, at 115-117 (stating the 'speed money' and 'grease
the wheels' theses and a demonstration of their weaknesses); See World Bank, World
Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World 103, at
http://www.worldbank.org (last visited Apr. 20, 2002) (refuting the 'speed money"
argument); See also Transparency International, TI Source Book 2000, (2000), available
at http//www.transparency.orgsourcebook/index.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2002)
(rejecting the claim that corruption leads to efficient resource allocation).
24. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.S § 78dd-1 (2001).
25. Patrick Glynn et al., The Globalization of Corruption, in CORRUPTION AND THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 7-27 (Kimberly Ann Elliot, ed., 1997) (especially at 16, where they
make the following point: 'Many developed states not only legally permit such bribery but
also permit firms to deduct such bribes as a legitimate business expense. This is not only
a widespread and pernicious instance of corruption but also a practice by which the
industrial nations, in effect, encourage and contribute to corruption in the developing
world.")
26. Article 1 of the Convention criminalizes bribery of foreign public officials, Article
2 provides for liability of legal persons, and Article 3 provides sanctions including
.effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties," and the seizure and
confiscation of the proceeds of bribery, or property equivalent thereto. Article 8 calls on
States to adopt within the framework of their laws and regulations, accounting and
auditing standards, and financial statement disclosures, 'to prohibit the establishment of
off-the-books accounts, the making of off-the-books or inadequately identified
transactions, the recording of non-existent expenditures.., for the purpose of bribing
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Having identified the factors that broadly explain the rise in
corruption in developing countries, it is pertinent to outline its effects
on the developing country's economy, and society. As already noted, one
of the early arguments proffered as a justification for corruption in
countries with excessive bureaucratic and regulatory requirements, is
that the bribery of officials works to "speed the wheels of commerce,"
and so has an overall positive effect on the economy, because it
facilitates more investment.27  This "grease the wheels" or "speed
money" thesis has now been largely discredited. Empirical research has
shown that bribery of officials to secure government approval for
business, operates both as an adverse incentive to potential investors,
and does not really speed up the approval process. On the contrary,
survey data from two thousand four hundred firms, in 58 countries,
show that those corporate managers, who pay more bribes, on average,
spend more time negotiating with their conspirators in government,
than managers that pay fewer bribes.' Kaufmann cites the case of a
senior Indian civil servant who not only failed to speed the approval
process for the company that bribed him, but also offered his services to
rival businesses to slow the process down for them." The implication is
that the "speed money" hypothesis is clearly flawed.
With respect to its effects on the economy, there is evidence that
investors view bribery as a private tax on their investment, and tend to
shy away from jurisdictions with high rates of "private taxation."3 1 In
other words, bribery increases the transaction costs of doing business in
particular jurisdictions. The effect has been lower inflows of foreign
investment to countries with high rates of corruption. Indeed, Mauro's
analysis shows a negative correlation between the amount of corruption
and the level of investment in a country.2 It further shows that a
country that improves its standing on the corruption index by one
foreign public officials or of hiding such bribery." See Convention on Combating Bribery
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, arts 1-3,
8 S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-43, 1997 U.S.T. LEXIS 105. While a liberal interpretation of
this provision may require Parties to outlaw tax deductibility, the provision as it stands,
falls short of the expected express requirement to prohibit tax deductibility of illicit
payments.
27. David H. Bayley, The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation, 19 WESTERN
POLITICAL QUARTERLY 719 (1966) (arguing that corruption has positive effects on
developing economies).
28. See Wei, supra note 10, at 13-14.
29. See id. at 14.
30. See Kaufinann, supra note 10, at 117.
31. Paulo Mauro, Why Worry About Corruption?, in ECON. ISSUES at 6 (Int'l Monetary
Fund, Economic Issues, No. 6), available at http'//www.imf.org/externallpubs/ft/issues6/
issue6.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2002)..
32. See id. at 9 (where he writes that" Regression analysis indicates that the amount
of corruption is negatively linked to the level of investment and economic growth, that is
to say, the more corruption, the less investment and the less economic growth.")
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standard deviation (on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is the most corrupt
and 10 the least corrupt), will experience an increase in its rate of
investment by about four percentage points.3 Similarly, Wei examined
data of foreign investment flows from fourteen source countries to forty-
one host countries in the 1990s, and concluded that there was clear
evidence that corruption discourages foreign investment. Using a
number of statistical corruption indices (to rank countries according to
their levels of corruption), the author concluded that if, for example,
India was to reduce its corruption level to that of Singapore (in a
ranking where Singapore was perceived to be the least corrupt country),
the effect would be equivalent to reducing its rate of corporate tax by up
to 22 percent.
Corruption has also been found to slow economic growth. In his
study referred to earlier, Mauro further concluded that the
improvement by one standard deviation in a country's corruption index
would translate to an annual growth rate of over half a percentage
point in per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) . It is important to
note that in both the Mauro and Wei studies, the statistical relationship
between corruption and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and economic
growth is valid across all regions. Thus, even though the locus of their
research is not Africa, their conclusions remain significant, and have
important implications for African countries.
One of the causes of corruption identified earlier is the structure of
developing country public services, particularly their selection and
promotion processes, as well as their low wage scales. In addition to
distorting the human resource capacity, this factor has led to
distortions of both public policy and government expenditure.
Corruption-prone public servants often customize government policies
in developing countries to facilitate receiving bribes or other illicit
payments, rather than in accordance with the needs and aspirations of
the people. Thus, government policy and expenditure are prioritized
towards capital-intensive infrastructure, defense, and cognate "supply-
type" contracts that offer opportunities for rent-seeking and kickbacks,
instead of socially desirable and needed health, education, and public
welfare projects.3 Moreover, even these projects are often delivered in
substandard quality, necessitating further expenditure within a short
period of time on either maintenance, or new projects.39 The result is
33. Paulo Mauro, Why Worry About Corruption?, in ECON. ISSUES at 6 (Int'l Monetary
Fund, Economic Issues, No. 6), available at httpJ/www.imf.org/external/pubs/ftlissues6/
issue6.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2002).
34. See Wei, supra note 10, at 9.
35. See id. at 6-7, 10.
36. See Mauro, supra note 31, at 9.
37. See Kaufmann, supra note 10, at 120.
38. Id. at 118.
39. Vito Tanzi & Hamid Davoodi, CORRUPTION, PUBLIC INVESTMENT, AND GROWTH 7,
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that the living conditions of the poor in these already poor societies
worsen, with little opportunity for advancement.
Corruption has also resulted in a significant diversion of public
funds, from both internal revenue, and external development
assistance. Figures for Gambia for the early 1990s estimate that
"customs and tax revenues amounting to 8-9 percent of GDP were
foregone, largely as result of corruption."4 0  In 1994-95 fiscal year,
revenues in Tanzania were reported to have dropped dramatically as a
result of corruption by revenue officials.4'
The above research has important policy and legal implications for
Africa. Lagging behind most regions of the world in terms of flows of
FDI and the rate of economic growth, and leading the world in rates of
poverty, disease, unemployment, and general lack of development,
Africa is the region that can least afford the economic costs of
corruption. For Africa, the fight against corruption deserves similar
attention and priority as accorded to other issues that threaten the
development of the continent such as HIV/AIDS, environmental
degradation, poverty, war, and undemocratic governance. In other
words, it is an imperative development challenge. The GCA has put
this point succinctly, "Corruption in Africa is a development issue."
African countries cannot bear the costs of corruption, which impedes
development and minimizes the ability of governments to reduce
poverty. For these reasons, effectively addressing corruption in African
countries has become a development imperative.'4 2
FACING THE CHALLENGE: THE GCA ADDRESSES CORRUPTION IN AFRICA
The issue of corruption first surfaced in GCA deliberations in 1995,
when several delegates brought it up at the 1995 Plenary Session of the
Organization held in Maastricht.43 It quickly gained prominence, and
there was agreement that it should be given more attention within the
GCA." As a result, it was assigned as the main subject of the 1997
GCA Policy Forum held in Maputo, Mozambique."' Initial efforts were
directed at reducing bribery in the international procurement,
especially in donor-financed projects and contracts. 6 For this purpose,
8, 15, 17-18, 20 (Int'l Monetary Fund Working Paper, No. 97/139, 1997), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/wp97139.pdf (last visited Oct. 1997); See also
Kaufmann, supra note 10, at 118; See Wei, supra note 10, at 11; Mauro, supra note 31, at
10, 11.
40. See GCA, supra note 10, at 11.
41. See Jeremy Pope, supra note 10, at 15.
42. GCA, supra note 10, at 2.
43. See id. at 1.
44. Id.
45. GCA, supra note 10, at 2.
46. Id. at 2.
2002
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
a new GCA initiative was launched with a three-pronged approach: (1)
African Heads of State would prohibit their officials from receiving
bribes from international procurement contracts; (2) the heads of
international companies bidding on contracts would certify that their
servants and agents were barred from offering or paying bribes; andd
(3) international financial institutions would be requested to include "no
bribery" clauses in contracts that they finance.47
In order to maintain momentum, the GCA embarked on an
inclusive and participatory process of consensus building that saw input
from African and international non-governmental organizations,
African parliamentarians, governments, and development partners. In
addition to bribery in procurement contracts, the issues for debate were
also broadened to include corruption in development assistance and in
international business transactions generally.48  The broad-based
participation was due to a realization on the part of the GCA and the
participating governments that a successful anti-corruption strategy
will require broad coalitions among African governments, civil society
and the international community. It was this process that culminated
in the 1999 Washington meeting at which the Anti-corruption
Principles were announced.4 9
At a recent GCA Policy Forum held in Abuja, Nigeria, attended by
twenty-three African governments, including three heads of state,
development partners, parliamentarians, mayors, non-governmental
organizations, and the private sector, most participants expressed their
agreement with the Anti-corruption Principles and expressed the
willingness of their respective governments to endorse and implement
them.0 It is my argument that the adoption of the principles, as well as
subsequent follow-up and endorsement by governments, demonstrates
an emerging normative consensus that may provide the basis for the
development of regional customary law on corruption.51 When the
47. GCA, supra note 10, at 2. There is no indication of the extent to which this
initiative has been successfully implemented.
48. Id. at 3.
49. Global Coalition for Africa, Corruption, Collaborative Frameworks to Address
Corruption, at http://www.gca-cma.orglecorrup.htm#1098 (last visited Feb. 23, 1999)
[hereinafter Principles to Combat Corruption].
50. Global Coalition for Africa, Meetings, Report on the 2000 Policy Forum, at
http://www.gca-cma.org/epolicy.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2002). The Policy Forum, which
was attended by the author, was held from October 19 to 21 in Abuja. The African
countries represented were Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Cote
d'Ivoire, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia,
Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia. Among the
development partners in attendance were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Japan,
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States.
Also present were the World Bank, the IMF, the European Commission, and the UNDP.
See Global Coalition for Africa 2000 Policy Forum List of Attendees (on file with author).
51. On the requirements of local custom at international law, See Rights of Passage
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regional consensus is considered along with legal developments in other
parts of the world, particularly, among the OECD and OAS states, the
result is arguably the emergence of international customary law on
corruption. In the next section, I will discuss the requirements for the
formation of a rule of custom in the international law.
CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW
Under Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, the principal sources of international law are listed as
conventions, custom, and general principles of law." The Article also
provides that judicial decisions and the teachings of the most qualified
publicists are subsidiary sources of the international law.53
While the validity of the above categories as sources of
international law cannot be gainsaid, a sophisticated understanding of
the process of contemporary international law making, reveals that the
Article is inadequate in important respects. First, the provision was
negotiated and concluded by a small, largely homogenous group of
Western countries.' Since the end of the Second World War, the
structure of the international legal order has changed significantly,
with a new majority of developing countries with widely varying
priorities and challenges from those of the western powers. This new
dynamic called for a corresponding evolution of the law making
process.5  Attempts by the new States to effect this change in
Over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 6 (Apr. 12). "The Court sees no reason
why long continued practice between two States accepted by them as regulating their
relations should not form the basis of mutual rights and obligations between the two
States. . ."; See also Asylum, supra note 8, and accompanying text.
52. Statute of the International Court of Justice (59 Stat. 1055 1945), U.S.T.S. 993,
art. 38.
53. Id.
54. See KAROL WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-5 (1993) (a useful
account of the negotiating history of this provision, especially the role of what she calls
"the Great Power Jurists"). The Advisory Committee of Jurists that was appointed by the
Council of the League of Nations to prepare the establishment of the Permanent Court of
International Justice were appointed in an independent, personal capacity. By "Great
Power Jurists" the author means jurists from the powerful industrialized countries like
the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, who exercised no mean
influence during the negotiation and drafting of the Statute.
55. The most candid expression of this situation was made by Michael Reisman in the
context of a discussion on the legal status of soft law:
The rapid growth of soft law and complaints about it are, in large part, a
concern of developed countries. Part of it has to do with the deep
dissatisfaction that we feel at the shift of power within formal lawmaking
arenas, in which we are in a numerical minority. We discover that many of
these fora make law we do not like. This law, we insist derisively, is soft.
This may be a valid complaint, but those who are making this soft law also
have a valid complaint. From their perspective, customary law, which we
would consider very hard, is in fact law that is created primarily because of
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international law making were largely resisted by the West.56 Secondly,
alongside the emergence of new states, there has also been a
proliferation of international organizations, non-governmental
organizations, and other non-state actors, most of them playing
significant roles in influencing international lawmaking." As Toope has
commented:
... the latter part of the twentieth century has been marked by the
emergence of a wider variety of actors seeking to shape the evolution of
international law. It may now be safely argued that international
organizations, international non-governmental organizations, groups
claiming self-determination, individuals, and even "epistemic
communities" shape international law through their influence within
institutionalized processes of discussion.... 
the great power that we in the industrial world exercise over others. There
are really two sides to the controversy over soft law. It is important when we
criticize it, to appreciate that there are others on the other side of the mirror
who are looking at it quite differently.
See W. Michael Reisman, A Hard Look at Soft Law, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of
American Society of International Law, (Apr. 20-23, 1988), in A.S.I.L. PROC. at 377.
56. The most prominent example of this was the developing country argument that
resolutions and declarations of the United Nations General Assembly are potentially
creative of international law. It was in pursuance of this argument that the instruments
of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) were said to lay down new customary
rules. These instruments were the United Nations Declaration on a New International
Economic Order, the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, and the
Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources. Together, they were also
argued to have laid the foundation for the customary law right to development. These
arguments were strongly opposed, and ultimately muted by most western countries, who
clung to the traditional conception of international prescription laid down in Article 38 of
the ICJ Statute.
57. Stephen J. Toope, Redefining Norms for the 21' Century, in CAN. COUNCIL ON
INT'L L. PROC. 191, 197 (1995). The work of the United Nations and its Specialised
Agencies, and that of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) in
the environmental field could be cited as examples. The IUCN not only influences the
international agenda for environmental lawmaking, it has on several occasions, either
solely, or with other organisations, provided soft law instruments and draft treaties for
negotiation by states. Examples include the 1980 World Conservation Strategy, which
was revised and renamed in 1991 as Caring for the Earth: A Strategy for Sustainable
Living. It prepared an Earth Charter that was intended for, but not adopted by the 1992
UNCED Conference. Either singly, or in collaboration with other organizations, the
IUCN worked on the following treaties: the 1971 Convention on Wetlands of International
Significance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat (RAMSAR), the 1972 World Heritage
Convention, the 1973 CITES Convention, the 1979 Migratory Birds Convention, and the
1992 Biodiversity Convention. The Global Coalition for Africa provides a similar forum
for international discourse on issues of development facing Africa. On the role of non-state
actors in international economic governance, See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Governing the
Global Economy through Government Networks, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 177-205
(Michael Byers, ed., 1999).
58. Toope, supra note 57, at 197; See Peter M. Haas, Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic
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Handl also supports the view that states no longer enjoy exclusive
competence in international lawmaking, "[a] statist view of
international law.., is difficult to reconcile with a multitude of
nonstate transnational actors who, as a sophisticated legal process
analysis would show, now have had a significant impact on
international law."59
Having said the above, the inadequacies of Article 38 need not
delay us further. This paper has a more limited objective than a
deconstructionist attack on traditional sources doctrine. Other scholars
have ably done that, and the interested reader may refer to them.
60
Since the principal argument of this paper is that the conclusion of the
Anti-corruption Principles marks the beginning of the process of
formation of a regional customary law on corruption, I will focus on the
requirements for a rule of customary international law to exist.
Under subparagraph 1 (b) of Article 38, custom must be evidenced
in a "general practice accepted as law."6 ' Thus, two elements must be
present in order for a rule of law to qualify as one of customary law:
there must be general state practice, together with a conviction on the
part of states that such practice is required by law - the opiniojuris sive
necessitatis.62 It is the latter element that distinguishes legally relevant
custom from mere habit, usage, social practice, or public policy.6 In
other words, opinio juris is what confers on state practice what Toope
has called a distinct "concept of legal normativity."' In the Asylum
Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control, 43 INT'L ORGANIZATION 3, 377-403
(1989); See also Peter M. Haas, Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community
Efforts to Protect the Stratospheric Ozone, 46 INT'L ORGANIZATION 1, 187-224 (1992)
(discussing the role of epistemic communities in international environmental lawmaking).
59. Gunther F. Handl, A Hard Look at Soft Law, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of
the American Society of International Law (Apr. 20-23, 1988), in A.S.I.L. PROC. at 373;
See also K-C. Wellens & G.M. Borchardt, Soft Law in European Community Law, 14
EUR.L.REv. 267 (1989).
60. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (1989); PHILIP ALLOTr, EUNOMIA: NEW ORDER FOR A
NEW WORLD 298 (1990); See also Philip Allott, Language, Method and the Nature of
International Law, 1971 BRIT.Y.B.IN'L L 79; See also Toope, supra note 57.
61. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 52.
62. MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 130 (1999) [hereinafter BYERS]; See also
WOLFKE, supra note 54, at 41-45.
63. ROBERT JENNINGS & ARTHUR WATTS, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, 27 (9h
ed. 1993). They draw the following distinction:
"A custom is a clear and continuous habit of doing certain actions which has
grown up under the aegis of the conviction that these actions are, according
to international law, obligatory or right. On the other hand, a usage is a
habit of doing certain actions which has grown up without there being the
conviction that these actions are, according to international law, obligatory
or right." Id.
64. See Toope, supra note 57, at 195.
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Case, the International Court of Justice described the requirements of
custom as "a constant and uniform usage, accepted as law."65 These
requirements have now been accepted as applicable to general customs
as well.'
Similarly, in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the Court, in
considering whether State practice since the conclusion of the 1958
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, had been such as to
amount to a new rule of customary international law said:
Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they
must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of
a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a
rule of law requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e. the existence of
a subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris
sive necessitatis. The States concerned must therefore feel that they
are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation. The frequency,
or even habitual character of the acts is not in itself enough. There are
many international acts, e.g. in the field of ceremonial and protocol,
which are performed almost invariably, but which are motivated only
by considerations of courtesy, convenience or tradition, and not by any
sense of legal duty.
6 7
The two-pronged requirement has been eloquently referred to as
the "bipartite conception of customary international law."6 Several
writers have criticized this bipartite conception. Byers refers to it as a
"chronological paradox" requiring that when states create new
customary rules, their acts must be based on a prior belief that those
rules already exist. 69  In his view, this conception would make it
impossible for new customary rules to develop.0 Wolfke calls it a
"reverse sequence," arguing that "one cannot accept what does not yet
exist."7' She points out that the element of acceptance does not
necessarily have to come after the practice; the two could, and do often
happen simultaneously."2 For Akehurst, the traditional approach seems
to require that states must believe that something is "already law
before it can become law."13 In the words of D'Amato, "if we can say that
a state is acting in accordance with its conviction that it is acting in
conformity with prevailing international law, then by implication we
65. See Asylum, supra note 8 and accompanying text.
66. ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 233
(1971) [hereinafter CONCEPT OF CUSTOM].
67. North Sea Continental Shelf (Austl. v. Fr., N.Z. v. Fr.) 1969 I.C.J. 3, 35 (Feb. 20).
68. See BYERS, supra note 62, at 130.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 131.
71. See WOLFKE, supra note 54, at 64.
72. See WOLFKE, supra note 54, at 64.
73. Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 1974-75 BRIT.Y.B.
INT'L L. 32 (emphasis added).
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already know what that international law is ... if we know the law,
then there is no further need to cite the "evidence" of the state's actual
practice in conformity with that law."74 In addition to the sequencing
problem, subparagraph 1(b) also turns the order of things on its head,
for it is practice that is evidence of custom, and not the other way
round.
While there seems to be an agreement on the state practice and
opinio juris as constitutive elements of customary international law,
there is little consensus on the character of each element. At one end of
the spectrum are a group of scholars who argue that only the positive
acts of States count as state practice, and not their statements, claims,
or other verbal postulates.75 At the other end, are those who adhere to a
broader conception of state practice to include not only positive acts, but
also failures to act, statements, treaty ratifications, negotiating
positions as evidenced in travaux prdparatoires, votes for or against
resolutions, and declarations in international fora.76  Both the
International Court of Justice and the International Law Commission
seem to support this more inclusive view of state practice."
A middle ground could also be identified. According to Byers, the
inclusive conceptualization of state practice to include both acts and
statements would make it difficult to determine whether the
psychological element of custom exists in any given situation.78 From
74. See D'AMATO, supra note 66, at 73.
75. The leading proponent of this theory of state practice is Anthony D'Amato. In
1971, D'Amato wrote inter alia, that:
... in their disputes with their counterparts, national decision-makers
manifest a preference for having their acts cited against them rather than
their prior statements or expressions of will. For a State may say many
things; it speaks with many voices... But a State can act in only one way at
one time, and its unique actions, recorded in history, speak eloquently and
decisively."
D'AMATO, supra note 66, at 51. For other adherents to this restrictive view of state
practice, see WOLFKE, supra note 54; See also Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries, 1951 I.C.J. 3,
199 (Dec. 18) (J. Read).
76. See Akehurst, supra note 73, at 10; See also Ian Brownlie, Comparative
Approaches to the Theory of International Law, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of
American Society of International Law (Apr. 9-10, 1986), in A.S.I.L. PROC. at 154, 156
(where he implicitly refers to D'Amato and Wolfke's view as "Rambo" superpositivism,
and noting that they are in a minority on the issue).
77. In the Asylum Case, the Court relied both on 'official views' (statements) and
treaty ratifications (acts) in coming to a conclusion whether the alleged rule of customary
law existed. In the Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (Fr. v.
U.S.), 1952 I.C.J. 200 (Aug. 27), the Court relied on diplomatic correspondence as evidence
of state practice. The International Law Commission's (ILC) position is that treaties,
decisions of international and national tribunals, national laws, diplomatic
correspondence, and the opinions of national legal advisers are all possible forms of State
practice. See [1950] 2 Y.B. Int'l L.Comm'n 368-372.
78. See BYERS, supra note 62, at 136.
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the perspective of the "inclusionists," the only evidence of opinio juris
available will, at the same time, be State practice, despite the
requirement of a separate psychological element to distinguish legally
relevant from irrelevant State practice.79 The result, in Byers' view, is
"an epistemological circle, which renders one or the other element of
customary international law redundant."0  It is to avoid this
epistemological circle that he suggests a different conception of opinio
juris as a shared understanding among states about the legal relevance
or irrelevance of state practice."1
With the possible exception of the New Haven School and the work
of Thomas Franck, many early scholars relied on opinio juris to
distinguish legally relevant from irrelevant specific rules.2 On the
other hand, Byers focused on the process of customary law formation.83
As process, Byers argues that customary law involves a "collective
knowledge" or a set of shared understandings." Viewed from that
perspective, "opiniojuris may then be understood as being those shared
understandings which enable States to distinguish between legally
relevant and legally irrelevant State practice."85
79. See BYERS, supra note 62, at 136.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 148.
82. Propounded by Harold Lasswell and M.S. McDougal, and developed by W. M.
Reisman and his associates, the New Haven School is also process oriented. They view
international lawmaking as a constitutive process of international decision involving the
communication of three messages: 'policy content' (the prescription), 'authority signal'
(basis of legitimacy to prescribe), and 'control intention' (the power to enforce or make
effective). The New Haven School recognizes that lawmaking involves the interaction of
states and non-state actors. See Myres S. McDougal et al., The World Constitutive Process
of International Decision, 19 J. LEGAL EDUC. 253 (1966-67); Myres S. McDougal and W.
Michael Reisman, The Prescribing Function in World Constitutive Process: How
International Law is Made, (1980) Yale Studies in Public Order, 249; see W. Michael
Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, Address at the Annual
Meeting of American Society of International Law (Apr. 24, 1981), in A.S.I.L. PROCS., at
101; see also W. Michael Reisman, The View from the New Haven School of International
Law, (Apr. 2, 1992), in A.S.I.L. PROC., at 118. Thomas Franck also distinguishes between
substantive and procedural fairness in international law, arguing that the latter is
determined by meeting the requirements of process legitimacy, which, according to him,
are determinacy, symbolic validation, coherence and adherence. See Franck supra note 7.
83. See BYERS, supra note 62, at 148.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 150. Byers makes the following compelling critique of the traditional
position on opiniojuris:
Opiniojuris, when defined in terms of a belief on the part of States that they
are acting in accordance with pre-existing or simultaneously developing legal
rules, does not seem particularly helpful, either as a practical tool for
determining the existence of customary rules, or as an explanation of how
those rules arise. In contrast, shared understandings appear to be most
significant in the domain of the process of law creation rather than at the
level of individual rules. It is the process of customary international law
which best represents the conjunction of behavioral regularities and
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Byers' use of shared understandings to discuss the emergence of
opiniojuris is both novel and insightful. However, he largely leaves the
reader to speculate on how such understandings come into existence.
This may in part be explicable on the basis of his reliance on three
realist assumptions about international relations: (1) that states are the
predominant actors at the international level; (2) that consent is the
only basis upon which states can be bound by rules of international law;
and, (3) that states act more or less out of self-interest which they
promote through applications of power.86 This emphasis on statism and
on consent as the basis of state obligation is the evidence of positive law
thinking on Byers' work. His invocation of shared understandings
differs from their use by constructivist international relations scholars
for whom shared understandings emerge from practical reasoning and
the use of rhetoric among states and other international actors in the
course of international relations. The concept goes back to the
Aristotelian notion of topoi (commonplaces), which serve as seats of
argument for the development of further norms.
A process approach to the problem of customary international law
is both attractive and useful. For present purposes, it enables the
analysis to proceed without having to determine whether particular
acts or statements should be considered as state practice, whether a
rule must be expressly claimed to be of a norm-creating character, or
that it must be articulated as such in order to qualify as a rule of
customary law.8  Rather than focusing on the legal status of specific
rules, the analysis proceeds from the point of view of the process of
customary law formation. As it is argued in detail later, both the
legitimacy and influence of legal rules are significantly conditioned by
the processes through which they come into existence. 89
convergent expectations. BYERS, supra note 62, at 150.
86. Id. at 13-14.
87. FRIEDRICH V. KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS AND DECISIONS: ON THE CONDITIONS
OF PRACTICAL AND LEGAL REASONING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DOMESTIC
AFFAIRS 39 (1989) (discussion on shared understandings and their historical connection to
Aristotle); See also infra text accompanying note 116.
88. On the concept of articulation, see D'AMATO, supra note 66, at 73-82. According to
his theory, for a putative rule to qualify as customary norm, every act must be backed up
by an 'articulation" of international legality. Thus, articulation is the psychological
element that qualifies specific instances of state practice as customary law. This theory
while elegant, has limitations, the most obvious being that rules of customary law often
develop without any express ascription of legality to them. In other words, opinio juris
need not be express, it could take the form of a latent or underlying consensus.
89. See supra note 26.
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A Note on State Practice'
There is large and growing evidence of state practice in support of
anti-corruption measures in Africa. Some of these measures go back to
the period immediately following decolonization, and form a part of the
newly independent states' efforts to set their economies on the path to
growth. A review of domestic anti-corruption measures reveals two
main legal strategies. First, many countries have enacted specific anti-
corruption legislation that typically provides for the establishment of a
governmental agency with powers of investigation, prevention and
prosecution of corruption. 91 Provision is also made for declarations of
assets and business interests by political leaders and other public
servants, as well as issues of self-dealing and conflicts of interest.9 For
example, the Kenyan law not only set up the Anti-Corruption Authority
with powers of investigation and prosecution, but also provided for
security of tenure and freedom of political interference for the head of
the Authority."
Secondly, other countries have included anti-corruption provisions
in their national constitutions. The 1992 Constitution of Ghana
probably represents the most comprehensive approach." The
Constitution requires the State to "take steps to eradicate corrupt
practices and the abuse of power."95 All public servants must declare
their assets and liabilities to the Auditor-General upon their
appointment, to update such declarations every four years, and at the
end of their term of office.' Such declarations are admissible evidence
before a court of law or other tribunal. Any property contained in the
declaration that is not attributable to a legitimate source, is presumed
90. This section is based extensively on W. PAATI OFOSU-AMAAH ET AL, see supra note
10.
91. See Kenya's Prevention of Corruption Act 1965 (established the Anti-Corruption
Agency); Uganda's Leadership Code (Act No.8) of 1991; Tanzania's Public Leadership
Code of Ethics (No. 13) of 1995; See also Mozambique's Ethics Law 1998.
92. See Constitution of the Federal Government of Nigeria, Schedule 5, Part 1,(1999), at http://nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm (which
provides a code of conduct for public officers). Under the code, officers are prohibited from
placing themselves in a position where their personal interests would conflict with their
official duties or responsibilities; several senior public servants including the President
and his Cabinet, Commissioners of State governments, and members of the National
Assembly, are prohibited from holding external bank accounts; public servants are
prohibited from receiving gifts in the course of their duties, except where they can prove
that such gifts were of a customary nature, given on special occasions. Moreover, sections
149, 152, and 185 of the Constitution require various government officials to declare their
assets before assuming office).
93. W. PAATI OFOSU-AMAAH ET AL, supra note 10, at 44.
94. Constitution of the Fourth Republic of Ghana (1992), available at
http'/www.ghanareview.com/Gconst.html.
95. Id. at art. 35.8.
96. Id. at art. 286(1).
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to be acquired in contravention of the constitution." Finally, Chapter
24 of the Constitution provides a comprehensive code of conduct for
public officials in Ghana.98
Constitutionally guaranteed anti-corruption provisions can also be
found in the 1995 Constitution of Uganda which utilizes the concept of
trusteeship as the basis of the relationship between public officials and
the general public." Thus, public officers are accountable to the people
for the discharge of their official functions, and the State shall take "all
lawful measures.., to expose, combat, and eradicate corruption and
abuse or misuse of power" by public officials."®
The common feature of these anti-corruption drives is the
establishment of specific institutions to deal with corruption at the
domestic level.'0 ' On a less positive note, what is also common among
most of them is that the laws and institutions have not succeeded in
eradicating, or in some cases even reducing, corruption in public office.
While both Uganda and Botswana are hailed as African success stories
in the fight against corruption'N and General Obasanjo's second rule in
Nigeria have been credited with making progress in a society where
corruption has been historically endemic,0 3 African countries have little
else to show for their fight against corruption. The most recent
97. Constitution of the Fourth Republic of Ghana (1992), supra note 94, at art. 286(4).
98. See W. PAATI OFOSU-AMAAH ET AL, supra note 10, at 12. They cite Article 284 (on
general conflicts of interest), and 286 (5) prohibiting officials of public corporations or
authorities from serving as Chairmen of the Governing Boards of such bodies. The
provision applies to the President and all Members of Cabinet and Parliament, the
Speaker and his Deputy, the Chief Justice and Judges of the Superior Court of
Judicature, Ambassadors, and other senior civil servants. For a full listing, see
Constitution of Ghana, supra note 94, at art. 286(5); See also W. PAATI OFOSU-AMAAH, ET
AL, supra note 10, at 88-89.
99. Constitution of Uganda, Article XXVI (1995), at http://www.government.go.ug/
constitution (last visited Feb. 8, 2002).
100. Id. at art. XXVI (iii); See also W. PAATI OFOSU AMAAH ET AL, supra note 10, at 12.
101. Kenya established her Anti-Corruption Authority since 1965; in Tanzania the
Prevention of Corruption Act (1993) made provision for the establishment of the
Prevention of Corruption Bureau; in Ghana the Serious Fraud Office Act (1993)
established the Serious Fraud Office; in Botswana the Corruption and Economic Crime
Act set up the Directorate of Corruption and Economic Crime; and in Malawi, the Corrupt
Practices Act (1995) also established the Anti-Corruption Bureau.
102. GCA, supra note 10, at 21-22.
103. Tunku Abdul Aziz, Vice Chairman of Transparency International, Speaking in
Malaysia, June 2001:
Relief from the IMF and increases in aid funding are evidence that the poor
ranking of Nigeria in the CPI is recognized internationally as an inheritance
that cannot be overturned in the space of one or two years. The Nigerian
administration has also made great strides in its quest to recover funds
looted by the late dictator Sani Abacha.
Press Release, Transparency International, The Corruption Perceptions Index 2001
Ranks 91 Countries 2-3 (June 27, 2001), available at
http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2001/cpi200l.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2002).
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evidence of this can be found in Transparency International's
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) for 2001, which revealed that five of
the ten countries perceived as being the most corrupt in the world, can
be found in Sub-Saharan Africa including some of the apparent success
stories. 'T While the CPI may not be the most accurate measure of
corruption, (for example it does not reflect campaign finance
contributions) it does indicate that for developing countries especially
those in Africa, the problem is broader than corruption simpliciter; the
misuse of public trust and confidence that has become characteristic of
African leaders and public sector employees, is in reality a governance
problem that needs to be addressed in a holistic, rather than spectoral
manner.
As I argued in the first part of this paper, legislative and
institutional reform measures alone are insufficient to eradicate
corruption in Africa. Political leaders, civil servants, the press, civil
society, and the general public all have important and increasingly
complementary roles to play. Apparently, political leadership and
public support were crucial for the relative success of the anti-
corruption efforts in both Botswana and Uganda.'05 Yet, unless
governmental structures are reformed to introduce greater
responsibility and accountability, and the rule of law is entrenched as
the fundamental norm of behavior in African societies, corruption will
continue to eat away at the very fabric of our societies.
Moreover, as African countries become increasingly integrated in
their economies, and into the larger global economy, single-state efforts
to combat what is in effect a global problem, are unlikely to be very
successful. The massive movement of investment capital across
national boundaries means that there are increasing opportunities for
public officials to benefit from corrupt payments. It equally provides an
opportunity for regional and international cooperation to fight
corruption, particularly in international business transactions.
Corruption provides another issue area for which the Westphalian
conception of state sovereignty poses a challenge to the need for
cooperation among states. It requires a merger of sovereignties across
regional and international levels in the common interests of all
countries and people. Arguably it is of common concern to all nations.
10 6
104. See Press Release, supra note 103, at 3-4. Under this year's CPI, Botswana
ranked as Africa's least corrupt country, with Tanzania, Cameroon, Kenya, Uganda, and
Nigeria being perceived as the five most corrupt countries respectively. This year's index
also shows that many of the 55 countries that scored less than 5 were also among the
poorest in the world. The CPI measures perceived public sector corruption i.e., among
public officials and politicians. Countries are allocated a score ranging from 10 to 0, the
higher score indicating the least degree of perceived corruption.
105. See GCA, supra note 10, at 22-23.
106. The principle of 'common concern of humanity' came in as a counterpoise to 'state
sovereignty' on the basis of which international society was organized since the Peace of
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For these reasons, it is my suggestion that in addition to the
consensus reflected in the Anti-corruption principles, an African
Convention on Corruption could provide the legal basis for regional
cooperation to combat corruption within the continent, as well as serve
as a mechanism for cooperative efforts with other regions of the world.
Such regional and international cooperation is consistent with the
global nature of the corruption problem.
BEYOND CUSTOM: TOWARD HORIZONTAL PROCESSES OF NORMATIVE
DEVELOPMENT
Adopting a process approach to the development of the
international legal norms, it is my argument that customary norms
emerge from the interaction of States in the international society, and
between States and non-state actors like international organizations,
non-governmental organizations, and even individuals. 7 The distinct
features of this interactive approach are, first, a multiplicity of actors
participating in the process of norm generation alongside states.0 8
Westphalia in 1648. It recognizes that even though states are sovereign and equal and
enjoy exclusive competence over matters within their territorial jurisdiction, there are
certain matters for which the whole international community has an interest in
preserving. In their advisory opinion in Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd.
(Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, the International Court of Justice placed international laws
prohibiting aggression, genocide, slavery, and racial discrimination among the category of
obligations that were owed to the international community as a whole - they are erga
omnes obligations. More recently, the common concern principle has been most commonly
invoked in the field of environmental protection. The 1992 Biodiversity and Climate
Change Conventions both provide that the preservation of the world's biodiversity as well
as protection of the world's climate system, are common concerns of humanity. See
Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M 818, 822 (preamble); see also
Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849, 851 (preamble);
see Gabcikovo-Nagymaros (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25) (the International
Court cited with approval the view of the International Law Commission that
safeguarding the earth's ecological balance is an essential interest of all states). For
commentary on the principle of the common concern, see ALEXANDRE C. KISS & DINAH
SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw, 22-24 & 250-254 (2d ed. 2000).
107. This explanation of the customary process is in some respects analogous to that of
the New Haven School referred to above, supra note 82. The New Haven School
recognizes that states are no longer the exclusive participants in international
lawmaking, which includes "participants formally endowed with decision competence...
and all those other actors who, though not endowed with formal decision competence, may
nonetheless play important roles in influencing decisions." Thus it is from the interaction
of these multiple participants, that international law emerges. See supra note 82.
108. See Toope, supra note 57, at 197:
... the latter part of the twentieth century has been marked by the
emergence of a wider variety of actors seeking to shape the evolution of
international law. It may now be safely argued that international
organizations, international non-governmental organizations, groups
claiming self-determination, individuals, and even 'epistemic communities'
shape international law through their influence within institutionalized
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Second, international legal norms emerge from a variety of fora of
interaction (both formal and informal), in contrast to the hierarchical
structures of courts, legislatures and executives within the domestic
sphere.1" Third, law emerges from processes of institutional discourse,
what Brunn6e and Toope call "institutionally shaped rhetorical
practices, and acceptances of reasoned argument."11 An interactional
explanation of normative development reveals that there exists a large
body of international legal norms for which compliance is not explicable
on the basis of the existence of a sanction or other coercive force.
Consistent with the horizontal nature of international society, and the
dearth of centralized decision-structures on the domestic law model,
alternative explanations must be sought for the persuasive power of
such legal norms.
Inspired by the work of Lon Fuller, Brunn~e and Toope argue that
the influence of legal norms is a function of their perceived legitimacy.'
Legitimacy in turn is induced by adherence to an "internal morality" of
rules, and to weak tests of "external morality."" In proposing an
interactional theory of international law, they emphasize key elements
of normative development at the international level. First is the
mutually generative character of international legal norms, i.e. the
involvement of an array of state and non-state actors in the
processes of discussion....
109. See McDougal & Reisman, supra note 82, at 26. "The situations of interaction
and communication are both official and non-official, organized and unorganized. The
organized situations include familiar diplomatic, parliamentary diplomatic,
parliamentary, adjudicative, and executive arenas and all situations are characterized by
differing degrees of institutionalization, temporal duration, geographic range, and
expectations of crisis." See also Reisman, supra note 82, at 122.
110. Jutta Brunnee & Stephen J. Toope, International Law and Constructivism:
Elements of an Interactional Theory of International Law, 39 COLuIM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 19,
51 (2000) [hereinafter "International Law and Constructivism"].
111. Brunnee & Toope, Supra note 110, at 51-52 ("Law is "authoritative", but only
when it is mutually constructed and, for that reason, legitimate").
112. The concepts of internal and external morality come from Fuller. He laid down
eight tests of internal morality applicable to both individual rules and legal systems.
They are generality, promulgation, non-retroactivity, clarity, non-contradiction,
possibility, constancy over time, and congruence of official action with underlying rules.
There is no requirement that all these tests must be present in conjunction in order to
meet the requirement of legitimacy. While the tests of internal morality relate to the
manner of bringing rules into existence, and to their application ( i.e. processes), external
morality relates to the substantive ends that law seeks to achieve, for example fairness,
equality and justice. Fuller also seems to imply that legality is primarily a function of
internal morality, i.e. that the pursuit of substantive outcomes would only make sense
once the existence of law is ascertained through adherence to internal morality. In view
of the pervasive interaction of ends and means implicit in interactionist thought, law that
adheres to internal morality would invariably also meet the requirements of external
morality. The upshot is that the tests of legality remain primarily those of internal
morality. The foregoing is based on the reading of Fuller contained in International Law
and Constructivism, supra note 110, at 54-57.
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development of norms, as well as the mutual construction of actors and
the institutions within which actors socialize.1  This element
distinguishes the interactional model from hierarchical explanations of
international lawmaking. By arguing that law is the product of social
engagement by a multitude of actors in a variety of formal and informal
settings, interactionism provides a more appropriate depiction of
processes of normative development at international law than both
positivism and the policy science approach."4 Interactionism also
provides justification for recognition of the increasing influence of non-
state actors, whether corporations, non-governmental organizations,
issue-oriented groups, epistemic communities, government networks, or
individuals in international lawmaking."'
The second element of the interactional theory is the role of
rhetorical knowledge in generating "behavioral expectations" or "shared
understandings" that serve as seats of argument for the development of
further norms."6  This element recognizes what Fuller calls the
113. See International Law and Constructivism, supra note 110, at 48. It is partly
through this mutual conditioning of actors and structures that interaction is said to affect
not only behavior, but also actor identity. In the process of socialization, actors utilize
rhetorical knowledge as an instrument of persuasion. It is largely through processes of
socialization, and the employment of reasoning by analogy (rhetoric), that shared
understandings emerge from actor interaction. Institutions in which such socialization
takes place, therefore, serve as centers of learning by states and other actors.
114. The "Policy Science approach," more commonly known as the New Haven School
of international law, also recognizes that law emerges from patterns of interaction among
a diversity of actors including those 'formally endowed with decision competence', as well
as those not so endowed, and that there are various sites of normative interaction, both
formal and informal. As is apparent from the foregoing discussion, interactionists share
these same non-hierarchical conceptions of normative development in international law.
However, whereas the New Haven School is instrumentalist in orientation - the pursuit of
human dignity being its ultimate objective- the interactional model does not seek to
promote any particular value system. On the contrary, it calls for the incorporation of
'plural cultural influences' into the evolution of legal norms. On more specific differences
between interactionism and the New Haven School, see International Law and
Constructivism, supra note 110, at 24-25. For a non-exhaustive list of sources on the New
Haven School, see supra note 82. For a critique of the New Haven School, see Phillip 1.
Trimble, International Law, World Order and Critical Legal Studies, 42 STAN. L. REV.
811 (1990); See also Toope, supra note 57.
115. Toope, supra note 57, at 197; On the role of government networks, see Slaughter,
supra note 57.
116. On the notion of law as rhetoric, and of legal reasoning as a particular aspect of
practical reasoning see KRATOCHWIL, supra note 87, at 39. Kratochwil also makes
reference to the Aristotelian concept of 'topos' or 'topoi' (commonplaces) in the context of
practical reasoning. In what he calls a 'discourse on grievances', topoi operate in several
choice situations including instances of both political and legal decision-making. In the
former context, they operate as 'seats of argument', helping to identify starting-points,
and in building consensus. In the context of legal reasoning/argument, rules of procedure
and evidence (juridical topoi) serve as basis for exclusion of facts and items of proof, and
as aids to judicial decision-making. It is worth noting, as Brunnde and Toope did, that
Kratochwil's analysis is limited to the context of judicial lawmaking. Hence, despite his
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'entrepreneurial' character of lawmaking: that is, that the development
of law and legal systems is an ongoing, hence incomplete, project. 117 As
such, legal development straddles along a continuum from the pre-legal
or "contextual" stage to binding normativity."8  Legal principles or
interstitial norms serve as important instruments of change and
development in this continuum."9
The implication of adherence to an internal morality, and
particularly the element of mutual generation, is that by involving a
diverse set of actors in the development of legal norms, actors develop a
sense of ownership of emergent norms. This quality of acceptance in
turn introduces a perception of legitimacy. Rules that are perceived as
legitimate thus exercise a compliance pull of their own. 20
It is here that the interactionist theory meets with the work of
Thomas Franck. In proposing a theory of legitimacy at international
law, Franck posited that legitimacy is "a property of a rule or rule-
making institution which itself exerts a pull towards compliance on
those addressed normatively because those addressed believe that the
rule or institution has come into being or operates in accordance with
generally accepted principles of right process.""' The elements of this
express disavowal of legal positivism, the structure of his analysis shows a strong
positivistic underpinning. See also Friedrich V. Kratochwil, How Do Norms Matter?, in
THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 35 (Michael Byers ed., 1999). See also Toope, supra note 57, and
accompanying text.
117. See International Law and Constructivism, supra note 110, at 45-57; contra
Vaughan Lowe, The Politics of Law-Making: Are the Method and Character of Norm
Generation Changing?, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW at 209 (Michael Byers ed., 1999),
[hereinafter Politics], arguing that the international legal system is 'practically complete'.
See also FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 7, at 4-6,
arguing that international law has entered a post-ontological era, a mature and complex
legal system that provides for all types of relationships and interactions at the
international level. I suppose that both Lowe and Franck would not deny that despite its
practical completeness and maturity, international law remains an evolving phenomenon.
118. Jutta Brunnee & Stephen J. Toope, Environmental Security and Freshwater
Resources: Ecosystem Regime Building, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 26 (1997) (explaining regime
evolution as a continuum from the pre-legal or "contextual" stage, to binding normativity).
119. On the role of interstitial norms as agents of change and development in
international law, see Vaughan Lowe, Sustainable Development and Unsustainable
Arguments, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: PAST
ACHIEVEMENTS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES 19-37 (Alan Boyle & David Freestone eds.,
1999); See also Politics, supra note 117, at 207-226. Lowe's argument however limits the
role of interstitial norms to the context of judicial decision-making, arguing that the
principle of sustainable development operates in the context of judicial decision to
reconcile the operation of primary norms where the latter are likely to conflict in their
application. This restriction to judicial decision, is evidence of positive law influence on
Lowe's thesis.
120. See THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS, supra note 7, at 16.
121. Id.
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process legitimacy are determinacy, symbolic validation, coherence, and
adherence."' These elements generally merge into the interactionist
tests of internal morality.m However, whereas for Franck, legitimacy is
an attribute of right process, tests of internal morality as propounded
by Fuller and applied by the interactionists, "are genuinely moral, not
mere desiderata of coherence or logical soundness."12" Thus for the
interactionists, law's ends and means stand in a relationship of
"pervasive interaction." Mutual generation, as a process value,
introduces greater acceptance of norms by participants in the process of
normative generation, and increases their commitment to substantive
outcomes." In effect, for both Franck and the interactionsists, the
method by which norms come into existence has a bearing on their
influence in international society. For the former, norms that meet the
tests of process legitimacy exercise a compliance pull of their own."'
For the latter, when the tests of internal morality are met, norms will
be perceived as legitimate and would attract "their own adherence."127
While not seeking to apply their respective theses, my arguments
are influenced by some elements of both process legitimacy and
interactional theory. In particular, I adhere to the view that inclusive
processes of normative generation have a bearing on the degree of
compliance with, or influence of a norm. I argue that as an
international organization, the GCA provided a forum for
institutionalized discourse and interaction of African governments and
a variety of actors on the issue of corruption in Africa. That discursive
process led to the adoption of the Anti-corruption Principles. The
traditional sources doctrine would categorize the Principles as a non-
binding (soft-law) instrument. Whatever their characterization under
sources doctrine, the adoption of the principles represents the starting-
point on a continuum of normative development that may culminate in
the emergence of a customary law on corruption in Africa, or the
adoption of a regional convention to combat corruption, or both. In
their present form, the Principles could be viewed either as shared
understandings among African governments and other actors involved
in their development, as an emerging opinio juris, or as representing
the pre-legal or contextual stage of normative development in this issue
area.128
122. For an accessible treatment of each of these elements, see FAIRNESS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 7, at 25-46.
123. The only difference appears to be Frank's requirement of "symbolic validation."
See International Law and Constructivism, supra note 110, at 53.
124. See International Law and Constructivism, supra note 110, at 53.
125. International Law and Constructivism, supra note 110
126. See FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 7, at 26.
127. See International Law and Constructivism, supra note 110, at 56.
128. I do not claim that these pre-legal categorizations are always mutually exclusive
or chronological. Michael Byers for example, has suggested that in view of the difficulties
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Hence even in their present state, the Anti-corruption Principles
are not without normative value. They could provide inspiration to
governments to adopt anti-corruption legislation at the domestic level,
provide the basis for negotiation of a regional Convention on Corruption
thus contributing to the progressive development of international law,
serve as an instrument of moral suasion for public officials,
corporations, and international organizations, and a tool in the arsenal
of civil society in providing a check against governmental excess and
the abuse of power.
INCLUSIVE PROCESSES OF NORM BUILDING: NEGOTIATING THE ANTI-
CORRUPTION PRINCIPLES
The African Anti-corruption Principles were the outcome of a
diffuse discursive process that brought together States, international
organizations, non-governmental organizations, the private sector, and
individuals. As part of the preparations for the 1997 GCA Policy
Forum, African Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) met in
Nairobi, Kenya, and adopted a Statement for submission to States
when they meet at the Policy Forum. 29 The NGO Statement recognized
that corruption erodes the moral fabric of society, that it is a violation of
the social and economic rights of people, and undermines
development. 130 It expressly called on African States to co-operate in
the adoption of a regional Anti-corruption Convention, and to take
effective domestic measures to fight against corruption.13' Among the
measures suggested are the establishment of anti-corruption
commissions with power to investigate and prosecute cases of
corruption, the maintenance of judicial independence and adherence to
the rule of law, reform and restructuring of African public services and
improvement of their terms of service, streamlining the role of
inherent in the concept of opiniojuris and to avoid an 'epistemological circle', opiniojuris
should be properly understood as shared understandings which enable states to
distinguish between legally relevant and legally irrelevant state practices. See BYERS,
supra note 62, at 148. Brunne and Toope also suggest that under an interactionist view,
the existence of law should be measured by the influence it exerts, and not by a rule's
provenance from any given hierarchical source. Thus, 'sources of law' could be understood
as shared understandings which could be invoked depending on their adherence to tests
of internal, and to a limited degree, external morality. See International Law and
Constructivism, supra note 110, at 65.
129. See Global Coalition for Africa, GCA Collaboration with the Civil Society, NGOs,
Parliamentarians, the Private Sector and Others, Statement of African NGOs on
Corruption, available at http://www.gca-cma.orgengo.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2002) (the
NGOs met from 23-28 October 1997 in Nairobi, Kenya. The GCA Policy Forum was held
from 1-2 November 1997, in Maputo, Mozambique).
130. Global Coalition for Africa, GCA Collaboration with the Civil Society, NGOs,
Parliamentarians, the Private Sector and Others, Statement of African NGOs on
Corruption, available at httpJ/www.gca-cma.org/engo.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2002)
131. Id.
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government in the economy, and transparency in government
procurement and contracting procedures.1 3'2 The fact that a number of
these recommendations found their way into the Anti-corruption
Principles illustrates the influence the NGO statement had on the
deliberations of the States. 3'
In addition to the separate NGO meeting held in Nairobi, non-state
actors also participated in all GCA Policy Forums that addressed the
issue of corruption. As already indicated, this was the case with the
meetings held in Maputo in 1997, and in Abuja in 2000.134 The Anti-
corruption Principles not only resulted from this diffusive discursive
process, but the involvement of a diverse group of stakeholders in GCA
deliberations has continued to give legitimacy to the principles.
In the Anti-Corruption Principles, African States expressed concern
about the effects of corruption on the social, economic and political
foundations of nations, as well as on their socio-economic development
and poverty alleviation efforts. It was recognized that an effective
anti-corruption strategy would require a combination of domestic
measures, and regional and international collaboration.'36
At the domestic level, several measures are necessary to create an
enabling environment for the fight against corruption. These include
political will and leadership that is itself committed to the ideal of a
corruption-free society, good governance and the institutionalization of
democratic rule,'37 the rule of law and independence of the judiciary,'
civil service reform,"9 as well as re-evaluation of the role of the State in
the economy."4 ° It is only against this background that specific anti-
corruption measures like the establishment of anti-corruption
agencies,' and the enactment of anti-corruption legislation can be
effective.' In addition, governments would need to put in place an
enabling legal and administrative environment that permits input from
non-state actors like NGOs, the free-press, and individuals. For these
reasons, the Anti-corruption Principles make provision for the
participation of the public and of civil society in anti-corruption
132. Global Coalition for Africa, supra note 130.
133. See Principles to Combat Corruption in Africa, supra note 49.
134. See id.
135. Id. at preamble.
136. Id. at principles 13-17, 19-25. See also GCA, supra note 10, at 1.
137. See Principles to Combat Corruption in Africa, supra note 49, at preamble.
138. Id. at principle 17.
139. Id. at principle 6.
140. Principles to Combat Corruption in Africa, supra note 49, at principle 3. See also
the discussion on p. 6 supra, on the continuing relevance of the state in developing
economies, particularly those in Africa.
141. See Principles to Combat Corruption in Africa, supra note 49, at principle 13.
142. Id. at principle 4.
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programs,"' and for rights of access to information about corruption
through, inter alia, protection of press freedom. 1"
The interaction of states and non-state actors in the process of
developing the Anti-corruption Principles exemplifies the contemporary
dynamic that the process of normative evolution in international law is
no longer the exclusive domain of States. When one adopts a conception
of norms that analyses their legitimacy not on the potentiality of
enforcement, but on the inclusiveness of the process of normative
creation, it becomes apparent that a norm generated through broad-
based participation of various international actors commands greater
persuasive power and a greater potential for successful
implementation.1 4 5  According to Brun6e and Toope, "[riules are
persuasive and legal systems are perceived as legitimate when they are
rooted in thick acceptance by the citizenry... Arguably, it is the
inclusive process that characterized the development of the Anti-
corruption Principles that explains their increasing endorsement by
African States.
1 4 7
CONCLUSION
The burden of this paper has been to argue that there is an
emerging normative consensus against corruption among Africa States.
This consensus resulted from a distinctive African discourse on
corruption that took place under the auspices of the Global Coalition for
Africa, with participants drawn from a number of African governments
and non-governmental actors, as well as Africa's development partners.
I argued that the inclusiveness of this discursive process engendered a
perception of legitimacy that in turn explains the increasing popularity
of the Anti-corruption Principles. Arguably, the Anti-Corruption
Principles represent an emerging opiniojuris among African states that
may evolve into rules of customary law. In the alternative, they could
be viewed as shared understandings among African states and other
participants in the discursive process about the corruption issue, or as
the pre-legal or contextual stage of normative development in this issue
area. Whichever way they are characterized, what is important is that
the Principles represent the starting point of a continuum of normative
development. The end point of this continuum may be either the
143. Principles to Combat Corruption in Africa, supra note 49, at principles 15 and
16.
144. Id. at principle 18.
145. See Toope, supra note 57, at 198.
146. See International Law and Constructivism, supra note 110, at 51.
147. It is noteworthy that within a period of three years (1997-2000), the number of
African countries that endorsed the principles increased from eleven to twenty-three. See
Collaboration to Combat Corruption (February 26-7, 2001), available at http://www.gca-
cma.org/ecorrup.htm#0201 (last visited Mar. 19, 2002).
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rules or, the adoption of a treaty as envisaged by the negotiators of the
Principles.
Having said that, it must be emphasized that the adoption of a
regional anti-corruption treaty has obvious advantages for Africa and
should be the objective of regional cooperation in this area. A treaty
will permit the express criminalization of corruption, especially in
international business transactions and development assistance. In
this respect, it could form the basis not only of the international
responsibility of states, but also of personal criminal responsibility of
individuals and corporations. Secondly, a treaty could make provision
for regional and international cooperation in the fight against
corruption. Provisions relating to mutual legal assistance in the
investigation and prosecution of offenders, as well as extradition of
criminals, could all be the subject of an international agreement
between states. Furthermore, a regional treaty could make provision
for confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds of corruption; especially in
situations where such proceeds or their beneficiaries are located in
other jurisdictions. Such treaty provisions would complement the fight
against corruption at the national level. For example, despite its
relative success in fighting corruption locally, the Government of
Botswana has encountered difficulty in corruption cases where the
subject matter of the crime (either the criminal or the funds) is located
outside its borders.
1 4 8
Provisions in an anti-corruption convention could also be a
stimulus for African governments to put in place within their domestic
legal systems, foundational elements of a viable anti-corruption
environment such as provisions for civil society participation, a free
press, an independent judiciary, and the protection of sources of
corruption information. Moreover, the adoption of a treaty will perform
signaling functions to national public officials, international investors,
and the general public that African states have both the political will
and the legal muscle to stamp out corruption in Africa, and thus
contribute to the development an 'anti-corruption sensibility' in the
continent.
148. See GCA, supra note 10, at 22.
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INTRODUCTION
The Arctic marine environment is not pristine, as commonly
imagined, but is facing numerous pressures,' the most serious arguably
coming from outside the region. Melting of sea ice, linked to global
warming, threatens the long-term survival of various species including
polar bears2 and has potential to seriously disrupt ocean currents.3
' This is an expanded version of a chapter published in THE LAW OF THE SEA AND POLAR
MARITIME DELIMITATION AND JURISDICTION (A. Oude Elferink & D. Rothwell eds., 2001).
* Professor, Dalhousie Marine and Environmental Law Programme. Professor
VanderZwaag would like to acknowledge the research support of the Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRCC) in his ongoing research comparing
Canadian and Australian approaches to toxic chemicals management in light of
sustainable development principles and human rights.
-Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary.
Research Assistant, Dalhousie Marine and Environmental Law Programme.
1. For a review of various "internal" environmental pressures, such as offshore oil
and gas developments, disposal of radioactive wastes, increasing shipping traffic and
land-based pollution sources, see WORKING GROUP ON THE PROTECTION OF THE ARCTIC
MARINE ENVIRONMENT, Report to the Third Ministerial Conference on the Protection of the
Arctic Environment, 20-21 March 1996, Inuvik, Canada (1996) [hereinafter PAME 1996
Report].
2. Polar bears seriously may be impacted by loss of feeding areas through reduction
in coastal sea ice. See PAI Prestrud and Ian Stirling, The International Polar Bear
Agreement and the Current Status of Polar Bear Conservation, 20.3 AQUATIC MAMMALS
113, 120 (1994).
3. Higher temperatures and lower salinity of surface waters threaten to slow down
the sinking of cold ocean water which helps to drive global ocean currents; colder climates
in Scandinavia and Northwest Russia might result. See ARCTIC MONITORING AND
ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, Arctic Pollution Issues: A State of the Arctic Environment
Report 12, 161 (1997), available at http://www.amap.no/assess/soaer-cn.htm (last visited
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLYV
Persistent organic pollutants (POPs), including pesticides, industrial
compounds and combustion by-products, are transported via air and
water currents from regions outside the Arctic and become concentrated
in the fatty tissues of animals." The pollutants threaten not only the
well being of wildlife but the health of northern residents heavily
dependent on country foods.5 Heavy metals, such as mercury, lead and
cadmium, coming from various transboundary sources, including fossil
fuel combustion and waste incineration, are also contaminating the
Arctic marine environment.6 Most Arctic bird species are migratory and
during the winter months may accumulate various contaminants from
industrialized locations further south and pass along pollutants to other
Arctic animals when the birds become prey.! Ozone holes over the
Arctic, while smaller in size and of shorter duration than in the
Antarctic, raise concerns with negative effects on marine phytoplankton
production8 and human health effects such as skin cancer.
Given the potentially serious consequences of transboundary
environmental issues in the Arctic, international responses to date
appear sluggish and weak."0  At the regional level, the Arctic
Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), adopted by the eight Arctic-
rim States in 1991," and the subsequent amalgamation of the AEPS
into the work of the Arctic Council, established in 1996,12 have largely
involved studying and talking about environmental problems with little
concrete action."3 Limited responses have been made to hazardous
substance pollution through: the recently concluded global convention
Jan. 4, 2002) [hereinafter ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME].
4. See ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 3, at 72.
5. See id. at 172-173.
6. Id. at 92-109.
7. Only about 10 bird species live in the Arctic throughout the year of the millions of
birds that breed in the Arctic. See KATHLEEN CRANE & JENNIFER LEE GALASsO, ARCTIC
ENVIRONMENTAL ATLAS 16 (1999).
8. See id. at 119.
9. See id. at 180.
10. The regulatory exception is in the area of ozone depletion where countries
through the Montreal Protocol have continued tightening controls over ozone depleting
substances including the phase out of the most damaging substances, such as fifteen
CFCs. A review of the global ozone control efforts is beyond the scope of this chapter. For
a review of the quite successful ozone management regime, see Katya Jestin,
International Efforts to Abate the Depletion of the Ozone Layer, 7 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L.
REV. 829 (1995).
11. See Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, Jan. 14, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1624.
12. See Joint Communique and Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic
Council, Sept. 19, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1382.
13. For a recent critique, see David VanderZwaag, Regionalism and Arctic Marine
Environmental Protection: Drifting Between Blurry Boundaries and Hazy Horizons, in
ORDER FOR THE OCEANS AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY 236 (Davor Vidas & Willy Ostreng
eds., 1999).
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on POPs;'4 the 1998 Convention on the Prior Informed Consent
Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in
International Trade; 5 the United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe (UN ECE) Protocols on POPs and Heavy Metals; The North
American Sound Management of Chemicals Initiative; and the
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the
Northeast Atlantic. 7
A comprehensive inventory of heavy metal pollution sources around
the world has yet to be undertaken and global controls on heavy metals
are non-existent with no global heavy metals negotiations yet proposed
and no global land-based marine pollution convention on the immediate
horizon. 8 Addressing global climate change has been glacial and
complicated with the Kyoto Protocol 9  laden with practical
implementation questions and minimal greenhouse gas reduction
commitments.
This article, in a four-part format, highlights how the present
regional and multilateral legal and institutional responses might be
described as tinkering in light of severe environmental threats facing
the Arctic. The discussion begins with a summary describing how the
Arctic environment might be pictured as "tottering" given the special
14. The Draft Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, agreed to on
December 10, 2000, was adopted by a Conference of Plenipotentiaries in Stockholm,
Sweden May 22-23, 2001. The final text at 40 I.L.M. 532 [hereinafter Stockholm POPs
Convention].
15. See Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous
Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, Sept. 11, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter
Convention on PIC Procedure].
16. See Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution
on Persistent Organic Pollutants, June 24, 1998, 21 INT'L ENVT REPORTER 5001
[hereinafter POPs Protocol]; Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-range
Transboundary Air Pollution on Heavy Metals, June 24, 1998, 21 INT'L ENVT REPORTER
4951 [hereinafter Heavy Metals Protocol].
17. See Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment for the North-East
Atlantic, Sept. 22, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 1069.
18. The "soft" Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine
Environment from Land-Based Activities makes rather general pleas for national and
regional actions on heavy metals and implementation efforts have been constrained by
numerous factors including lack of financing. See David L. VanderZwaag, Peter G. Wells
& John Karau, The Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine
Environment from Land-Based Activities: A Myriad of Sounds, Will the World Listen?, 13
OCEAN YEARBOOK 183 (1998). General estimates do exist on continental contributions of
various heavy metals, for example, Asian countries are thought to be responsible for
almost 50 percent of total mercury emissions. See ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT
PROGRAMME, AMAP REPORT 2000:4, AMAP Report on Issues of Concern: Updated
Information on Human Health, Persistent Organic Pollutants, Radioactivity, and Mercury
in the Arctic, 62-63 (2000) available at http'//www.amap.nool-docspcb-es.pdf (last visited
September 2002).
19. See Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change:
Kyoto Protocol, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22.
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sensitivities and the emerging combined stresses of persistent organic
pollutants, heavy metals, climate change and ozone depletion. This is
followed by an evaluation of the roles of the AEPS and Arctic Council in
responding to environmental threats. The article continues by
critiquing the adequacy of multilateral responses to date including
global efforts to control hazardous substances and climate change, UN
ECE Protocols on POPs and Heavy Metals, and North American and
Northeast Atlantic initiatives. Concluding remarks then suggest future
directions for further action to address transboundary environmental
issues such as the need for a more comprehensive approach to
managing toxic chemicals in light of developing rights, such as the
rights of children and indigenous peoples to a healthy environment, and
the precautionary approach.
THE ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT: TOTTERING
The Arctic environment is especially sensitive. The low levels of
solar energy received in the North encourage natural processes yet the
region's cold temperatures slow rates of photosynthesis and
decomposition. 20 Biodiversity in the region involves short and simple
food chains that have little or no possibility of species substitution.2'
Since Arctic species are naturally under constant stress to survive
within the harsh environment of the North, they are especially
vulnerable to any additional sources of stress, both natural and human
induced.' The combining forces of POPs, heavy metals, ozone depletion
and climate change raise major concerns.
Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs)
Persistent organic pollutants exhibit a combination of particularly
dangerous properties. In particular, "they are toxic; they are persistent
in the environment, resisting normal processes that break down
contaminants; they accumulate in the body fat of people, marine
mammals and other animals and are passed from mother to fetus; and
they can travel great distances. " ' POPs fall into three categories.
20. See S.E. Hobbie, Direct and Indirect Effects of Plant Species on Biogeochemical
Processes in Arctic Ecosystems, in ARCTIC AND ALPINE BIODIVERSITY: PATTERNS, CAUSES
AND ECOSYSTEM CONSEQUENCES 213 (F. Stuart Chapin III & Christian Korner eds.,
1995).
21. For example, the lichen-caribou-human chain in Arctic Canada. See UNITED
NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, Global Environment Outlook 2000, 180 (1999),
available at http'//www.unep.org/geo2000/english/0119.htm (last visited Dec. 8, 2001).
22. See id. at 177.
23. SIERRA CLUB, Toxics: Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants
Signed, Sierra Club Environmental Update (2001), at http/www.sierraclub.org/toxics/
resources/treaty.asp (last visited Dec. 7, 2001).
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Pesticides, among others, include dieldrin, DDT, toxaphene, chlordane
and lindane.24 Industrial compounds include polychlorinated biphenyls
(PCBs), hexachlorobenzene (HCB) and short-chained chlorinated
paraffins.' Combustion by-products include dioxins and furans."6
Since most POPs are not used in the Arctic, it is clear that these
chemicals are transported to the North by long-range pathways.
Research studies have explored the potential of contaminant transport
in drifting ice 27 and species migration,2 including birds. But, the most
prevalent sources of the toxic chemicals found in the North are through
atmospheric and ocean circulation patterns. 29 Air pollution in Russia
and Eastern Europe may be carried across the Arctic Ocean to Alaska
and Canada in only two weeks.0
A recent modeling study of the sources of airborne dioxin in North
America and rates of deposition in the Canadian polar territory of
Nunavut demonstrates how numerous pollution sources may be and
how specific point sources may be identified." This study, carried out
by the Center for the Biology of Natural Systems, Queens College, City
University of New York on behalf of the North American Commission
for Environmental Cooperation, estimated the amount of dioxin emitted
from each of 44,091 North American sources that is deposited at each of
16 Nunavut receptor sites. 2 The study, noting that the sources include
5,343 individual facilities such as waste incinerators and 38,748 area
sources such as backyard trash burning, found three activities -
municipal waste incinerators, backyard trash burning and cement kilns
burning hazardous wastes - account for two-thirds of the total dioxin
emissions. U.S. sources were estimated to contribute the most dioxin
deposition in Nunavut (70-82 percent depending on receptor) with
Canadian sources contributing 11-25 percent and Mexican sources five
24. SIERRA CLUB, Toxics: Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants
Signed, Sierra Club Environmental Update (2001), at http//www.sierraclub.orgtoxics/
resources/treaty.asp (last visited Dec. 7, 2001).
25. Id.
26. See ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 3, at 74-75.
27. See Edward R. Landa, et al., Transport of'-"Cs and 240 Pu with Ice-rafted Debris
in the Arctic Ocean, 51 ARCTIC 27 (1998).
28. See Goran Ewald, et al., Biotransport of Organic Pollutants to an Island Alaska
Lake by Migrating Sockeye Salmon (Oncorhynchus nerka), 51 ARCTIC 40 (1998).
29. Environment Canada, Toxics, Environment Canada Science and Environment
Bulletin (1997), httpJ/www.ec.gc.ca/science/issues/oct97/toxic.htm (last visited Dec. 8,
2001).
30. Environmental Defense, Large-Scale Pollution Revealed Throughout the Arctic,
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE NEWSLETTER Vol. XXIV, No.5. (1993)
http://www.edf.org/pubs/Newsletter/1993/sep/c-largepoll.html (last visited Dec. 7, 2001).
31. See BARRY COMMONER, ET AL., LONG-RANGE AIR TRANSPORT OF DIOXIN FROM
NORTH AMERICAN SOURCES TO ECOLOGICALLY VULNERABLE RECEPTORS IN NUNAVUT,
ARCTIC CANADA (2000).
32. See id.
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to ten percent.33 The amount of dioxin originating from sources outside
North America was estimated to be between two percent and twenty
percent of the total deposition in Nunavut. 4
The study was also able to identify individual sources and estimate
their deposition contribution. For example, the largest individual
contributors of dioxin deposition at the Coral Harbour receptor were
identified as the following ten facilities: three municipal waste
incinerators in Minnesota, Iowa and Pennsylvania; three cement kilns
burning hazardous wastes in Michigan, Missouri and Nebraska; two
iron sintering plants in Indiana; a secondary copper smelter in Illinois;
and a Canadian municipal waste incinerator in Quebec."
The effects of POPs in the Arctic are not yet fully understood.
Many species at the bottom of Arctic food webs are contaminated and
pollutants are therefore passed on to their predators through
consumption.36  Chemicals proceed through the food web as they
bioaccumulate in the fatty tissues of animals 37 and increase in
concentration "as much as 10-fold from one 'link' to the next".8 Polar
bears, at the top of their food chain,39 are therefore especially
susceptible to the contaminants found in the many species below. Fatty
ringed seals, the polar bear's food of choice, can pass along a significant
amount of concentrated POPs.'0 These chemicals will remain in the
polar bear's fat reserves until they are used during off-season periods of
fasting when the chemicals relocate from the polar bear's fat tissue to
their target organs.4' The same pollutants have been known to effect
animal immune systems, reproduction success and rates of
development.42
Many research projects are currently working to understand and
33. COMMONER, supra note 31, at xi.
34. Id. at x.
35. Id. at 77.
36. See Norman Davis, The Arctic wasteland: a perspective on Arctic pollution 32:182
POLAR RECORD, 237 (1996).
37. See Final Act of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Stockholm Convention
on Persistent Organic Pollutants, supra note 4, at 185.
38. Lisa Mastny, Coming to Terms with the Arctic, 13:1 WORLD WATCH 24, 29 (2000).
39. For example, ice algae - zooplankton - arctic cod - ringed seal - polar bear. See
Greenpeace, Climate Press Release, Polar Bears Threatened by Dramatic Arctic Warming
(Nov. 2, 1998), at http://www.greenpeace.org/pressreleases/arctic1998nov2.html (last
visited Dec. 7, 2001).
40. See Environment Canada, Polar Bears at the Top of POPs, 18 Sci. & ENv'r BULL.
5 (2000), http://www.ec.gc.ca/science/sandemayO0/article4_e.html (last visited Dec. 7,
2001).
41. See ENVIRONMENT CANADA, CANADIAN WILDLIFE SERVICE RESEARCH PROGRAM,
Assessment of Arctic Ecosystem Stress: Trends and Effects of Contaminants in Polar Bears
(1999), at http://www.cws-scf.ec.gc.canwrcnorstrml.htm (last visited Dec. 7, 2001).
42. ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 3, at 72-73.
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assess the effects of pollutants on the Arctic. 3 International efforts
have been directed towards identifying the sources of Arctic
contaminants, their methods of transport to the Arctic, measuring the
levels and charting the spatial and temporal distribution of pollutants
and understanding the effects of toxic chemicals on Arctic wildlife and
human health."
Heavy Metals
While some heavy metals are required by organisms in very small
amounts such as arsenic, copper and zinc,45 three non-essential and
potentially toxic heavy metals are of special concern in the Arctic.
Mercury, cadmium and lead are present in some regions of the Arctic at
levels that may pose risks to the environment and human health.46
Globally, approximately 3,600 tons of mercury are emitted from human
sources per year, primarily from coal-burning, waste incineration and
nonferrous smelting and refining operations.47  Total worldwide
atmospheric emissions of cadmium are estimated to be 9,000 tons per
year with only 1,400 tons coming from natural sources and the primary
human sources being the nonferrous metal industry, waste incineration
and inputs from fossil fuel production. 8  Global lead emissions,
primarily from the burning of leaded gasoline, have reached over
300,000 tons/year 9 and lead concentrations in mothers' blood in
northern populations have been reported to vary from 82.9 to 12.4
micrograms (per liter whole blood).'
43. See THE POLAR ENVIRONMENTAL CENTRE, Eco-TOXIcOLOGY PROGRAMME, at
http:// www.polarenvironment.nol/Polarms.nsfAlleSideDok/E2.6?OpenDocument (last
visited Oct. 3, 200); INDIAN AND NORTHERN AFFAIRS CANADA, Description of the Northern
Contaminants Program (1999), at http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ncp/abt/des _e.html (last
visited Dec. 7, 2001); NORDIC ARCTIC RESEARCH PROGRAMME, Changing Patterns of
Biomagnified Pollutants in the Northern Marine Environment (2001), at
httpJ/thule.oulu.f/narp/pages/projects.htm (last visited Dec. 7, 2001).
44. For a summary of results from AMAP's Human Health Monitoring Program see
ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 3, at 171-186.
45. CRANE & GALASSO, supra note 7, at 95.
46. See ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 3, at 94.
47. CRANE & GALASSO, supra note 7, at 95.
48. Id. at 102.
49. See ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 3, at 97.
However, more recent estimates than the 1983 emissions data used in the 1997 AMAP
Assessment indicate a substantial worldwide emission reduction in lead to about 119, 259
tons/year in 1995. ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, AMAP REPORT
2000:4, supra note 18, at 61-62.
50. The highest level is recorded for Nunavik (Northern Quebec) Canada and the
lowest for Northern Norway but the lead levels, according to AMAP's State of the Arctic
Environment Report, do not pose a significant threat to the health of Arctic people. See
ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 3, at 179.
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Ozone Depletion
Although ozone depletion is more prevalent in the Antarctic, recent
measurements of Arctic ozone have revealed notable reductions in
ozone levels.51 A large-scale research project52 was launched to measure
ozone and other atmospheric gases in the Arctic during the 1999/2000
winter and observations indicated that ozone levels were 60% less than
usual, the greatest amount of Arctic ozone loss to date.0
Little is known about the potential effects of increased UV-B
radiation on Arctic plants and animals. The United Nations
Environment Programme has predicted that, ... Arctic plants are more
likely to be affected by increased UV-B radiation than plants at lower
latitudes."' Studies concerned with the impacts of UV-B radiation on
the environment have focused on the reaction of animal immune
systems, the damage done to forests and amphibian eggs, the
sensitivity of plants and fish and the possibility of decreasing yields in
specific crops and commercial tree species. Perhaps more relevant to
the Arctic ecosystem are those studies that indicate the vulnerability of
phytoplankton and zooplankton to intense UV-B radiation.55
Although the Montreal Protocol of 1987 was implemented in an
international effort to phase-out the use of ozone-depleting chemicals to
restore the ozone layer, the reparation of the ozone layer will likely be
delayed. According to NASA climate models, Arctic ozone depletion will
continue to worsen, with the possibility of peak losses occurring
between 2010 and 2019.5 "Based on the maximum predicted emissions
of ozone-depleting chemicals allowed under the Montreal Protocol, it
51. During March of 1996, ozone values in the high Arctic were as much as 30%
below normal while a decrease of as much as 45% was measured in March of 1997. See
ANGUS FERGUSSON & DAVID I. WARDLE, ARcTIc OZONE: THE SENSITIVITY OF THE OZONE
LAYER TO CHEMICAL DEPLETION AND CLIMATE CHANGE 3 (1998).
52. NASA-sponsored SAGE III Ozone Loss and Validation Experiment (SOLVE)
conducted jointly with the European Commission-sponsored Third European
Stratospheric Experiment on Ozone (THESEO 2000). See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Press
Release, Ozone Loss of European Arctic: EU and US join forces in the biggest field study
yet. (Nov. 18, 1999), at http://europa.eu.int/conun/researcldpress/1999/prl8llen.html (last
visited Nov. 6, 2001).
53. See NASA, News Release 00-36, NASA-European Campaign Observes Significant
Arctic Ozone Loss (Apr. 5, 2000), at http://trc.dfrc.nasa.gov/EAO/PressReleases/2000/00-
36.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2001).
54. UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, Global Environment Outlook 2000,
supra note 21, at 185.
55. See UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, Environmental Effects of Ozone
Depletion: 1998 Assessment (1998).
56. See FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, Fact Sheet, Re-ignite the Effort: Halon Recovery to
Protect the Earth's Ozone Layer (1999), at http://www.foe.org/ptp/atmosphere/halons/
page3.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2001).
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will be at least the year 2050 before the ozone layer recovers."57
Climate Change
Climate change and its effects in the Arctic may be the most
serious environmental issue threatening the Arctic environment.
Average annual temperatures in the Arctic have increased by
approximately 1C in the last century, approximately double the
increase in global average temperatures.58 This Arctic warming has
contributed to increases in lake temperatures59 , permafrost thawing,
increased stress on plant and animal populations and the melting of
glaciers6' and sea ice.' Research has revealed decreases in both sea ice
extente and cover.'
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in January 2001
released a third assessment report on the scientific basis of climate
change which solidified the link between greenhouse gas emissions and
Arctic environmental effects.6 The report concluded "It is likely that
there has been about a 40% decline in Arctic sea ice thickness during
late summer to early autumn in recent decades and a considerably
slower decline in winter sea ice thickness."6 The Panel, predicting
temperature rises of between 1.4 to 5.8°C over the period from 1990 to
2100 and a global mean sea level rise of .09 to .88 meters, was quite
conclusive as to human activities being the main climate change
culprit:
57. See Robinson Shaw, ENVIRONMENTAL NEWS NETWORK, Press Release, Ozone
Layer Could Heal by 2050 (Dec. 4, 1999), at http://www.enn.com/enn-news-
archive/1999/12/120499/csiroozone-7907.asp (last visited Nov. 6, 2001).
58. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, Fact Sheet, Early Signs of Global Warming:
Arctic and Antarctic Warming, at http://www.ucsusa.org/warming/gw-arctic.html (last
visited Nov. 7, 2001).
59. See RAINFOREST ACTION NETWORK, Fact Sheet 4A, Rainforests and Global
Warming (1996), at httpJ/www.ran.org/ran/info_center/factsheets/04a.html (last visited
Nov. 7, 2001).
60. See PATRICK MAZZA & RHYS ROTH, GLOBAL WARMING Is HERE: THE SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE (1999), httpi/climatesolutions.orglglobal-warming-is-here/ (last visited Nov. 7,
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In the light of new evidence and taking into account the remaining
uncertainties, most of the observed warming over the last 50 years is
likely to have been due to the increase in greenhouse gas
concentrations.
However, there are still skeptics holding a variety of views
concerning climate change. While some oppose the idea that
temperatures are rising, others concede that global warming is
occurring but question the cause; natural or human induced?" Those
who attribute the Earth's increased surface temperatures to its natural
processes look to the environment as the cause through such
phenomena as Arctic Oscillation,69 El Nifio,7" strong tides 7 ' and
fluctuating solar activity.72
Skeptics also remain unsure of the predictions made by computer
models. Despite the precise numbers and realistic pictures produced,
critics dwell on the assumptions and simplifications used to run the
models.73 These simplifications are necessary since without them there
is not enough data or computing power available to create a computer-
generated climatic simulation.74 Since the expected impacts of global
warming are based largely on the predictions of climate models, the
environmental issues surrounding climate change have been described
as "driven solely by the imagination of a computer.7 5 Since the quality
of output is dependent on the quality of the data used, climate models
are vulnerable to poor data collection 76 and they are also limited by the
amount, scale and type of data available.77  Models often cannot
67. CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING
GROUP I TO THE THIRD ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE (John T. Houghton, et al., eds., 2001) at 6.
68. See W.K Stevens, Global Warming: The Contrarian View, THE N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
29, 2000, at Fl.
69. See Richard A. Kerr, A New Force in High-Latitude Climate, 284 SCI. 241 (1999).
70. See A Heated Controversy. Change and Decay, ECONOMIST, Aug. 15, 1998, at 66.
71. See T. Hesman, It's High Tide for Ice Age Climate Change, 157 Sci. NEWS 246
(2000).
72. See Willie Soon, et al., Environmental Effects of Increased Atmospheric Carbon
Dioxide, 13 CLIMATE RES. 149 (1998).
73. See COOLER HEADS COALITION, Global Warming Information Page Science Article,
Climate Model Uncertainties (2000), at http://www.globalwarming.org/sciup/sci2-25-
00.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2001).
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/climatemodels.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2001).
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incorporate all of the factors that are environmentally important
including cloud characteristics, solar variability, atmospheric
circulation fluctuations, surface albedo changes
78 and land use change. 79
Nevertheless, some scientists are now warning that climate change
could be a leading cause of biodiversity loss.8 ° Entire ecosystems are at
risk as climate change is likely to create conditions that are unsuitable
for species in their natural habitat, which results in considerable threat
for immobile species like vegetation. Entire forests can be lost as well
as the wildlife dependent on them.8 Studies have shown that the
effects of climate change will be felt in all types of environments,
altering terrestrial plant species composition,82 exposing aquatic life to
ultraviolet radiation 83 and making coastal regions more vulnerable to
shoreline erosion."
Various Arctic wildlife populations already have been forced to
adapt to changes in their habitats. Polar bears live on sea ice while
hunting their prey and reductions in sea ice due to warming have
resulted in shorter feeding periods and decreased accessibility to the
seals that they hunt." The Peary caribou of the high Canadian Arctic
suffered a dramatic decrease in population during a period of unusually
warm winters." They were not able to reach the tundra vegetation that
they feed on as it was covered by a layer of crusty snow and ice that
formed as a result of warming. 7 Walrus populations are also suffering
from the retreat of the sea ice and changes in food supply as is evident
by their recently low juvenile survival rates. 8" Killer whales have been
78. S. Fred Singer, Human Contribution to Climate Change Remains Questionable,
80:16 EOS TRANSACTIONS 183 (1999).
79. See COOLER HEADS COALITION, Global Warming Information Page Science Article,
Climate Change Uncertainty Overstated (2000), at
http://www.globalwarming.org/sciup/sci2-1-00.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2001).
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Biodiversity Loss, Environmental Defense Newsletter Vol. XXXI, No. 2 (2000), at
http://www.environmentaldefense.org/pubs/newsletter/2000/Jun/k climat.html (last
visited Nov. 7, 2001).
81. See GREENPEACE, Fact Sheet, Climate Change and the Northern Forests (1998), at
http://www.greenpeace.org/-climate/arctic99/html/content/factsheets/oldreports/forests.ht
ml (last visited Nov. 7, 2001).
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Mar. 30, 2000.
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.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2001).
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reported as feeding on sea otters since their prey of choice, sea lions and
harbor seals, have followed changes in fish migration patterns and
89moved out of the killer whales' habitat range.
REGIONAL TINKERINGS: THE AEPS AND ARCTIC COUNCIL
The Arctic was one of the last areas of the world to develop as a
political region. Prior to World War II, it was seen as a cold and
forbidding area that was sparsely inhabited by "Eskimos."9° Except for
the whaling industry that was over-exploited by the 1930s, it was seen
as an area of little economic or political benefits. The severe nature of
the climate meant that few southerners were willing to take the risk in
traveling to this area. The end of World War II ushered in the
beginning of the Cold War, which fundamentally altered how the Arctic
was viewed. With the invention of nuclear weapons international
relations became frozen. The corresponding development of long-range
bombers and ballistic missiles as delivery systems for these weapons
turned the North into a primary theater of operations.9' Given the
importance that both sides gave to maintaining their strategic nuclear
capabilities, it was not surprising that there was little movement
towards international cooperation in the region.
The endeavor to create an Arctic specific international
arrangement that included all of the Arctic States was not implemented
until the end of the 1980s. This endeavor ultimately led to the creation
of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), which was
then transformed into the Arctic Council.' These regional initiatives
are significant developments in responding to the environmental
problems facing the North, and they also represent important first steps
in the development of regional cooperation. However, there is concern
that these initiators may be incapable of responding to the
environmental problems in the Arctic. The main concern stems from the
fact that these efforts operate on a soft law basis. Both the AEPS and
the Arctic Council are founded on the basis of non-binding documents,
Evidence of Climate Change Impacts in the Arctic (Aug. 5, 1999), at httpJ/greenpeace.orgt
pressreleases/arctic/1999aug5.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2001).
89. See David Suzuki Foundation, Fact Sheet, Climate Change: Imperiled
Ecosystems (1999), at http://www.davidsuzuki.org/campaigns-and.ProgramsClimate-
change/ClimateScience/Climate-Damage/ImperilledEcosystems.asp (last visited Nov. 7,
2001).
90. The term that was used by most southerners in reference to the Inuit.
91. For a good overview of the security problem as it has evolved see NATIONAL
SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION IN THE ARCTIC - THE CASE
OF NORTHERN SEA ROUTE 1-354 (Willy 0streng ed., 1997). Also see Rob Huebert,
Canadian Arctic Security Issues: Transformation in the Post-Cold War Era, 54:2 INT'L J.
203-229 (1999).
92. Alan Saunders, Pondering an Arctic Council, 19:2 N. PERSP. 1 (1991), available at
http://www.carc.org/pubs/vl9no2/1.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2002).
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not a treaty. Was this the best that could be achieved given the varied
interests and capabilities of the northern States or does the lack of
treaty law miss an important opportunity for dealing with the problems
faced by the region? To address this question, it is necessary to
examine how the AEPS and Arctic Council were created and to then
consider what functions they perform.
Creation of AEPS
Limited cooperation in the Arctic began to change when Mikhail
Gorbachev made his Murmansk speech in October 1987. 93 While the
western response to the speech was originally cool, Gorbachev's effort
represented the first step by an Arctic State to further northern
cooperation since the Cold War began. In his speech, Gorbachev called
upon Arctic States to, "set aside their differences and to join in a zone of
peace and fruitful co-operation."" However, since Gorbachev had
defined his Arctic zone of peace to exclude the Soviet naval base of
Murmansk, most leaders of the other Arctic States viewed his proposals
with a large degree of skepticism. Nevertheless, the speech was
significant in that it was the first time in which either an American or
Soviet leader had actually suggested that broad cooperative behavior
might be possible in the Arctic.5 Any doubts that the NATO States
may have harbored were quickly overcome by events in the USSR.
Gorbachev's reforms unleashed forces that soon overtook his
government and saw the breakup of the Soviet empire and the fall of
the Communist government. As these processes occurred, several Arctic
groups and States saw the opportunity to initiate discussions for
cooperative action in the Arctic.
The two most important initiatives are the AEPS and the Arctic
Council.9 To a large degree, the AEPS was the result of the initiative of
the Finnish Government led by Ambassador Esko Rajakoski at the end
of the 1980s.97 He has listed four main reasons why his government
believed that the time had arrived for the conduct of international
discussions regarding environmental problems in the Arctic."
93. See DAVID SCRIVENER, GORBACHEV'S MURMANSK SPEECH: THE SOVIET INITIATIVE
AND WESTERN RESPONSES 1-75 (1989).
94. Pondering an Arctic Council, supra note 92.
95. GORBACHEV'S MURMANSK SPEECH: THE SOVIET INITIATIVE AND WESTERN
RESPONSES, supra note 93 at 1-75.
96. For a discussion into the creation of both see Rob Huebert, New Directions in
Circumpolar Cooperation: Canada, The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, the
Arctic Council and Canada, 5:2 CAN. FOREIGN POL'Y 37-58 (1998); and DAVID SCRIVENER,
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION IN THE ARCTIC: FROM STRATEGY TO COUNCIL 1-35 (1996).
97. Esko Rajakoski, Multilateral Cooperation to Protect the Arctic Environment: The
Finnish Initiative, in THE ARCTIC: CHOICES FOR PEACE AND SECURITY 54-55 (1989).
98. Id.
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Specifically these were: the improved relations between the East and
the West; the lack of existing international legal instruments; the need
to improve scientific research in the Arctic; and, most importantly, the
awareness of the deterioration of the Arctic environment.
Finland initiated negotiations in October 1988 with the other seven
Arctic States." Receiving positive feedback to their initial discussions,
they officially launched a proposal to create a multilateral body on
January 12, 1989.20 Several more meetings were held up to June 1991.
At that time the eight Arctic States - the United States, Russia,
Canada, Finland, Sweden, Iceland, Norway and Denmark for
Greenland - met at Rovaniemi to sign the Declaration on the Protection
of the Arctic Environment and the accompanying Strategy."1 The
Strategy consisted of: a set of objectives and principles;' 1 identification
of six main types of pollutants - persistent organic contaminants, oil
pollution, heavy metals, noise, radioactivity and acidification; 0 3
identification of the existing mechanisms for the protection of the Arctic
environment;" and a section on the actions to be taken to counter the
pollutants.105
An interesting innovation that was associated in the creation of the
AEPS was the inclusion of three northern indigenous organizations to
represent their people. These included the Inuit Circumpolar
Conference (ICC), the Saami Council and the Association of Indigenous
Minorities of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian
Federation (now known as the Russian Association of Indigenous
Peoples of the North)." While they were not accorded completely equal
status to the State members, they were allowed to participate in almost
all of the AEPS discussions and have subsequently been granted the
status of Permanent Participants. 7
Structure of AEPS
The AEPS was created pursuant to "soft international law." 8
Rather than commit to the establishment of an international treaty, the
members of the AEPS would participate in the AEPS activities on a
voluntary basis. To a certain degree, this was the result of the United
99. Rajakoski, supra note 97, at 54-55.
100. Id. at 56.
101. Id.
102. See Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, supra note 11, at 1631-1633.
103. See id. at 1633-1643.
104. See id. at 1644-1649.
105. See id. at 1649-1655.
106. See Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, supra note 11, at 1655-1664.
107. Id.
108. See ORAN YOUNG, CREATING REGIMES: ARCTIC ACCORDS AND INTERNATIONAL
GOVERNANCE, 3 n.7 (1998).
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States' reluctance at the time to participate in any new multilateral
organizations and to enter into any new international financial
commitments. One of the most difficult challenges that the founders of
the AEPS faced was the development of a structure and work plan for
the Strategy.
The plan to implement the Strategy had three main focal points.
First, the commitment was made to continue to meet at the ministerial
level on a regular basis. This was intended to ensure that the AEPS
continued as an ongoing process.' The second commitment was to
involve the indigenous northern peoples in the process in a meaningful
manner." The third commitment was the establishment of working
groups in four areas: Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program
(AMAP); Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME);
Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR); and
Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF)."'
Following the first meeting at Rovaniemi, the second ministerial
meeting was held in Nuuk, Greenland in September 1993.112 Much of
what had been agreed to at the first meeting was reaffirmed. However,
since the 1992 United Nations Conference on the Environment and
Development (UNCED) had been held in Rio," attention was also
turned to the concept of sustainable development. 1 4 This is reflected in
the title of the official declaration, "The Nuuk Declaration on
Environment and Development in the Arctic" as well as in the decision
to create a fifth working group - the Task Force on Sustainable
Development."' It was also decided that there was a need to improve
the involvement of northern indigenous peoples in the process. Even
though the classification as Permanent Participant meant that these
groups were officially included in the deliberations of the AEPS, many
109. See ARCTIC ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION STRATEGY, supra note 11, at 1655-
1664.
110. Id.
111. See id. at 1655-1664.
112. See The Arctic Environment: Second Ministerial Conference, 16 September 1993
- Nuuk, Greenland (1993), httpJ/eppr.arctic-council.org/reports/930916.html (last visited
Dec. 31, 2001).
113. See UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT (1992),
http://www.unep.org/Documents/Default.asp?DocunmentID=78&ArticleID=1l63 (last
visited Dec. 31, 2001).
114. See Nigel Bankes, et al., Toward Sustainable Development in Canada's Arctic:
Policies and International Relations, in CANADA AMONG NATIONS 1993-1994: GLOBAL
JEOPARDY 180 (Fen Osler Hampson & Christopher Maule, eds. 1993).
115. See THE ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT: SECOND MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE, THE NUUK
DECLARATION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE ARCTIC, NUUK, GREENLAND,
SEPTEMBER 1993 3-4 (1993), available at http://www.arctic-council.org/nuuk-report.asp
(last visited Dec. 22, 2001).
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believed that there had not been enough effort dedicated to this action.
In order to provide the three indigenous groups with logistical
assistance, the Government of Denmark and the Greenland home rule
office established the Indigenous Peoples Secretariat in Copenhagen in
1994.116 Its primary task is to act as a coordinating body for the three
indigenous organizations."'
The third ministerial meeting was held in Inuvik, Canada in March
1996.118 To a certain degree, the operating procedure developed at the
last two ministerial meetings was maintained. Consideration had been
given to the elimination of one of the working groups (PAME) but the
ministers decided against this course of action and the four working
groups were maintained. The ministers also directed that the task
force on sustainable development and utilization be transformed into a
working group.
The AEPS and Its Working Groups and Task Force
The most significant contributions of the AEPS in responding to
environmental degradation of the Arctic region have been through the
work of its working groups and task force. For the most part, these
working groups and task force have two main objectives: to determine
the nature and extent of the specific environmental problems; and to
examine options to remedy them through cooperative action.
Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP)
AMAP is the cornerstone of the AEPS. Its primary function is to
determine the levels of anthropogenic pollutants in the Arctic. 119 The
focus of AIVIAP is to build as much as possible on pre-existing programs
to allow for better comparative analysis and to be more cost-effective.
Nevertheless, AMAP has begun to develop programs to fill in gaps that
have been discovered through the monitoring of contaminants. AMAP
published two assessment reports on the state of the Arctic
environment in 1997 and 1998. The first, summary report provided
policymakers with a review of the major findings." The second AMAP
116. THE ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT: SECOND MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE, THE NUUK
DECLARATION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE ARCTIC, NuuK, GREENLAND,
SEPTEMBER 1993 16 (1993), available at http://www.arctic-council.org/nuuk-report.asp
(last visited Dec. 22, 2001).
117. Id.
118. See PAME 1996 Report, supra note 1, at 1.
119. See ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, About AMAP, at
http://www.amap.no/about.htm (last visited Dec. 31, 2001).
120. ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, About AMAP, at
http://www.amap.no/about.htm (last visited Dec. 31, 2001).
121. See ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 3, at 3.
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report was a comprehensive technical and scientifically presented
assessment of all validated data on the status of the Arctic environment
relative to the AMAP mandate. This report was over 850 pages. "
AMAP then developed a new strategic plan covering the years 1998-
2003." At the fourth AEPS ministerial meeting in Alta, June 1997, the
Ministers, "endorsed continuation of [AMAP] activities for monitoring,
data collection, exchange of data on impacts and assessment of the
effects of contaminants and their pathways, increased UV-B radiation
due to stratospheric ozone depletion, and climate change on Arctic
ecosystems." 4 To guide the efforts of the working group, five priorities
were established. These included the continued examination and
assessment of: 1) contaminants levels, trends and effects in human
populations and in the environment; 2) effects due to changes in climate
and UV radiation; 3) source-receptor relationships; 4) human health;
and 5) to provide for the full and complete communication of
information."
Since the release of the State of the Arctic Environment Report, the
main focus of AMAP has been directed to examining the linkage
between human health and Arctic pollutants, 26  and further
examination of specific pollutants such as PCBs. 1
7
Although AMAP has emerged as one of the most important
international bodies assessing the levels of contaminants in the Arctic,
the body has been provided with a very modest budget. For example,
between 1994 and 1996, AMAP was allocated only $3,875,200.12" Lack
of resources is the most significant problem facing AMAP. The work
that is accomplished is of a very high caliber. But the amounts that are
allocated to it will only allow for AMAP to coordinate the study of Arctic
122. See ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, AMAP Assessment
Report: Arctic Pollution Issues (1998).
123. See ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, AMAP Strategic Plan:
1998-2003, AMAP Report 99:6, available at http://www.amap.no/ol-docs/str-plan.pdf (last
visited Jan. 2, 2002); AMAP STRATEGIC PLAN: 1998-2003, AMAP REPORT 99:6, available
at httpJ/www.amap.no/ol-docs/str-plan.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2002).
124. See ARTIC COUNCIL, The Alta Declaration on the Arctic Environmental Protection
Strategy (1997), http:J/www.arctic-council.org/alta.asp (last visited Jan. 2, 2002).
125. See ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, AMAP Report 99:6,
AMAP Strategic Plan: 1998-2003 1-17, available at http:/Avww.amap.no/ol-docs/str-
plan.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2002).
126. See ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, AMAP Report 2000:1,
Workshop on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) in the Arctic: Human Health and
Environmental Concerns (2000) available at http://www.anap.no/ol-docs/wsphh-rep.pdf
(last visited Jan. 2, 2002); and ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME AMAP
REPORT 2000:4, supra note 18, 1-71.
127. See ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, AMAP Report 2000:3,
PCB in the Russian Federation: Inventory and Proposals for Priority Remedial Actions 1-
30 (2000), available at http://www.amap.no/ol-docs/pcb-es.doc (last visited Jan. 2, 2002).
128. AMAP Report to the Ministers (Alta: 1997)
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contaminants, it will not allow for substantial new science, nor will it
allow for efforts to remedy the problems. Unfortunately, there is no
indication in the most recent reports to suggest this will change in the
future.
Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR)
Of the working groups of the AEPS, the EPPR has likely been the
least active. The major mandate of this group is to develop a
cooperative approach to emergency responses caused by environmental
accidents." 9 It is not mandated as a response organization. The major
focus of the organization has been on the development of risk
assessment of threats to the Arctic and the development of a guide on
emergency prevention, preparedness and response in the Arctic. 30 As
stated in its Strategic Plan of Action:
[the Arctic countries and permanent participants meet within the
working group to coordinate, cooperate and exchange information, and
undertake projects with the aim of improving the capability to
prevent, prepare for, and respond to pollution incidents in Arctic areas.
The EPPR working group is an expert's forum focusing on enhancing
best practices, and although the EPPR working group does not provide
direct response to emergencies it can be a mechanism to provide advice
or assistance as appropriate during a major emergency. The EPPR
working group deals with accidental releases and events and not with
chronic discharges. Pure natural disasters are not at this moment a
part of the working group's plan and although nuclear questions are
part of the work plan, currently no initiative focuses specifically on
nuclear issues.'
1
'
The EPPR has been criticized for its inability to respond to
environmental disasters when they have occurred. To illustrate; the
EPPR has been dormant despite incidences of major oil spills in the
Russian north as a result of pipeline breaks."2 The reason is resources
and concerns over sovereignty. The members of the AEPS are not
willing to provide the organization with the capability to respond
129. See ARCTIC COUNCIL, Rovaniemi Declaration Signed by the Eight Arctic Nations,
June 14, 1991, http://www.arctic-council.org/rovaniem.asp (last visited Jan. 2, 2002).
130. See PAME 1996 Report, supra note 1, at 2-3; EMERGENCY PREVENTION,
PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE, Report of the 1999 Emergency Prevention, Preparedness
and Response (EPPR) Working Group Meeting (1999), available at http://www.artic-
council.org/reports/990908.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2002).
131. EMERGENCY PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS & RESPONSE, STRATEGIC PLAN OF
ACTION FOR THE ARCTIC EMERGENCY PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS & RESPONSE WORKING
GROUP (18 Aug. 1998) at 5, available at http://eppr.arctic-council.org/strat-plan.html (last
visited May 3, 2002).
132. Strategic Plan of Action for the Arctic Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and
Response Working Group, supra note 130.
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independeintly due to the significant cost incurred by such a capability.
Nor are States willing to allow other States unfettered access to their
territory in the face of a environmental disaster. Essentially, EPPR's
primary function when an environmental emergency occurs is to
develop guidelines to assist member States to deal with the
emergency.'33 It does not have the mandate or the ability to act
personally. However, when a State is responding to an emergency, it is
primarily focused on responding to the crisis and obtaining immediate
assistance. Thus, the EPPR is of limited use in the context of an actual
environmental emergency.
Currently, the EPPR continues to act only as a coordinator for the
member States to develop and coordinate a common emergency
response policy. In its most recent report, the body's activities included
the development of an EPPR web-site and brochure." The most
substantial project has been the creation of a circumpolar map of
resources that are at risk from oil spills in the Arctic.13 This serves to
illustrate that the organization has demonstrated little potential to
develop beyond its initial limited mandate.
Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME)
This working group was created to, "describe the environmental
threats to the Arctic marine environment and review the adequacy of
existing international instruments pertaining to the Arctic marine
environment. " 13 6 Of the bodies that exist under the AEPS and Arctic
Council, PAME has been the one whose mandate that has been the
most focused on maritime environmental issues. Specifically,
[t]he PAME working group addresses policy and non-emergency
pollution prevention and control measures related to the protection of
the Arctic marine environment from land and sea-based activities. 37
PAME's first course of action was the review of land-based and marine-
based sources of pollution and the existing international instruments.
133. Strategic Plan of Action for the Arctic Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and
Response Working Group, supra note 130..
134. See EMERGENCY PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE, REPORT OF THE 13-
15 JUNE 2000 EMERGENCY PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE (EPPR) WORKING
GROUP MEETING 9 (2000), available at http://www.artic-council.org/reports/990908.html
(last visited Jan. 2, 2002).
135. See id. at 6.
136. PROTECTION OF THE ARCTIC MARINE ENVIRONMENT, Work Plan for the Protection
of the Arctic Marine Environment 2000-2002 1 (2000), available at
http:www.grida.no/pame/PAME
work%20_plan_2000-2002.doc (last visited Jan. 2, 2002).
137. PROTECTION OF THE ARCTIC MARINE ENVIRONMENT, Work Plan for the Protection
of the Arctic Marine Environment, supra note 136.
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This review determined that no single instrument completely
addresses the problems associated with land-based sources of pollution
in the Arctic. 3"
Participants at the 1998 Iqaluit Ministerial meeting established
five objectives for the working group: 1) to prevent marine pollution
from land-based activities; 2) to prevent marine pollution from offshore
oil and gas activities; 3) to prevent marine pollution from shipping
activities; 4) to implement international agreements and to assess the
need for further actions or measures and; 5) to develop and promote
integrated and cost-effective action.!9
The working group's main efforts are now focused on the
implementation of the Regional Programme of Action for the Protection
of the Arctic Marine Environment from Land-based Activities. 4 ' PAME
has sponsored conferences and studies on various marine issues. It has
also attempted to assist the Russian Government through cooperation
with the Advisory Committee on the Protection of the Sea (ACOPS)."'
At the same time, PAME's efforts to deal with offshore sources of
pollutants have tended to be limited to the study and survey of current
activities relating to shipping and offshore oil and gas. A principal
action has been to monitor and observe the efforts of the IMO in the
development of the Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-
Covered Waters.
4 2
Conservation of Arctic Fauna and Flora (CAFF)
The Conservation of Arctic Fauna and Flora (CAFF) working group
was created through the intervention of the Canadian Wildlife Service
of Environment Canada during the negotiations of AEPS.4 1 The
original objectives of CAFF were: 1) to conserve Arctic flora and fauna,
their diversity and their habitats; 2) to protect the Arctic ecosystem
from threats; 3) to improve conservation management laws, regulations
and practices for the Arctic; and 4) to integrate Arctic interests into
138. See PAME 1996 Report, supra note 1, at 10.
139. See PROTECTION OF THE ARCTIC MARINE ENVIRONMENT, WORK PLAN FOR THE
PROTECTION OF THE ARCTIC MARINE ENVIRONMENT 2000-2002 supra note 136, at 3-7.
140. See ARCTIC COUNCIL, The Iqaluit Declaration: The First Ministerial Meeting of
the Arctic Council, Iqaluit, Canada, September 17-18, 1998, art. 24, available at
http://arctic-council.org/iqaluit.asp (last visited Jan. 13, 2002).
141. See PROTECTION OF THE ARCTIC MARINE ENVIRONMENT, Working Group Meeting
Report, June 5-8, 2000, Copenhagen, Denmark 8 (2000).
142. For a discussion regarding the Guidelines see Lawson W. Brigham, The Emerging
International Polar Navigation Code: Bi-polar Relevance?, in PROTECTING THE POLAR
MARINE ENVIRONMENT: LAW AND POLICY FOR POLLUTION PREVENTION 244 (D. Vidas, ed.
2000).
143. See CONSERVATION OF ARCTIC FLORA AND FAUNA, About CAFF, at
http://www.grida.no/caff/about.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2002).
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global conservation fora.'44
However, CAFF's plans were quickly modified when it was
recognized that the initial program was overly ambitious. In 1998,
CAFF submitted its strategic work plan for 1999-2000.145 Five specific
actions were agreed upon at the ministerial meeting in Iqaluit:.
1) Enhance efforts to monitor Arctic biological diversity, paying
particular attention to species, populations, habitats and ecosystems,
which are of greatest ecological, cultural and social value.
2) Support and implement measures for the conservation of Arctic
genetic resources, species and their habitats.
3) Establish protected areas in the Arctic where they contribute to the
conservation of ecosystems, habitats and species.
4) Manage activities outside protected areas in order to maintain the
ecological integrity of protected areas and to ensure the conservation of
biodiversity.
5) Enhance integration of biodiversity conservation and sustainable
use objectives into sectorial and cross-sectoral plans and policies.
Identify approaches and develop strategies by which information on
the conservation of Arctic biological diversity can be made available in
an appropriate manner to those making socio-economic decisions. 146
As with the other working groups, CAFF has accomplished
important work in the sharing of information regarding the particulars
of its area of study. However, most of its effectiveness depends entirely
on the domestic policies of the various Arctic States involved. Protection
of most habitat areas will take place only if States are willing to invoke
the necessary legislation to offer protection.4 7 Since it often happens
that the habitat areas in question also contain economic resources such
as oil and gas, States have been slow to fill in the gaps in protected area
designation. As documented in a Summary of Legal Instruments and
National Frameworks for Arctic Marine Conservation (CAFF Habitat
Conservation Report No. 8), issued in July 2000, marine conservation
144. CONSERVATION OF ARCTIC FLORA AND FAUNA, About CAFF, at
http://www.grida.no/caff/about.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2002).
145. See CONSERVATION OF ARCTIC FLORA AND FAUNA, The CAFF Work Plan 1999-
2000, at http://www.grida.no/caff/workplan.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2002).
146. Id.
147. See generally Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna, Caff Habitat Conservation
Report No. 8: A Summary of Legal Instruments and National Frameworks for Arctic
Marine Conservation (2000), httpJ/www.grida.no/caff/MarinePaper-fmal.htm (last visited
Jan. 14, 2002).
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legislation is not always implemented and adequately enforced. " 8
Sustainable Development and Utilization (SDU)
The SDU began its existence as a task group and not a working
group when it was created at the second ministerial meeting in Nuuk
49
The specific distinction has not always been made clear in official
terms, however, in practical terms there has been a tendency to treat a
task group as a more informal organization than is the case with the
working groups.
As previously mentioned, the impetus for the creation of the Task
Force for Sustainable Development and Utilization (TFSDU) came as a
result of UNCED. Participants at the Nuuk meeting reached a general
recognition that the AEPS needed to consider issues of sustainability
and not only environmental protection. 150 As with the working groups,
the first task given to the TFSDU was to develop a proposed course of
action to be presented to Ministers for approval.' In accomplishing
this task it became apparent that there were substantial differences
among the various States and Permanent Participants as to what
constituted sustainable development. Nevertheless, the TFSDU was
able to identify five major issue areas: 1) trade policies, opportunities
and barriers (which focused on the harvesting of marine mammals and
fur bearing animals); 2) case studies of sustainable renewable resource
use; 3) environmental impact assessment; 4) communication and
education strategy; and 5) regional applications of Agenda 21.152
Following the Inuvik meeting, the status of the task force became
somewhat confused. The ministers agreed in the Inuvik Declaration to
transform the task group into a working group. However, during the
negotiations for the creation of the Arctic Council, consideration was
instead given to eliminating the task group. 5 ' Supporters of the Arctic
Council wanted the new organization to focus on the issues of
148. See Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna, Caff Habitat Conservation Report
No. 8: A Summary of Legal Instruments and National Frameworks for Arctic Marine
Conservation (2000), http://www.grida.no/caff/MarinePaper-final.htm (last visited Jan. 14,
2002) at 30.
149. See ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT, The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, Global
Agenda, Vol. 3, No. 3, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/english/news/newsletr/global/globc2-
e.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2002).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. TASK FORCE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND UTILIZATION, Report of the
Task Force for Sustainable Development and Utilization and Working Papers in Progress
3-5 (1996).
153. See ARCTIC COUNCIL, The Iqaluit Declaration: The First Ministerial Meeting of
the Arctic Council, Iqaluit, Canada, September 17-18, 1998, art. 7-11, available at
http://arctic-council.orgliqaluit.asp (last visited Jan. 13, 2002). [Hereinafter The Iqaluit
Declaration: The First Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council].
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sustainability. Therefore, it was reasoned, that if a working group on
sustainability was created, it would duplicate the work of the Arctic
Council and dilute the actions the Council. Thus, when the Declaration
on the Establishment of an Arctic Council was agreed upon, it
contained references to the four existing working groups, but no
mention was made of the task group nor of the decision at Inuvik to
transform it into a working group."M But, at the Iqualuit Ministerial
meeting in September 1998, the decision was made to establish both a
Sustainable Development Program and a Sustainable Development
Working Group.'55
Part of the difficult existence faced by the TFSDU can be attributed
to the differences between American officials on the one hand, and
Canadian officials and Permanent Participants on the other, regarding
the harvesting of marine mammals. The Americans have continually
opposed any form of trade in northern marine mammals.' President
Clinton went on record as opposing Canadian efforts to address trade
in marine mammal products within the Arctic Council."7  However,
Canadian Ambassador, Mary Simon, has repeatedly emphasized
Canadian support of trade in these goods." There are reports of heated
discussions within meetings of the AEPS and Arctic Council as a result
of these differences.
The first meeting of the Sustainable Development Working Group
took place in Anchorage Alaska, 3-6 May, 1999."59 At this meeting, it
was clear that the efforts of Canadian officials to include the harvesting
of marine mammals as an issue area had been defeated. There is no
mention of marine mammals in any of the documents. Instead, the
working group is focusing its attention on issues such as health,
fisheries, eco-tourism and the health and well-being of Arctic children
and youth." Once again, the main focus is on understanding the
nature of the issues within each of these subject areas, and as such it is
too soon to see concrete results.
154. The Iqaluit Declaration: The First Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council,
supra note 153.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See Letter from Bill Clinton, President of the United States, to the Congress of
the United States, (Feb. 10, 1997) (http://whale.wheelock.edu/archives/info97/0034.html).
158. Mary Simon, "Circumpolar Nations Tackle Big Jobs with Arctic Council", Speech
to the Canadian Club of Toronto, Nov. 4, 1996, Canadian Speeches, Jan.-Feb. 1997, vol.
10, no. 9:26-30.
159. See ARCTIC COUNCIL, Sustainable Development Working Group, Anchorage,
Alaska, May 3-4, 1999, httpJ/www.arctic-council.org/pmeetings/sdwg anc.asp (last visited
Jan. 14, 2002).
160. ARCTIC COUNCI, Sustainable Development Working Group, Anchorage, Alaska,
May 3-4, 1999, httpJ/www.arctic-council.org/pmeetings/sdwganc.asp (last visited Jan. 14,
2002).
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The AEPS and Arctic Council
On September 19, 1996, the eight Arctic States signed the
Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council' in Ottawa and
the AEPS was thus placed within the Council. The creation of the
Arctic Council was a Canadian initiative from its origins. Little
consideration was given to the creation of such a body during the Cold
War. It was only after relations had begun to warm between the Arctic
States at the end of the 1980s that it became possible to even consider
such an organization. Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney
proposed the idea of the Arctic Council during his visit to Leningrad in
November 1989.162 On November 28, 1990, the Canadian Secretary of
State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, announced that he would bring
the issue of the Arctic Council to the attention of the other States.
Initially, American officials were very reluctant to support this
initiative. However, following the change of administrations in the
United States from a Republican president to a Democrat one, the
Americans became more accepting.'" Nevertheless, the Americans still
made it clear that if they were to participate in such an organization,
they had certain minimum requirements that needed to be met. First,
the Arctic Council could not address security related issues.'" Second,
any actions that required financial assistance could only be taken on a
voluntary basis.'6 In other words, the Arctic Council could not raise its
own independent sources of revenue. Correspondingly, it was not to be
allowed to create a large bureaucracy independent of the national
agencies. Officials could be tasked, but they were to do so at the
discretion of the State.
These requirements were met and tentative agreement was
reached in 1995. Drawing directly from the AEPS, the Arctic Council
would be comprised of the eight Arctic States and the three indigenous
organizations, and would allow for the involvement of invited
observers.'" The Council would operate on the basis of consensus by
the eight States.67  It was also mandated to establish a small
secretariat to be shared on a rotating basis every two years to oversee
operations.'"
161. See ARCTIC COUNCIL, Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council,
Sept. 19, 1996, httpJ/www.arctic-council.org/establ.asp (last visited Jan. 14, 2002).
162. Alan Saunders, Pondering an Arctic Council, 19:2 N. PERSP. 1 (1991), available at
http://www.carc.org/pubs/vl9no2/l.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2002).
163. Id.
164. The Iqaluit Declaration: The First Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council,
supra note 153, art. 1(a).
165. Id
166. Id. at art. 2-3.
167. Id. at art. 7.
168. Id. at art. 5.
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The Arctic Council/AEPS has continued to meet as required. The
ministerial meeting of the AEPS that took place in Alta, Norway in
June 1997 was, in many respects, serving as a transition to the Arctic
Council. The first official ministerial meeting of the Arctic Council took
place on September 17 and 18, 1998, in Iqaluit, Canada.1 6 9 The second
ministerial meeting took place in Barrow, Alaska in October 2000.'1
0
The tenth Anniversary of the AEPS was celebrated by a meeting on
June 11, 2001, when the members of the Arctic Council convened to
discuss sustainable development in the Arctic context."'
In many regards, the Arctic Council meetings have not differed
from the AEPS meetings. The same working groups have presented
their work achievements and future plans. Three additional
Permanent Participants, the Aleut International Association, the Arctic
Athabaskan Council and the Gwich'in Council International have been
granted membership to the Council.
The primary difference between the Arctic Council and the AEPS is
that the Arctic Council was specifically mandated to develop a
sustainable development program and, "to disseminate information,
encourage education and promote interest in Arctic related issues."'
To this end, the Arctic Council has not only continued to support the
work undertaken by AEPS but has also developed a Sustainable
Development Framework Document and an Arctic Council Action Plan
to Eliminate Pollution of the Arctic (ACAP).7
Soft Law to Hard Law?
While the examination of the impact of the AEPS is somewhat
cursory, it is clear that this iniative has played a major role as a
facilitator. The five working groups have been instrumental in bringing
169. See The Iqaluit Declaration: The First Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council,
supra note 153.
170. See ARCTIC COUNCIL, Second Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, Barrow, Alaska,
U.S.A., October 12-13, 2000, http://www.arctic-council.org/barrow/barrow2000.asp (last
visited Jan. 14, 2002).
171. See ARCTIC COUNCIL, The 10t' Anniversary of the Arctic Environmental
Cooperation (2001), httpJ/www.arctic-council.org/pmeetings/aepsl0/index.asp (last visited
Jan. 14, 2002).
172. See ARCTIC COUNCIL, Report of the Senior Arctic Officials to the Arctic Council,
Iqaluit, Canada, September 17-18, 1998, Part I(C), http://arctic-
council.org/pmeetings/98rep.asp (last visited Jan. 13, 2002) [hereinafter Report of the
Senior Arctic Officials to the Arctic Council]; ARCTIC COUNCIL, Barrow Declaration on the
occasion of the Second Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council 6 (2000).
173. See Report of the Senior Arctic Officials to the Arctic Council, supra note 172, at
Part I(A).
174. Both of these programs go beyond the scope of this paper. See generally ARCTIC
COUNCIL, Activities and Working Groups, http://www.arctic-council.org/activities.asp (last
visited Jan. 13, 2002) (detailing more information about these programs).
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together the Arctic States to discuss common approaches to
environmental challenges in the region. However, since the AEPS
inception in 1989, there has been little evidence that it is evolving into
something more than a means of shared communications. Individually,
some of the working groups, such as AMAP, have successfully initiated
new research on the part of the participating States, but this remains
the exception and not the rule. There is no sign that the AEPS or the
Arctic Council is having any impact on jurisdictional issues in this
region. The participating States are willing to co-operate on the
understanding that only limited resources are utilized. Insofar that
there was a need to develop a joint understanding of the problems
facing the Arctic region, the AEPS/Arctic Council has been a success.
However, initiatives are still largely tinkering with a growing number
of ad hoc projects but there is still no clear regulatory mandate or
agenda.
GLOBAL AND EXTRA-REGIONAL TINKERINGS
Given the substantial transboundary environmental threats facing
the Arctic, one might think firm and comprehensive regulatory and
policy responses at the global and extra-regional levels would be
forthcoming and pushed by Arctic-rim States in particular. However,
international responses have been fragmented and weak.
Rather piddling responses to transboundary hazardous substance
movements, discussed below, include: the global convention on POPs
concluded in December 2000;115 the 1998 Convention on the Prior
Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and
Pesticides in International Trade; 176 the UN ECE Protocols on Heavy
Metals and POPs;177 the North American Sound Management of
Chemicals Initiative 7 and; the Convention for the Protection of the
Marine Environment of the Northeast Atlantic.1 79 Also summarized is
175. United Nations Environment Programme Global POPS Treaty, Dec. 2000, U.N.
Doc. INC5/, httpJ/www.ipen.org/handbook/pop-pap/paperlO.pdf (last visited Jan. 13,
2002).
176. Convention on PIC Procedure, supra note 15.
177. Heavy Metals Protocol and POPs Protocol, supra notes 16 & 17.
178. COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION, Sound Management of
Chemicals Project at
http://www.cec.org/programs-projects/pollutants-health/321Jindex.cfm?varlan=
english (last visited Nov. 11, 2001).
179. Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Northeast
Atlantic. The list, of course, is not exhaustive. For example, ministers responsible for the
protection of the North Sea environment, at the Fourth International Conference on the
Protection of the North Sea in 1995 adopted the Esbjerg Declaration pledging to move
towards the cessation of emissions and losses of hazardous substances by the year 2020.
See Esbjerg Declaration (1995), http://odin.dep.no/md/html/conf/declaration/esbjerg.html
(last visited Nov. 23, 2001). The United States and Canada have adopted a Strategy for
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the "Kyoto fiasco" where even Canada, a country facing the potential
"polar punch" of climate change, has failed to push for strong and clear
greenhouse gas reduction commitments.
Global Convention on POPs
At the fifth session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating
Committee for an International Legally Binding Instrument for
Implementing International Action on Certain Persistent Organic
Pollutants, occurring in Johannesburg, South Africa in December 2000,
representatives from 122 countries reached agreement on a global POPs
treaty.80 A diplomatic conference for adoption of the Convention took
place in May 2001 in Stockholm."'
The new Convention has numerous positive points. It calls for the
elimination of eight POPs pesticides (aldrin, endrin, dieldrin, chlordane,
heptachlor, hexachlorobenzene (HCB), mirex and toxaphene).8 ' PCB
production will also be prohibited and countries are required to make
determined efforts to phase out PCB containing equipment by 2025.183
The precautionary principle is recognized as an objective... and a
precautionary approach is to be applied in identifying and taking action
the Virtual Elimination of Persistent Toxic Substances in the Great Lakes Basin, 7 April
1997. See 31 INT'L ENV'T REP. 1701-1708. Baltic States, through Annex I of the 1992
Helsinki Convention, have pledged to prohibit the use of various substances including
DDT and it derivatives and PCBs (except in closed system equipment). See Peter Ehlers,
The Helsinki Convention, 1992: Improving the Baltic Sea 8 Environment, 8 INT'L J.
MARINE & COASTAL L. 191 (1993) (reviewing the Helsinki Convention).
180. Summary of the Fifth Session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for
an International Legally Binding Instrument for Implementing International Action of
Certain Persistent Organic Pollutants, EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL., Dec. 12, 2000, at 1, at
http://www.iisd.ca/linkages/download/pdf/enb1554e.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2001).
181. Report of the Conference Plenopotentiaries on the Stockholm Convention On
Persistent Organic Pollutants, EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL., May 25, 2001, at 1, at
http://www.iisd.ca/chemicalIpopsd/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2001). See also THE
INTERNATIONAL POPS ELIMINATION NETWORK POPs: The Birth of a Public Health
Treaty, httpJ/www.ipen.org/treaty02.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2001); THE
INTERNATIONAL POPS ELIMINATION NETWORK, Surmnary of Key Elements in the Global
POPs Treaty, Dec. 14, 2000, http://www.ipen.org/treaty03.html (last visited Nov. 20,
2001).
182. Stockholm POPs Convention, supra note 14, at Annex A, Part I. For a description
of the pesticides and other POPs included in the "dirty dozen" see Clive Tesar, POPs:
What They Are; How They Are Used; How They Are Transported, 26 N. PERSP., 2 (2000).
HCB is not only a fungicide but is also a by-product of the manufacture of certain
industrial chemicals and exists as an impurity in several pesticide formulations. Id. at 4.
183. Stockholm POPs Convention, supra note 14, at Annex A, Part II
184. Id. at art. 1. The Objective states: "Mindful of the precautionary approach as set
forth in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the
objective of this Convention is to protect human health and the environment from
persistent organic pollutants." Id.
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against additional POPs.8 5 Developed country Parties will be required
to provide new and additional financial resources to developing country
Parties and Parties with economies in transition, and the Global
Environment Facility (GEF) is named on an interim basis as a financial
mechanism.'.
However, various limitations stand out. While the ultimate goal for
DDT is elimination, the treaty will allow continued use for disease
vector control in accordance with World Health Organization
guidelines.18 The treaty adopts a very flexible approach to by-products,
such as dioxins, by calling on Parties to take measures to reduce total
releases "with the goal of their continuing minimization and, where
feasible, ultimate elimination."88  The Convention will require 50
ratifications before entry into force, which likely will delay effect at
least 3-4 years until enough countries have accepted the Agreement. 9
The new Convention might still be categorized as a case of
tinkering. The Convention is not a comprehensive chemical treaty
addressing the huge number of synthetic chemicals in commercial use,
estimated between 50,000 and 100,000, with some 1,000 or more new
compounds entering the economy each year.19°  The Convention
establishes a rather complicated procedure for adding new POPs for
control, which does not bode well for prompt and strong precautionary
actions.'9' A chemical proposed by a Party for new listing would have to
185. Stockholm POPs Convention, supra note 14, at art. 8. A scientific POPs Review
Committee is to be established to evaluate additional chemicals for inclusion based on the
criteria of toxicity, persistence, bioaccumulation and long-range transport. Art. 8(7)
states: "If, on the basis of the risk profile conducted in accordance with Annex E, the
Committee decides . . . that the chemical is likely as a result of its long-range
environmental transport to lead to significant adverse human health and/or
environmental effects such that global action is warranted, the proposal shall proceed.
Lack of full scientific certainty shall not prevent the proposal from proceeding." Id.
186. Id. at art. 14. Resolutions, prepared at the final negotiating session for
consideration at the Stockholm diplomatic conference, set out various requests including.
that the GEF establish a new focal area for POPs; that the GEF report to the first POPs
Conference of Parties on measures to ensure the transparency of the project approval
process; that procedures for accessing funds are simple, flexible and expeditious; and that
donors to the GEF Trust Fund contribute adequate additional financial resources to
enable the GEF to carry out its mandate under the POPs treaty. Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Final Act of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Prganic
Pollutants, U.N. ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, U.N. Doc. UNEP/POPs/CONF/4(2001) at
Appendix I.
187. Stockholm POPs Convention, supra note 14, at Annex B.
188. Id. at art. 5.
189. WORLD WILDLIFE FUND'S GLOBAL ToxIc CHEMICALS INITIATIVE, Summary of Key
Elements in the Global POPs Treaty (2000), at http://www.worldwildlife.orgtoxics
progareas/pop/global.htm (last visited Nov., 14, 2001).
190. See Anne Platt McGinn, POPs Culture, 13:2 WORLD WATCH 26, 26-36 (2000).
191. See Stockholm POPs Convention, supra note 14, at art. 8. For a recent general
critique of risk assessment in environmental decision-making and the need for businesses
and government to undertake alternative assessments in order to figure out options for
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meet screening criteria set out in Annex D of the Convention, undergo a
risk profile conducted in accordance with Annex E and a risk
management evaluation in accord with Annex F.'" The exact number of
POPs remains uncertain but thousands of chemicals might qualify for
the term."'
The 1998 Convention on the Prior Informed Consent (PIC) Procedure
The Convention on the PIC Procedure for Certain Hazardous
Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, adopted in Rotterdam
on September 10, 1998, may also be described as tinkering with
chemicals management.' The Convention does not prohibit trade in
hazardous chemicals banned or severely restricted by a country but
tries to facilitate trade subject to a prior informed consent procedure.'9 5
For chemicals listed in Annex III to the Convention, exporting States
must ensure importing States receive notice of and consent to proposed
chemical shipments. 19 As of October 2001, the Convention, being
implemented on an interim basis until the Convention enters into force,
only covered 31 chemicals, including 21 pesticides, five severely
hazardous pesticide formulations and five industrial chemicals.97 The
Convention provides for a rather tedious process for adding additional
hazardous substances to the PIC list. Before listing can occur, at least
two countries from different Prior Informed Consent regions" must
notify the Secretariat of final regulatory actions banning or severely
restricting a chemical; a Chemical Review Committee must prepare a
draft decision guidance document; the Committee must confirm that
treating ecosystems and public health with utmost care see MARY O'BRIEN, MAKING
BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS: AN ALTERNATIVE TO RISK ASSESSMENT (2000).
192. See Stockholm POPs Convention, supra note 14, at art. 8.
193. See McGinn, supra note 190, at 26-36.
194. See Report of the Seventh Session of the INC for an International Legally Binding
Instrument for the Application of the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain
Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL.,
Nov. 6, 2000, at http'J/www.iisd.ca/chemicals/pic/pic7 (last visited Oct. 3, 2001) (reviewing
the history of negotiations).
195. See Convention on PIC Procedure, supra note 15.
196. See id.
197. See Eighth Session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for an
International Legally Binding Instrument for the Application of the Prior Informed
Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International
Trade, EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BuLL., Oct. 8, 2001, at http://www.iisd.ca/chemica~lpic/pic8
(last visited Oct. 9,2001).
198. See Convention onPIC Procedure, supra note 15, at art. 5. At the Sixth Session of
the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee in July 1999 in Rome, government
representatives adopted provisional Prior Informed Consent regions (Africa, Europe, Asia,
Latin America and the Caribbean, Near East, Southeast Pacific and North America), but
the Convention leaves final regional delineation to the Conference of the Parties. See PIC:
Steady Progress at Latest Session,29 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 219, 220 (1999).
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final regulatory actions were based upon scientific risk evaluation; and
the Conference of the Parties must approve listing.
The Convention does not establish clear financial commitments by
developed States to assist developing States in strengthening chemical
management capacities. Article 16 provides only a general technical
assistance pledge:
The Parties shall, taking into account in particular the needs of
developing countries and countries with economies in transition,
cooperate in promoting technical assistance for the development of the
infrastructure and the capacity necessary to manage chemicals to
enable implementation of the Convention .... "
The Convention leaves compliance procedures to be worked out.
Article 17 mandates the Conference of the Parties to, "as soon as
practicable" develop and approve procedures and institutional
mechanisms for determining non-compliance with the Convention and
for treatment of non-complying Parties.2"
The Convention has not yet entered into force. The Convention
requires 50 ratifications before becoming binding.201 As of September 1,
2001, the Convention had only been ratified by sixteen States (Bulgaria,
Czech Republic, El Salvador, Germany, Guinea, Hungary, Kyrgyzstan,
Mongolia, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Saudi Arabia,
Senegal, Slovenia and Suriname).2n
The UN ECE Protocols on POPs and Heavy Metals
Rather limited control efforts for managing persistent organic
pollutants and heavy metals have been taken pursuant to Protocols
under the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution. 2
The POPs Protocol only initially targets sixteen substances for control.
For the twelve substances scheduled for elimination, some major
exceptions are allowed. For example, DDT production is not to be
eliminated until within one year of consensus by the Parties that
suitable alternatives to DDT are available for public health protection
from diseases such as malaria and encephalitis.' Countries with
199. Convention on PIC Procedure, supra note 15.
200. Id.
201. Id. at art. 26. "This Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after
the date of deposit of the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession." Id.
202. See Status of Signature and Ratification, Acceptance, Approval and Accession as
of 12 November 2001, at http://www.pic.int/statusofl-signatureand _ratifica.htm (last
visited Nov. 24, 2001).
203. See Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979, 1302
U.N.T.S. 217, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1442 (1979).
204. POPs Protocol, supra note 16, at Annex 1.
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economies in transition are given until December 31, 2015, to eliminate
PCB production.0 5  To reduce emissions of polycycic aromatic
hydrocarbons (PAHs), dioxins and furans and hexachlorobenzene,
Parties are required to apply best available techniques (BAT), an
approach which allows for considerable leeway to weigh economic
factors.2°0 Emission limitations on dioxins and furans for major
stationary sources (specifically municipal and medical waste
incinerators and hazardous waste incinerators) could be weakened for
existing stationary sources through the loophole, "insofar as technically
and economically feasible"."7 The Protocol is reactive in approach,
allowing further substances be added one by one through amendments
to the annexes.0 0
The UN ECE Heavy Metals Protocol also displays numerous
weaknesses. Only three heavy metals, cadmium, lead and mercury, are
initially subject to controls. Specific percentage reductions are not
required," and Parties are obligated to apply best available techniques
to various sources including: iron and steel plants; cement kilns and;
fossil fuel combustion in power plants. While emissions limit values are
established for various source categories,2 11 such limits are weakened
1 2
for existing stationary sources with the qualification "insofar as
technically and economically feasible," and an eight year delay in
applicability is allowed from the Protocol's entry into force.13
The pace of ratifications for entry into force of the Protocols has
been slow. Both protocols require 16 ratifications/acceptances before
entry into force." 4 As of October 5, 2001, the POPs Protocol had been
205. POPs Protocol, supra note 16, at Annex I.
206. Id. at art. 3(5).
207. Id. at art. 3(5)(iv).
208. For a review of the negotiation debates over the informational and procedural
approaches to adding new chemicals to the Protocol regime and the further setting out of
information requirements and procedures in Executive Body decision 1998/2, see Kirsten
Hillman, International Control of Persistent Organic Pollutants: The UN Economic
Commission for Europe Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, and
Beyond, 8 REV. EUR. COMMUN. & INT'L ENVTL. L. 105, 110 (1999).
209. Heavy Metals Protocol, supra note 16, at Annex I.
210. See id. at Art. 3(1). The Protocol in Article 3(1) requires each Party to reduce its
total annual emissions into the atmosphere of the three heavy metals, but Annex I leaves
countries the discretion to choose the reference year (1990 or an alternative year from
1985 to 1995 inclusive specified by a Party upon ratification/acceptance) and the Protocol
does not provide a specific reduction target. Id.
211. See Heavy Metals Protocol, supra note 16, at Annex V. For example, Annex V
sets limit values for mercury emissions from hazardous waste incinerators at .05 mg/m'
and from municipal waste incinerators at .08 mg/m'. Limit values for mercury emissions
from medical waste incinerators are to be evaluated by the Parties no later than two
years after the Protocol's entry into force. Id.
212. Id. at Art. 3(2)(d).
213. Heavy Metals Protocol, supra note 16, at Annex IV.
214. Id. at art. 17(1), POPs Protocol, supra note 16, at art. 18.
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ratified by only seven countries: Canada; Denmark; Luxembourg; the
Netherlands; Norway; Sweden and; Switzerland.2 1 5 The Heavy Metals
Protocol had been ratified by nine countries: Canada; Denmark;
Finland; Luxembourg; the Netherlands; Norway; Sweden; Switzerland
and; the United States. 216
The North American Sound Management of Chemicals Initiative
Rather, minimal steps to address hazardous chemicals have been
taken to date under the umbrella of the North American Agreement for
Environmental Cooperation"' adopted as a side agreement to the North
American Free Trade Agreement.2 1 Through Resolution #95-05 on the
Sound Management of Chemicals, adopted by the Council of Ministers
of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation on October 13, 1995,
the United States, Canada and Mexico agreed to develop North
American Regional Action Plans (NARAPs) for addressing persistent,
bioaccumulative and toxic chemicals of concern to the three countries. 9
To date, the Sound Management of Chemicals Initiative has focused on
developing NARAPs on a chemical-by-chemical basis. Only four
NARAPs have been developed, thus far, covering DDT, chlordane, PCBs
and mercury.2° A complicated process for nominating and selecting
additional chemicals for control actions promises to favor industrial
interests over environmental protection. For example, before a
substance can be designated for tripartite action, a comprehensive,
scientifically-based risk assessment document must be prepared
characterizing risks to the environment and human health of a
particular substance.2l Two other NARAPs are under development,
215. See Protocol on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs), Status of ratification of the
1998 Aarhus Protocol on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) as of 5 October 2001, at
http://www.unece.orgenv/lrtap/protocol/98pop-st.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2001).
216. Protocol on Heavy Metals, Status of the ratification of the 1998 Aarhus Protocol
on Heavy Metals as of 5 October 2001, at http://www.unece.org/env/lrtapprotocol/98hm-
st.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2001). The European Community was listed as a further
acceptance. Id.
217. North American Agreement for Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, 32
I.L.M 1480.
218. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289.
219. See COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENT COOPERATION [hereinafter CEC], Council
Resolution #95-05 (1995), http://www.cec.org/whowe-are/council/res... /disp-res.
cfm?varlan=english&documentID=6 (last visited Dec. 15, 2001).
220. See CEC, Pollutants and Health, http://www.cec.org/programs-projects/
pollutantshealth/smocindex.cfm? varlan=english (last visited Nov. 9, 2001) (detailing
the Action Plans promulgated for these substances).
221. A Task Force on Criteria, reporting to the North American Working Group on the
Sound Management of Chemicals, has developed a substance selection process involving a
nomination stage, an evaluation stage and a decision stage. Scientific assessments of
toxicity, persistence, bioavailability and bioaccumlation and expert judgments are given
key roles. See Draft Process of Identifying Candidate Substances for Regional Action
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namely, one for dioxins and furans and hexachlorobenzene and the
other on environmental monitoring and assessment.m Following a
Symposium on North American Children's Health and the Environment
in May 2000, the Commission for Environmental Cooperation is still at
the initial stages of considering law and policy responses in light of the
special vulnerability of children to environmental hazards.'
The Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the
Northeast Atlantic
At first glance, the Convention for the Protection of the Marine
Environment of the Northeast Atlantic, often referred to as the OSPAR
Convention, adopts quite a strong approach to controlling toxic
pollution. The Convention adopts the precautionary principle24 and the
OSPAR Strategy with Regard to Hazardous Substances, adopted in
1998, pledges Parties to endeavor to cease all discharges/losses of
hazardous substances by the target date of 2020.m Parties agree to
develop further programs and measures for addressing chemicals on the
OSPAR list of chemicals for priority action (listed in Annex 2 of the
Strategy).6  Parties commit to develop a proactive selection and
priority setting mechanism to select further hazardous substances
including endocrine disruptors for control actions.2 7  The OSPAR
under the Sound Management of Chemical Initiative Report to the North American
Working Group on the Sound Management of Chemicals by the Task Force on Criteria,
http'//www.ece.orgfprograms-projects/pol... ts-health/smoc/criter.cfm?verlan=english
(last visited Nov. 9, 2001).
222. Final Communiqud: CEC Council Session in Dallas, 12-13 June 2000,
http:www.cec.org/news/details/index.cfin?varlan=english&ID=2257 (last visited Dec. 31,
2001).
223. See CEC SECRETARIAT, Background Paper for the Symposium on North American
Children's Health and the Environment (2000), available at http://www.cec.org/programs
_projects/pollutants-health/children/child-e.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2001).
224. The Convention in Art. 2(2) requires Contracting Parties to apply, "the
precautionary principle, by virtue of which preventative measures are to be taken when
there are reasonable grounds for concern that substances or energy introduced, directly or
indirectly, into the marine environment may bring about hazards to human health, harm
living resources and marine ecosystems, damage amenities or interfere with other
legitimate uses of the sea, even when there is no conclusive evidence of a causal
relationship between the inputs and effects ... " See Convention for the Protection of the
Marine Environment for the North-East Atlantic, supra note 17, at art. 2(2).
225. OSPAR COMMISSION, FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT OF THE
NORTH-EAST ATLANTIC, OSPAR Strategy with Regard to Hazardous Substances, sec. 4
(1998), available at httpJ/www.ospar.org/eng/html/sap/strategy-hazardous,_substances.
htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2001).
226. See id. at Annex 2. The Annex lists 15 chemical categories including mercury and
organic mercury compounds, lead, pentachlorophenol, polyaromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs),
PCBs and dioxins and furans.
227. OSPAR COMMISSION, FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT OF THE
NORTH-EAST ATLANTIC, supra note 225, at sec. 3. 1(e).
2002
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Commission has "legal teeth" whereby besides recommendations, the
OSPAR Commission can adopt binding decisions by unanimous vote or
three quarters majority vote in case of a lack of consensus." 8
However, the OSPAR Commission in practice has preferred to
move through recommendations rather than binding decisions with
almost twice as many recommendations adopted as decisions. Even for
binding decisions, few actually ban or prohibit pollution. For example,
the use of chlorine for bleaching pulp in the pulp and paper industry
was required to be phased out by January 1, 1998, pursuant to
PARCOM Decision 96/2.22 Many OSPAR decisions adopt rather
arbitrary/compromise standards. For example, mercury levels from
industrial sectors, other than the chlor-alkli industry, and cadmium
levels from various industries, such as electroplating, are set in terms of
mg/i. Pollutants from pulp industries, such as total suspended solids,
sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides, are set in terms of kgltonne of pulp
produced. 210  The OSPAR Convention while calling for precautionary
and pollution prevention approaches to land-based pollution allows
considerable flexibility by requiring Parties to apply best available
techniques (BATs) for point sources and best environmental practices
(BEPs) for point and diffuse sources." BATs require Parties to look to
the state of the art processes, facilities or operation methods and to
emphasize non-waste technology if available, but "watering down"
occurs through allowing consideration of factors such as economic
feasibility. BEPs require the most appropriate accommodation of
environmental control measures and strategies (such as public
education; mandatory labeling; recycling, recovery and reuse; economic
instruments; establishing a license system with restrictions or bans).
228. Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment for the North-East
Atlantic, supra note 17, at art. 13. Parties are still allowed to opt out of decisions,
however.
229. Oslo and Paris Conventions for the Prevention of Marine Pollution, PARCOM
Decision 96/2 on the Phasing-out of Processes Using Molecular Chlorine (C/,) in the
Bleaching of Kraft and Sulphate Paper, June 17-21, 1996, art. 2.1, available at
http://www.ospar.org/aspospar/dra.asp (last visited Oct. 3, 2001).
230. Oslo and Paris Conventions for the Prevention of Marine Pollution, PARCOM
Decision 85/1, Programs and Measures of 31 December 1985 on Limit Values and Quality
Objectives for Mercury Discharges by Sectors other than the Chlor-alkali Industry,
available at http://www.ospar.org/asp/ospar/dra.asp (last visited Oct. 3, 2001). See also
Oslo and Paris Conventions for the Prevention of Marine Pollution, PARCOM Decision
85/2, Programs and Measures of 31 December 1985 on Limit Values and Quality
Objectives for Cadmium Discharges; available at http://www.ospar.org/asp/ospar/dra.asp
(last visited Oct. 3, 2001); Oslo and Paris Conventions for the Prevention of Marine
Pollution, PARCOM Decision 95/2 on Discharge and Emission Limit Values for the
Integrated and Non-integrated Sulfate Paper Pulp Industry; available at
http://www.ospar.org/asp/ospar/dra.asp (last visited Oct. 3, 2001).
231. Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment for the North-East
Atlantic, supra note 17, at Annex I.
VOL. 30:2
ARCTIC ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION STRATEGY
Glacial Responses to Global Climate Change
In light of the long list of environmental threats to the Arctic
marine environment raised by climate change, including sea ice melting
and disruption of ocean currents, one can certainly be cynical over the
limited control commitments to date. The overall commitment in the
Kyoto Protocol by industrialized countries to reduce their greenhouse
gas emissions by at least 5% between the year 2008-2012 provides no
reason to celebrate. Some States, such as Australia and Iceland, are
even allowed to increase their emissions.ns Developing countries have
yet to "come aboard." It remains highly questionable whether
industrialized states such as United States will be able to meet their
greenhouse reduction targets. For example, the US committed to a 7%
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels by 2008-2012,
but emissions have been projected to increase by some 23% by 2010.23
In March 2001, the US administration declared the Protocol to be
"fatally flawed," and industry and Congressional opposition to the
Kyoto Protocol in the United States has been zealous.234  As of
September 28, 2001, only 40 countries, almost all developing states, had
ratified the Kyoto Protocol.ns The Protocol requires ratification by at
least fifty-five Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate
Change, including developed countries and countries with economies in
transition representing at least fifty-five percent of the total 1990
carbon dioxide emissions from this group. 36
While some positive developments occurred at the resumed Sixth
Session of the Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention
on Climate Change in July 2001, through the Bonn Agreement, 7
numerous limitations and weak points stand out. For example, even
though countries agreed on the need for new and additional funding to
232. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 19.
233. SEBASTIAN OBERTHR & HERMAN E. Orr, THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: INTERNATIONAL
CLIMATE POLICY FOR THE 21' CENTURY 18 (1999).
234. For a detailed review of the politics surrounding U.S. climate change policy, see
CLIMATE CHANGE AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (Paul G. Harris ed., 2000). See also,
letter from President George W Bush to Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig and Roberts,
reprinted in 31 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 122 (2001).
235. Kyoto Protocol Status of Ratification, httpJ/www.unfcc.de/resource/kpstats.pdf
(last visited Oct. 26, 2001).
236. The United States is a key country since its share of 1990 carbon dioxide
emissions has been calculated at 36.1 percent of global emissions. See U.N. DEP'T OF
INFO., Setting the Record Straight: Facts About the United Nations, U.N. Doc.
DPI/1815/Rev. 14 (1998).
237. See Review of the Implementation of Commitments and of other Provisions of the
Convention: Preparations for the First Session of the Conference of the Parties Serving as
the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (Decision 8/Cp.4), United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2001]L.7 (2001),
available at http'J/www.unfccc.int/resource/docs/op6secpart/107.pdf.
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assist developing countries and to establish three new funds, no specific
funding level was specified. A joint political declaration was made by
the European Community and its member States, together with
Canada, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland, pledged preparedness to
contribute collectively US $410 million annually by 2005, with that
level to be reviewed in 2008. 2" Many technical details of the flexibility
mechanisms remain to be worked out. Even though a cap has been
placed on the use by countries of forest management credits, a complex
accounting system seems likely to foster ongoing controversies over
allowable credits for land-use, land-use change and forestry activities
(LULUCF).2 9  Only a general framework for addressing compliance
under the Kyoto Protocol was agreed to at Bonn, such as the
composition of a compliance committee, with resumed negotiations
scheduled for the Seventh Conference of the Parties and national
viewpoints still differing over the legally binding nature of the regime.'o
CONCLUSION: FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Effective governance for Arctic marine environmental protection is
more of a distant goal than a present reality. Key agreements for
addressing transboundary pollutants into the Arctic, including the
global POPs Convention and UN ECE Protocols on POPs and Heavy
Metals, are not yet in force.24 No comprehensive global chemicals
management convention exists. No global agreement on controlling
heavy metal emissions has been forged. Effective addressing of climate
238. See Review of the Implementation of Commitments and of other Provisions of the
Convention: Preparations for the First Session of the Conference of the Parties Serving as
the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (Decision 8/Cp.4), United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/L.7 (2001),
available at httpJ/www.unfccc.int/resourcedocs/cop6secpart107.pdf.
239. See id. at 10.
240. For reviews of the Bonn Agreement and related political "deal-making", see R.J.
Kopp, An Analysis of the Bonn Agreement, WEATHERVANE, at http://www.weathervane
.rff.org/features/featurel34.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2001); Summary of the Resumed
Sixth Session of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change, 12 EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL. (July 30, 2001), at
http://www.iisd.ca/linkages/vol12/enb12176e.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2001). The
Conference of the Parties at its seventh session in Marrakesh, Morocco in November,
2001, while developing some rules for emissions trading joint implementation and the
clean development mechanism, still left for future decision the legal form of compliance
procedures and mechanisms. The Marrakesh Accords are available at
http://www.unfccc.delcop7/documents/accords draft.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2001).
241. Given the substantial pollutant loading from the Russian Federation, especially
heavy metals and smog from northern industries including smelters, a special concern is
when the Russian Federation will accept binding legal obligations. See Inuit Circumpolar
Conference, Northern Contaminants and Global POPs Program, at
http://inuitcircumpolar.con/Activities/NorthernContaminantsandGlob/Northern_conta
minants-and.glob.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2001).
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change threats remains elusive. 2 2 The Regional Programme of Action
for the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment From Land-Based
Activities remains quite a general document with few concrete actions
and lacking a guaranteed budget.24 ' The Arctic Council has continued
the "talk and study" mentality of the Arctic Environmental Protection
Strategy.
Various political and practical realities will likely continue to
hinder strong governance responses. Arctic States, like Canada and the
United States, are not driven solely by a "northern vision" while
southern economic and trade interest have compromised negotiation
positions in climate change and chemicals management.2" Forging
comprehensive and effective environmental agreements has not come
easy with continuing problems of weak standards, limited acceptance
and implementation, insufficient financing and questionable compliance
and enforcement.24 A globalization agenda and free market values
have overshadowed alternative societal visions embracing cultural
diversity and environmental integrity.
24
While fundamental reforms in forging international environmental
law have been called for, such as an empowered UN Environment
Organization with regulatory powers and strengthened public and
industry representation, 7 various incremental steps seem more likely
242. See The Royal Institute of International Affairs' various workshop reports and
papers on climate change, at http://www.riia.org/Reasearch/eep/eepl.html#cc (12 October
2001).
243. For a detailed critique see David VanderZwaag, Land-Based Marine Pollution in
the Arctic: Polarities Between Principles and Practice, in PROTECTING THE POLAR AND
MARINE ENVIRONMENT: LAW AND POLICY FOR POLLUTION PREVENTION 192-94 (Davor
Vidas ed., 2000).
244. For a good discussion of how Canada's negotiating positions for the UN ECE
POPs Protocol were subject to differing views of civil servants and how a coalition of
indigenous groups sought to influence Canada's positions, see Terry Fenge, POPs in the
Arctic: Turning Science into Policy, 25:2 N. PERSP., 21 (1998). The Government of Canada
has provided federal funding to allow the Canadian Arctic Indigenous Peoples Against
POPs (CAIPAP) to be involved in international negotiation processes. See ENVIRONMENT
CANADA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN THE CANADIAN
ARCTIC (2000), available at http://www.ec.gc.ca/agenda2I/2000/indigenous.htm (last
visited Nov. 9, 2001).
245. For a review of the theoretical and practical problems of evolving international
environmental law relating to oceans, see Douglas M. Johnston & David L. VanderZwaag,
The Ocean and International Environmental Law: Swimming, Sinking and Treading
Water at the Millennium, 43 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 141 (2000).
246. For a discussion of how globalization efforts have supported inequalities and
hierarchical decision-making, see Anthony G. McGrew, Human Rights in a Global Age:
Coming to Terms with Globalization, in HUMAN RIGHTS FIFTY YEARS ON: A REAPPRAISAL
188 (Tony Evans ed., 1998).
247. For example, see Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International
Environmental Law, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 259 (1992). See also Frank Biermann, The Case
for a World Environment Organization, 42 ENV'T 22 (2000). An Open-Ended
Intergovernmental Group of Ministers or their Representatives on International
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in responding to Arctic transboundary environmental challenges.
Additional substances might be controlled under the global POPs
Agreement, UN ECE Protocols and other regional arrangements, such
as the OSPAR Convention and the North American Sound Management
Chemicals Initiative.248 As sources of heavy metals, such as mercury,
become clearer, pressures may increase for additional regional protocols
on heavy metals, for example for the Asia Pacific region, and even a
global agreement.
The development of a comprehensive and strong chemicals
convention, ensuring endocrine disruptors249 and other toxic substances
stay off the market and promoting non-synthetic industrial agricultural
processes, does not appear imminent50' UNEP's environmental law
reform agenda 251  has backed off encouraging negotiation of a
Environmental Governance has been considering various options for strengthening
governance and at the time of writing had yet to formalize proposals. See Linkages,
Summary of the Third Open-Ended Intergovernmental Group of Ministers or their
Representatives on International Environmental Governance, Sept. 9-10, 2001, at
http://www.iisd.ca/unepgc/ieg3/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2001).
248. For example, in June 2000, twelve additional hazardous chemicals were identified
under the OSPAR Convention for priority action including dicofol, endosulphan,
methoxychlor, octylphenol and benzene. See OSPAR Commission Press Notice, Further
Protection for the North-East Atlantic, at http://www.ospar.org/eng/html/final ospar_
2000pressrelease.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2001). The North American Sound
Management of Chemicals Initiative is considering the need for a regional action plan on
lindane. See Final Communiqu6, supra note 222. The possibility for the Initiative to be
expanded to other Latin American countries should also be recognized and capacity-
building and training efforts have been suggested for Central America in assisting
countries to fight malaria without DDT. See CEC, Program Update and Report on the
Outcome of the 8' Regular Meeting of the North American Working Group on the Sound
Management of Chemicals, at http://www.cec.org/programs.projects/pollutants-healthI
smoc/index.cfm?varlan=english (last visited Dec. 18, 2001).
249. For a review of special regulatory challenges raised by endocrine disruptors, some
of them POPs and whose numbers remain uncertain but estimated at over 50, see Noah
Sachs, Blocked Pathways: Potential Legal Responses to Endocrine Disrupting Chemicals,
24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 289 (1999).
250. For suggestions for a more proactive approach to chemicals management, see
David VanderZwaag, International Law and Arctic Marine Conservation and Protection:
A Slushy, Shifting Seascape, 9 GEO. INTL ENVTL. L. REV. 303, 342-344 (1997).
251. A Draft Programme for the Development and Periodic Review of Environmental
Law for the First Decade of the Twenty-First Century (Third Montevideo Programme),
following an experts meeting 23-27 October 2000, was tabled for approval at the February
2001 meeting of UNEP's Governing Council. See Meeting of Senior Government Officials
Expert in Environmental Law to Prepare a Programme for the Development and Periodic
Review of Environmental Law for the First Decade of the Twenty-First Century, Nairobi,
23-27 October 2000, UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/Env.Law/4/2 (2000), available at httpJ/www.unep.org/new-law/ (last visited Oct. 3,
2001). The Council adopted the Programme through decision 21/23. See Decisions
Adopted by the Governing Council at Its Twenty-First Session, UNITED NATIONS
ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, TWENTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE GOVERNING COUNCIL GLOBAL
MINISTERIAL ENVIRONMENT FORUM (Feb. 9, 2001), at 40.
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comprehensive, global chemicals agreement.2"2
Nor does the forging of Arctic regional agreements, such as a
framework regional seas agreement with protocols in key areas like
land-based activities, shipping, and biodiversity protection, seem likely
in the near future. 3 The PAME Working Group, recommending
against new international agreements in its 1996 Report,2 continues to
review the legal situation and is expected to report at the next Arctic
Council ministerial meeting in 2002. A U.S. administration, committed
to resource development in the North, including possibly opening up the
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to oil and gas development, is unlikely
to support new regional regulatory efforts. 2' The Arctic Council is still
a relatively new initiative and even the continued financial support for
that initiative remains uncertain.25
252. The Report of the experts meeting, including the Third Montevideo Programme in
Annex I, highlights the need for more effective implementation of existing international
environmental regimes rather than forging of new ones. Action items under Section 15 on
pollution prevention and control, while promoting the further development of regional
agreements to combat transboundary pollution, in particular transboundary air pollution,
merely calls for promoting, "the effective implementation of multilateral agreements in
the field of chemicals, including adherence to the Rotterdam Convention... and to a
global legally binding instrument on persistent organic pollutants." Another action item
is to elaborate, "a strategy to enhance the coherence between environmental and other
conventions concerning chemicals." Meeting of Senior Government Officials Expert in
Environmental Law to Prepare a Programme for the Development and Periodic Review of
Environmental Law for the First Decade of the Twenty-First Century, Nairobi: 23-27
October 2000: Report of the Meeting of Senior Government Officials Expert in
Environmental Law to Prepare a Programme for the Development and Periodic Review of
Environmental Law for the First Decade of the Twenty-First Century, UNITED NATIONS
ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, U.N. Doc. UNEP/Env.Law /4/4 (2000). In decision 21/7 on
Chemicals Management, the Governing Council of UNEP at its twenty-first session in
February 2001 requested "the Executive Director, in consultation with Governments, the
Inter-Organization Programme for the Sound Management of Chemicals, the
Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical Safety and other relevant organizations and
stakeholders to examine the need for a strategic approach to international chemicals
management and to prepare a report on the subject for consideration at the seventh
special session of the Governing Council/Global Ministerial Environment Forum in 2002."
Decisions Adopted by the Governing Council at Its Twenty-First Session, UNITED NATIONS
ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, TWENTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE GOVERNING COUNCIL GLOBAL
MINISTERIAL ENVIRONMENT FORUM (Feb. 9, 2001), at 12.
253. Various authors have suggested the need for strengthening the legal basis for
regional sea cooperation or at least further assessing the need. See Nigel Bankes, Steps
towards the International Regulation of POPs, 25:2 N. PERSP., 21 (1998); DOUGLAS
BRUBAKER, MARINE POLLUTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE
(1993).
254. See PAME 1996 Report, supra note 1, at 13-14.
255. See Bush Plans to Dismantle Recent Clinton/Gore Conservation Initiatives, 5:3
GARY GALLON ENVTL. LETTER, Jan. 18, 2001, available at
http://mai.flora.org/forum/23826.
256. Funding for Arctic Council activities continues to be voluntary and ad hoc. For a
discussion see David Scrivener, Arctic Environmental Cooperation in Transition, 35:192
POLAR RECORD 51, 55 (1999).
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While cooperative approaches to addressing environmental issues
in the Arctic have become the norm,57 the possibility of more
adversarial approaches cannot be ruled out. With pollutant modeling
becoming more sophisticated and individual sources identified, as in the
recent North American dioxin transport study,58 prospects for litigation
may increase.59 Indigenous groups might consider civil actions against
the more serious polluters including the seeking of injunctive relief.
State responsibility/liability claims, even if there was political will,
would face numerous obstacles including questions of jurisdiction and
acceptance of binding dispute resolution, as well as uncertain doctrinal
principles such as the basis of liability (strict vs. fault).260
One thing is certain. The Arctic law and policy agenda will not
remain "frozen in time" as various jurisprudential currents are
amassing and will likely drive further national, regional and
multilateral reforms. Calls for greater and clearer recognition of the
emerging right of children to a clean environment,2 61 the human right to
a healthy environment 262 and indigenous rights2 3 can be expected,
257. The large amounts of financial assistance pledged by G-7 nations to assist
Ukraine close and clean-up the Chernobyl nuclear plant and the recent Norwegian-
Russian agreement pledging Norwegian cooperation and financial aid in dealing with
pollution from the Northern Fleet has caused one author to lament over the trumping of
the polluter gets paid principle over state responsibility. See Justin Mellor, The Negative
Effects of Chernobyl on International Environmental Law: The Creation of the Polluter
Gets Paid Principle, 17 WIS. INT'L L.J. 65 (1999); Justin Mellor, Radioactive Waste and
Russia's Northern Fleet: Sinking the Principles of International Environmental Law, 28
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLY 51 (1999).
258. See BARRY CONMONER, ET AL., LONG-RANGE AIR TRANSPORT OF DIOXIN FROM
NORTH AMERICAN SOURCES TO ECOLOGICALLY VULNERABLE RECEPTORS IN NuNAvuT,
ARCTIC CANADA (2000).
259. For a review of legal issues surrounding transboundary pollution cases, see PAUL
MULDOON, CROSS-BORDER LITIGATION: ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE GREAT LAKES
ECOSYSTEM (1986).
260. The International Law Commission has for decades been involved in drafting
articles on state responsibility and international liability for injurious consequences
arising out of acts not prohibited by international law, but no global agreements have
been forged and customary law principles remain controversial. See Devereau F.
McClatchey, Chernobyl and Sandoz One Decade Later: The Evolution of State
Responsibility for International Disasters, 1986-1996, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 659
(1996).
261. See Malgoria Fitzmaurice, The Right of the Child to a Clean Environment, 23 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 611 (1999); THE RIGHT OF THE CHILD TO A CLEAN ENVIRONMENT (Agata
Fijalkowski & Malgoria Fitzmaurice eds., 2000).
262. See John Lee, The Underlying Legal Theory to Support a Well-Defined Human
Right to a Healthy Environment as a Principle of Customary International Law, 25
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 283 (2000).
263. Various rights continue to evolve including land and resource rights, rights to
engage in traditional and economic activities and self-governance but one of the most
important for environmental protection purposes may be the right to a people not to be
deprived of its own means of subsistence which is recognized in Article 1 of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International
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especially from NGOs and indigenous groups." The precautionary
principle/approach will continue to spark debate over how strong
precautionary measures should be.'65 Whether ongoing tinkerings will
be sufficient to ward off Arctic environmental disasters remains
questionable.
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. HUMAN RIGHTS, SELECTED DOCUMENTS 40-61
(Willem-Jan F.M. van der Wolf ed., 1994). For general review of indigenous rights see
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Sarah Pritchard ed.,
1998); SHARON HELEN VENNE, OUR ELDERS UNDERSTAND OUR RIGHTS: EVOLVING
INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDING INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (1998); and Garth Nettheim,
'Peoples' and 'Populations': Indigenous Peoples and the Rights of Peoples, in THE RIGHTS
OF PEOPLES 107 (James Crawford ed., 1988).
264. The Indigenous Environmental Network, in fact, argued for strong global
measures on POPs in light of various indigenous rights and prepared a briefing paper for
the fourth negotiating session in Bonn. INDIGENOUS ENVIRONMENTAL NETWORK,,
Indigenous Peoples and POPs, Briefing Paper in Preparation for the UNEP POPs
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC4) Meeting, in Bonn Germany, 20-25
March 2000, at http://www.ienearth.orgtpops-bonn-ieall.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2001).
265. The precautionary principle/approach, while torn between differing political and
philosophical views, has potential to continually drive decision-makers in more
preventative and biocentric directions. See, e.g., Andrew Jordan & Timothy O'Riordan,
The Precautionary Principle in Contemporary Environmental Policy and Politics, in
PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPLEMENTING THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 15, 32(Carolyn Raffensperger & Joel A. Tickner eds., 1999).
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INTRODUCTION
The law of state succession is one of the most complicated issues in
public international law.1 Although it has been dealt with since the
beginning of human interest in the field of relations among different
political entities,2 scholars, economists and politicians have seldom
'This work is dedicated to my wife, Ludovica.
* Ph.D. candidate,UniversitA degli Studi di Padova, Italy; J.D.,UniversitA degli Studi
Milano Bicocca, Italy; LL.M. in Internation and Comparative Law, Tulane Law School. I
would like to thank Professor Alberto Miele and Enrico Zamuner, Ph.d. (University of
Padova), Professor Tullio Scovazzi (University of Milano - Bicocca), Professor Gunther
Handl (Tulane Law School), and Professor William Anthony Lovett (Tulane Law School)
for their interesting suggestions and the useful discussions on this topic.
1. See, ROBERT YEWDALL JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (1963); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
654 (4" ed. 1990).
2. The definition of international relations - implying states as major subjects in the
international arena - demands a definition of international community (see, e.g., Christian
Tomuschat, Obligations Arising for States Without or Against Their Will, 241 RECUEIL
DES COURS 195, 232-236 (1993), discussing the theoretical foundations of the
international community) and INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS
(Mohammed Bedjaoui ed., 1991), especially the general introduction by the editor, at 1,
and the article by Luigi Condorelli, Custom, at 179. Notwithstanding this caveat, and the
fact that most scholars regard modern international community a product of the
Westphalia Peace (1648), early descriptions of succession among political entities are
provided by Grotius (see GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES, Vol. II, Ch. IX, §
XII (Aalen 1993) (1625).
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reached an agreement on what the real legal rules are on how to treat
this phenomenon. This note will analyze the case of the succession of
Yugoslavia and some of the problems raised by the disintegration of
that country into separate republics, paying special regards to the fate
of its financial obligations.
In order to address these concerns, the First Section will "set the
stage", providing some relevant facts that occurred before the Yugoslav
Federation broke up. The Second Section is an attempt to summarize
the present "state of the law" regarding state succession and financial
obligations (public debts). The Third Section will focus on the specific
problem of the distinction between succession as a phenomenon of fact,
on one side, and its consequences on the other, taking into account
historical cases as well as more recent events in Central and Eastern
Europe. Finally, the Fourth Section will deal with the fate of Yugoslav
public debts in the aftermath of its dissolution: the many options that
were proposed and various theoretical and practical problems faced by
the successor states. It will also try and assess the policy of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro)3 as regarding the apportionment of the former
Yugoslavia's public debt and the seemingly viable solution envisaged in
recent agreements .
I. THE CRISIS OF YUGOSLAVIA
In 1989, the tide was definitively turning against planned
economies and socialist parties all over Eastern Europe. In particular,
because of the deadly mixture of bad planning and populist promises,
the Yugoslav federation was suffering a terrible financial crisis.5 The
federal government launched a 'shock therapy' to curb inflation and
boost foreign investment. One year later, in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Croatia and Slovenia political pluralism developed: new nationalistic
parties - clearly anti-communist and, thus, anti-federation - were
quickly formed and won elections throughout the year.' On the other
side, in Belgrade, the Serbian Assembly suspended Kosovo's
government and parliament after Milosevic was elected Serbian
president with 65% of the popular vote. The election of Milosevic was a
signal that Serbia was in the field of the republics supporting
3. The denomination of the Yugoslav Federation (FRY) after April 27", 1992.
4. Before its dissolution, Yugoslavia was known as the Federal Socialist Republic of
Yugoslavia (FSRY). This denomination, as well as those of 'former federation', 'former
Yugoslavia', or simply 'Yugoslavia' will be used throughout this note.
5. On the economical situation of Yugoslavia, see Valerie Bunce, The Elusive Peace
in the Former Yugoslavia, 28 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 709, 712 (1995) and cited references.
6. See Konrad G. Bdhler, State Succession, Identity I Continuity and Membership in
the United Nations, in LA SUCCESSION D'ETATS: LA CODIFICATION A L'9PREUVE DES FAITS -
STATE SUCCESSION: CODIFICATION TESTED AGAINST THE FACTS 274-78 (Pierre Michel
Eisemann & Martti Koskenniemi eds., 2000) [hereinafter Eisemann & Koskenniemi].
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nationalism and rejecting a decentralization of the political and
economic system.
7
From that moment on, the struggle to keep the federation united -
at least as a confederation of sovereign states - interfered with the
struggle of Serbia to 'protect' its nationals who happened to be living in
other republics; also, Milosevic was advocating a 'strong Serbia' as the
leading force to promote a 'strong Yugoslavia'. The fact that the army
was seen as mostly Serbian in its higher cadres, and strongly pro-
federation, created a potentially powerful tool in the hands of its
leadership, but, even more, a reason for strong suspicion about the role
of the military within the republics.8 Moreover, this attempt for a
centralizing policy on the part of the Serbian leadership caught the
federal institutions in a moment of particular crisis; in fact, the
economic package launched in 1990 under an IMF Stand-by Agreement
(SBA) and a World Bank Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL II) required
large budget cuts and redirection of federal revenues towards debt
servicing. This led to the suspension of transfer payments by the center
to the governments of the Republics and autonomous provinces, thereby
creating even more discomfort towards the federal authorities, in a
moment of great distress.9
This internal situation also found the international community
unwilling, at least in part, to deal with the task of relieving the
situation.' In 1991, while the eyes of the world were focused on the
Gulf War, Tudjman and Milosevig were secretly meeting at Karadjordje
to discuss territorial partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the first military
outbreaks took place in Croatia, and Serbs of Krajina in a local
referendum declared their willingness to remain part of Yugoslavia.
Slovenia and Croatia declared their own sovereignty at the end of
7. Bihler, supra note 6, at 274-78.
8. An interesting analysis of the path from one Yugoslav nationalism to the
multitude of 'post-Yugoslav' nationalisms is provided in OLIVIER LADIsLAv KUBLI, Du
NATIONALISME YUGOSLAVE AUX NATIONALISMES POST-YOUGOSLAVES, (1998). See also
LAURA SILBER & ALLAN LITTLE, YUGOSLAVIA: DEATH OF A NATION, (1996) (especially Part
One).
9. MICHEL CHOSSUDOvSKY, THE GLOBALISATION OF POVERTY - IMPACTS OF IMF AND
WORLD BANK REFORMS 246 (1997). See also SUSAN WOODWARD, BALKAN TRAGEDY:
CHAOS AND DISSOLUTION AFTER THE COLD WAR 40 (1995) and Ann Orford, Locating the
International: Military and Monetary Interventions After the Cold War, 38 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 443, 452 (1997).
10. There seemed to be strong support for maintaining the territorial integrity of the
federation on part of the United States, the European Community and its members, the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well as Russia. Such a position
undoubtedly strengthened the perception in the Yugoslav and in the Serbian leaderships
that flexibility was not required in negotiations, since independence for Slovenia and
Croatia was not supported internationally. See Marc Weller, The International Response
to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 569,
570 (1992).
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June;" it is true that, at this very moment, the EC began an arms
embargo, freezing all economic aid to Yugoslavia in July in an effort to
try and ease the situation, but then the attention was diverted to
Moscow, where Gorbachev was declared 'sick' and then came back -
under the 'protective' wings of Yeltsin - after one of the strangest coups
in history. The only action taken by the European Community was the
establishment of a 'Peace Conference' on Yugoslavia; such an action,
that would prove to be very important for the resolution of the legal
problems linked to the dissolution of Yugoslavia, would be virtually
useless in regards to the conflicts and the political solution to the
crisis. 12 Macedonia, too, declared its independence in September, 3 and
only this triggered the first United Nations' action, when the Security
Council adopted a Resolution 4 for an embargo on arms sales to
Yugoslavia.
11. In this context, it is interesting to note the impact of the first casualties,
atrocities, and human rights violations not only on the international community, but, in
the first place, on the people of former Yugoslavia itself. The alienation towards the
central government on part of the general public greatly increased during the first
skirmishes in Slovenia and Croatia, as well as the deep distrust towards the Federal
Army (JNA).
12. At a meeting held in Brussels on August 27, 1991, the EC had actually agreed to
convene a peace conference on Yugoslavia that would bring together the Federal
presidency and the Federal Government of Yugoslavia, the Presidents of the six republics,
the president of the EC Council and representatives of the EC Commission and EC
member states. In this framework, an arbitration procedure would enhance the rule of
law in the settlement of disputes. This Arbitration Commission was to be made up of
three members appointed by the EC and two unanimously appointed by the collective
Yugoslav Presidency. However, this body never reached an agreement, and the three
members appointed by the EC chose to appoint the other two. At the first meeting, the
five members decided to elect as Chairman Mr. Badinter, the President of the French
Conseil Constitutionnel. This Commission [hereinafter, Badinter Commission, or
Commission] received the full support of the United States and of the USSR; in August
1992 it was replaced by the UN/EC International Conference on Yugoslavia For more
information about the role of the Commission in the Yugoslav crisis, see Maurizio Ragazzi,
Introductory Note, 31 I.L.M. 1488,1490 (1992). For a critique of the activity of the
Commission, see Michla Pomerance, The Badinter Commission: The Use and Misuse of the
International Court of Justice's Jurisprudence, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 31 (1998). As regards
the Opinions rendered by the Commission, see Badinter Commission, infra note 17, §3.
13. Macedonia is now widely recognized, although with the name of "Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" (FYROM); it was admitted to the UN in April 1993 (see
Susan Woodward, Are International Institutions Doing Their Job?, 90 AM. SOCY INT'L L.
PROC. 471, 473 (1996)). For the purposes of this note, the denomination of Macedonia will
be adopted.
14. S. C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/713 (1991), repealed after the
Dayton Agreement through S. C. Res. 1021, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. SIRES/1021 (1995). At
the meeting in 1991, the situation was especially confused, as demonstrated by the fact
that the Yugoslav representative, in an unprecedented move, requested that a complete
embargo be adopted through mandatory Security Council action under Chapter VII
against the country he was representing (U.N. Doc. S/PV.3009, at 17). For a vivid
description of the meeting, see Weller, supra note 10, at 578-79.
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If the Security Council was no longer hostage to the vetoes by the
Superpowers, one of which was rapidly losing its status, it could do no
more than condemn and adopt weak actions, without being able to
promote any real diplomatic solution for events that were clearly
developing as 'a threat to international peace and security."' In
October, the situation appeared even more complex: Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia were on the verge of
becoming independent countries, leaving Montenegro with Serbia as
the two remaining constituent parts of the Federation; the question
seemed to be only one of timing and of the legal framework to contain
the more than likely outbreak of violence. At this point, the European
Community finally decided to take a stand, one that looked bold to
many: it would not recognize newly independent countries in Eastern
Europe if they did not meet high criteria, never heard before in the field
of states' recognition.'" This action could have had a 'chilling' effect on
the rush towards independence that many republics were showing, and
it could have also promoted a more coherent approach by other
important countries - the United States, the fellow Non-aligned
countries, the newly emerging independent Russia together with the
other republics, all eager for international support and recognition
themselves. But the European Community was not able to live up to its
own set standards.
On December 23rd, 1991 Germany decided to unilaterally recognize
Slovenia and Croatia as independent countries, thus defeating the
substantive requirements - as well as even the timetable - previously
agreed on." The rest of the Community followed suit on January 15',
15. Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations deals with "Actions with respect
to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression." In particular, the
Security Council has primary responsibility to "determine the existence of any threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and [to] make recommendations, or
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain
or restore international peace and security." (U.N. CHARTER, art. 39).
16. The Declaration on Yugoslavia was issued at the Extraordinary Ministerial
Meeting held on December 16, 1991, in Brussels (see 31 I.L.M. 1485 (1992)). It contained
the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet
Union, [hereinafter Guidelines] where the member States agreed to "recognise, subject to
the normal standards of international practice and the political realities in each case,
those new states which, following the historic changes in the region, have constituted
themselves on a democratic basis, have accepted the appropriate international obligations
and have committed themselves in good faith to a peaceful process and to negotiations."
(emphasis added). On this point, see Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic
Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 90-91 (1992). As regards the 'appropriate international
obligations', the guidelines explained that the process of recognition required, inter alia,
"commitment to settle by agreement [... 1 all questions regarding state succession and
regional disputes". On the relevance of this specification, see Badinter Commission,
Opinion n. 5, 31 I.L.M. 1488, 1503.
17. See Badinter Commission, Opinion n. 5, supra note 16, at § 3, suggesting Croatia
was not fully 'ready' to be recognized: in fact, the Constitution of December 4, 1991, did
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respecting the formal dateline, but not necessarily the standards
proposed in the Guidelines. More importantly, on April 6" the
European Community recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina (despite negative
Badinter Commission advice)"s and refused to grant recognition of
Macedonia, due to the Greek veto (despite positive Badinter
Commission advice).'9  On the next day, the United States, too,
recognized Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 0 while, on April
27t', Serbia and Montenegro declared the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia to be the 'continuation' of the dismantled SFRY. This
happened while a surge of violence was taking place in the territory of
the republics of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina; especially in the
latter, war crimes and terrible human rights violations occurred,21
creating an environment where effective negotiations among the parties
was difficult to start, let alone succeed.
II. THE LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION
This note purports to shed some light on the legal principles
governing the transfer of financial obligations due to the succession in
the territory of the former Yugoslavia. In order to accomplish this aim,
however, it is necessary to reach an agreement on the terminology that
will be used, a common problem in dealing with international law
theory to be applied in practice. In particular, the definitions of 'state' -
and the relevance of recognition -, of debt, and of succession seem
necessary hermeneutical 'tools' for our purposes.
A. The State
Although this might seem an academic question with no practical
not sufficiently incorporate the suggested provisions on the autonomy of minorities;
written reiteration by President Tudjman of the commitments to protect the 'special
status' of minorities, however, was deemed sufficient (see Weller, supra, note 10, at 593.
As for Slovenia, see Badinter Commission, Opinion n. 7, 31 I.L.M. 1488, 1512 (declaring
that Slovenia met the requirements). On the question of the legality of secession by
Croatia and Slovenia, an early view was provided by Richard Iglar, Comment: The
Constitutional Crisis in Yugoslavia and the International Law of Self-Determination:
Slovenia's and Croatia's Right to Secede, 15 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.REv. 228 (1992).
18. Badinter Commission, Opinion n. 4, 31 I.L.M. 1488, 1501. On the international
subjectivity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, see Matthew Craven, The European Community
Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia, 66 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 333, 375 (1995).
19. Badinter Commission, Opinion n. 6, 31 I.L.M. 1488, 1507.
20. The United Nations recognized Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina on May
22, 1992, (U.N. Press Release, ORG/1156, Jan. 19, 1993).
21. See S.C. Res. 752, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/752 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 145
(demanding compliance with the April 12, 1992 cease-fire and urging to stop "violent
deterioration" of the situation) and S.C. Res. 757, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/757
(1992), 31 I.L.M. 1453 (calling for "immediate cessation of forcible expulsions and
attempts to change the ethnic composition of the populace").
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consequences, many discussions have actually arisen about the legal
threshold of what really constitutes a State, especially with regard to
the break-up of Yugoslavia.n The Restatement23 clarifies that an entity
must satisfy four requirements for statehood: territory,? permanent
population, government and capacity to conduct international relations.
Some of these elements, however, are quite loosely defined. For
example, the territory requirement seems to be satisfied even though its
boundaries have not been finally settled;2 5 also, the definition of
permanent population comprises situations like the one of the Vatican
City - with a mere 400 citizens and a total of around 750 permanent
residents.26 This is one of the reasons why it is possible to affirn that
the government, with its effective jurisdiction within state borders
and/or on the population, and its innate capacity to enter into relation
with other subjects of international law is clearly the most relevant
characterizing aspects of the State."
What is important to note, however, is that scholars are generally
agreed that an entity fulfilling these requirements is a State as such,
and does not need any kind of recognition by the 'international
community' to become a member.2 But, obviously, things are not as
22. In general, "all theories of succession must be funded in some general view of the
State, and on the relations between, on the one hand, the State and its internal legal
order and, on the other, that legal order and the international legal order of the
community of States." (O'Connell cited in James Crawford, The Contribution of Professor
D. P. O'Connell to the Discipline of International Law, 1980 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 23).
23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, §201
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT]; see especially Comments b to e. Although there are other,
very interesting, theories on the identity of states, this definition seems very useful in
describing the events in Central and Eastern Europe during the last decade of the
Twentieth Century, and will be therefore used in this work as a ground basis.
24. See Island of Palmas Case (1928), 2 RIAA 829, 839 (Judge Huber), stating that
"Territorial sovereignty ... involves the exclusive right to display the activities of a
State." Id.
25. See P.K, MENON, THE LAW OF RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 34 (1994).
26. See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 36-7
(1979); MENON, supra note 26, at 58-9.
27. See GAETANO ARANGIO-RUIZ, L'ETAT DANS LE SENS DU DROIT DES GENS ET LA
NOTION DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 297 (1975); see also ALBERTO MIELE, GLi STATI 4-
5(2001).
28. In international law, the question of recognition arises when a new state emerges
and I[... I seeks to establish relations with other existing states and also when it applies
for membership of the UN and other international [... I organizations." SEN, A
DIPLOMAT'S HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 501 (3 d ed. 1988) cited in
Mirjam Skrk, Recognition of States and Its (Non-)Implications on State Succession: The
Case of Successor States to the Former Yugoslavia, SUCCESSION OF STATES 15-31 (Mojmir
Mrak ed.,1998) [hereinafter Mrak]. Moreover, scholars have extensively drawn
distinctions between the recognition of States and the recognition of governments, the
latter being just a gesture of acceptance in the transition of governments within the
constitutional - domestic - order of a State. The establishment of diplomatic relations is
still a different matter, usually relating to mere political appreciation of a specific
government in a given situation. See MENON, supra, note 26, at 61-4; see also H.
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simple as that. Whether an entity satisfies the requirements for
statehood is ordinarily determined by other states when they decide to
treat that entity as a state.29 Moreover, many believe there is actually
no duty to recognize another entity as a state, although there is at least
a duty not to recognize an entity not fulfilling the above-mentioned
requirements." Thus, although recognition may not be theoretically
claimed to be a necessary step on the way to statehood, it may represent
an important achievement for a state-to-be or, even more, for a new
state.
During the last decade of the past century, however, the
dissolutions of Yugoslavia and the USSR have prompted a new attitude
by some countries - in particular, the European Community and its
members - which tried to establish other criteria to be admitted within
the international community. Specifically, the E.C. issued the now
famous "Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe
and in the Soviet Union", envisaging the standards new states are
supposed to meet in order to be deemed worthy of recognition. s' In
particular, the guidelines declare that those European countries are
ready to recognize, "subject to the normal standards of international
practice and the political realities in each case, those new states which,
following the historic changes in the region, have constituted
themselves on a democratic basis, have accepted the appropriate
international obligations and have committed themselves in good faith
to a peaceful process and to negotiations."3 2 This part was clarified in
the "commitment to settle by agreement ... all questions concerning
state succession and regional disputes."3
Much has been written and said regarding the 'democratic
governance' element as one creating a new level of control in the hands
of the international community.' But what is relevant for the present
discussion is, rather, the requirement of the need to accept the
appropriate international obligations in order to be recognized as a new
subject of international law. What are these obligations? Do they
comprise financial obligations of the predecessor state? Who is entitled
to define them and to decide whether these entities have accepted
them? Arguably, the answer to the latter question is the European
LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 88 (1947) (affirming the entitlement
of validly constituted governments to recognition).
29. RESTATEMENT, supra note 23, at § 201, comment h.
30. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 94-95 (1979).
31. See Guidelines, supra note 16, at 1486.
32. Id. (emphasis added).
33. Id.
34. For the emergence of the criterion of 'democratic governance' even before the case
of Yugoslavia, see Franck, supra note 16. For an early appraisal of this trend as regards
Yugoslavia, see Jean Salmon, Reconnaissance d'Etats, 25 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INT'L
226, 231-9 (1992).
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Community and its member States, those who issued these guidelines
and were thus, probably, the more interested in abiding by them.35 So,
in regard to the history of the swift break-up of Yugoslavia and the
problem raised during its succession, it is important to take into
account these political statements, as well as the way they were
interpreted through subsequent practice.
B. The Debts
Regarding the definition of what is a 'state debt', different scholars
have presented slightly different views, and it might be useful to focus
on some of them. Jennings and Watts write: "A state debt is any
financial obligation of a predecessor state arising in conformity with
international law towards another state, an international organization
or any other subject of international law. On the passing of state debts
the obligations of the predecessor state are extinguished and the
obligations of the successor state in respect of the state debts which
pass to it arise."36
The 1983 Convention 37 simply described a "state debt" as all those
"financial obligations undertaken by a state in conformity with
international law." One conceptual problem is posed by the fact that
the 1983 Convention was limited to dealing with debts contracted by
sovereigns with other subjects of international law, thus excluding
foreign nationals.38 In any case, there appears to be no doubt that
financial obligations, whether towards a foreign sovereign or a foreign
national, will be protected to a certain extent.3' On one hand, it is true
35. Ironically, many authors have pointed to the fact that those very European
countries could not force themselves to abide by these new self-imposed standards. In
fact, they promptly recognized: Bosnia-Herzegovina, whose status as a state was highly
questionable at the time, and Croatia, whose standards of democratic governance hardly
met any requirement especially in relation to minorities. See Weller, supra note 10, at
586.
36. JENNINGS & WATTS, 1 OPPENHEIMER'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 244 (9th ed. 1993).
37. Vienna Convention in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts, April 8,
1983, 22 I.L.M. 298 [hereinafter 1983 Convention]; this convention has never entered into
force, and it is largely thought not to reflect customary international law. It has been
ratified only by Croatia, Egypt, Georgia, Macedonia and Ukraine. See Multilateral
Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General (Status as on Dec. 31, 2000), U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER/E 19 (2001). On the debate about the 1983 Convention, See Eli Nathan,
The Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and
Debts, INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY (ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SHABTAI
ROSENNE) 489 (Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tabory eds., 1989).
38. Art. 33 of the 1983 Convention, supra note 37. This point was especially insisted
upon by the countries with a planned economy. See Nathan, supra note 37, at 505-509.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 23, at §209 (criticizing the lack of protection for private
creditors). Although art. 6 of the 1983 Convention leaves the door open to clauses and to
interpretations of customary international law. RESTATEMENT, supra note 23, at §201.
39. Scholars argue this point on the basis of customary international law. In
particular, reference should be made to the opinion expressed by the Permanent Court of
International Justice in the German Settlers Case, where it held that: "[pirivate rights
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that "foreign debt is generated in much the same way as domestic debt",
in that some financial institution agrees to borrow money from a foreign
source to fund a variety of projects and, in return, promises to pay
creditors principal and interest at regular intervals. On the other
hand, the sovereign state usually guarantees the debt, or, in many
cases, is the direct borrower. This fact poses a series of interesting
questions: the advantage of having some or all the finances of a state as
guarantee of the payment is very important, but the lending institution
must take into account some set-backs - for example, the uncertainty
regarding the law governing the contract and the difficulties in
enforcing against a defaulting sovereign."'
The World Bank 2 defines 'total debt stocks' as the sum of public
and publicly guaranteed long-term debt,43 the use of IMF credit," and
short-term debt.5  What is relevant for the purposes of our discussion
on the fate of financial obligations during a case of state succession is
long-term external debt, and in particular all public and publicly
guaranteed debt contracted by a sovereign (thus, excluding long-term
private non-guaranteed debt).46  These debts may well have been
contracted towards a multilateral official creditor (IMF, World Bank,
other multilateral institutions), or a public entity (a state); they might
also have been borrowed from a private creditor (a commercial bank or
others).
Another useful distinction is usually made, as regards international
acquired under existing law do not cease on a change of sovereignty... [E]ven those who
contest the existence in international law of a general principle of State succession do not
go so far as to maintain that private rights including those acquired from the State as the
owner of property are invalid as against a successor in sovereignty." Settlers of German
Origin in the Territory Ceded by Germany to Poland, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 6, at 36.
40. See Richard Schechter & Stanley Macel IV, When a Sovereign Defaults, LEGAL
TIMES, Sept. 9, 1996, at S36.
41. On the issue of the litigation of international debt claims in US courts during the
Eighties, see Jagdeep Bhandari, International Debt Litigation in United States Courts, 33
GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 383 (1990).
42. See, e.g., World Debt Tables (1994-95), External Finance for Developing
Countries, vol. 2, p. xv-xx.
43. Long-term debt is an external obligation of a public debtor, including the national
government, a political subdivision (or an agency of either), and autonomous public
bodies.
44. Use of IMF credit denotes repurchase obligations to the IMF with respect to all
uses of IMF resources.
45. Short-term external debt is defined as debt that has an original maturity of one
year or less, and the World Bank does not draw any distinction between public and
private non-guaranteed short-term debt for lack of adequate data.
46. This kind of debt may also pose relevant legal problems during succession of
states. In fact, a new legal regime may be applicable to private agreements as a result of
the replacement of one State by another and this may give rise to claims relating to
contracts of a financial nature. Nonetheless, this note will only address the issue of debts
contracted either by a public body, or guaranteed by such an entity.
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debts, between local, localized and general debts. LOCAL DEBTS are
those contracted by a local territorial authority - such as a province, or
a federated republic - for its own purposes according to the powers
granted to it by the constitutional 'division of powers' within the
country.47 LOCALIZED DEBTS can be negotiated both by the central
government and by local authorities, but they are meant to pertain
particularly to the development of a localized interest (a regional
railroad development scheme, an investment to start-up a mining
operation, the creation of a port...).48 Both of these cases are
conceptually easy to deal with in the case of succession, as the interest
at stake is fairly easily found to have a regional relevance; this means
that the debt will easily be accepted by the successor state gaining
authority on that territory. On the contrary, states usually negotiate
mainly 'GENERAL DEBTS' ('non-allocated debt'), debts that do not have a
specific territorial aim in mind, but serve the various purposes of state
actions modern economies require.49 These are the financial obligations
that pose the gravest problems in terms of policy of the successor states,
as well as in terms of law.
The expressions "public debt" and "state debt" are usually used as
synonyms, although, technically, they describe slightly different
concepts. Relying upon the conceptual distinction between 'state' and
'local' debts, it seems logical that 'state debts' are only those negotiated
by the central authorities of a country, while 'public debts' also include
those undertaken by regional or other minor territorial entities within
their official (public) authority. 'o In regards to localized debts
47. DANIEL PATRICK O'CONNELL, 1 STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 452 (1967).
48. These are "debts raised I.... with respect to expenditure on particular projects in
particular territories", I. L. A., Report of the 54" Conference, Aug. 23-29, 1970. A broader
definition of localized debt is one that takes into account all those financial obligations
linked to a specific territory; these are not only the expenditures on specific projects, but
also general obligations secured on a specific territory (secured debts). O'CONNELL, supra
note 47, at 407. For the purposes of this note, debts secured on a portion of the
predecessor state and localized debts will be considered together, unless specified.
49. The history of how public debts developed together with the development of the
modern state is fascinating. As a first step in this evolution, there are the personal debts
of the ruling Monarchs insofar as these obligations were not contracted for personal
purposes but for governing the state; then, at different moments in each state these debts
started to be regarded as of the Crown, and not personal of the Monarch; finally the
obligations started being regarded as of the State itself, often identified with the Nation
(especially in Continental Europe after the French Revolution). See Alexandre Sack, La
Succession aux Dettes Publiques d'Etat, 23 RECUEIL DES COURS 149 (1928).
50. This distinction seems especially relevant in the case of Yugoslavia, where the
difficult relationship between the central government and the single republics - and the
respective competences - is subject to a large debate. See Stephan Oeter, State
Succession and the Struggle over Equity: Some Observations on the Laws of State
Succession with Respect to State Property and Debts in Cases of Separation and
Dissolution of States, 38 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 73 (1995).
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(comprising debts secured on a specific territory), these are without any
doubt part of the 'state debts,' but this does not mean that they will be
treated together with the general debts (undertaken on behalf of all the
country and not secured on a specific portion of territory).
C. Succession
Both the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of
Treaties5 and the Vienna Convention in Respect of State Property,
Archives and Debts 2 provide the same definition as regards the legal
phenomenon of succession of states 3, which is:
[...] "succession of States" means the replacement of one State by
another in the responsibility for the international relations of territory".
The changes in the territory - or, rather, the changes in
government over a specific territory - may create different legal
outcomes, regulated by rules of international law on state succession.
These different outcomes can be, and usually are, labeled in order to
avoid confusion among similar situations; it must be clear from the
beginning that these 'labels', these categories, merely serve as useful
models to describe the legal significance of these replacements in
authority, and do not fully describe the whole variety of historical paths
leading to such changing.'
In the cases of universal succession - provided by dismemberment
and unification - every continuation of the predecessor state's
51. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, August 23,
1978, 17 I.L.M. 1488 [hereinafter 1978 Convention]. Although only 15 ratifications or
accessions were needed for it to enter into force, it did so only on November 6, 1996. The
15 instruments have been deposited by: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Dominica, Egypt,
Estonia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Macedonia, Morocco, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tunisia,
Ukraine, Yugoslavia. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General
(Status as on Apr. 23, 1997), U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E (1997).
52. 1983 Convention, supra note 38. On this Convention, see Rudolf Streinz,
Succession of States in Assets and Liabilities - a New Regime? The 1983 Vienna
Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives, and Debts, 26
GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 198 (1983). For a Soviet perspective on this topic, see G.K. Efimov,
Konferentsia OON po Voprosy o Pravopreemstv'e Gosudarstv v. Otnoshenii
Gosudrstv'ennoi Sobstvennosti, Gosudarstv'ennich Archivov i Gosudrstv'ennich Dolgov,
1984 SOVIET Y.B. INT'L L. 291.
53. The fact that very few countries have ratified or accepted has led many authors to
believe that they do not enshrine accepted principles of international law. For an analysis
of the customary provisions as opposed to those of 'progressive development' in the 1978
Convention, see ANTHONY AuST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 305-31 (2000). On
the relevance of some of the legal rules contained in the 1983 Convention, see Oeter, supra
note 50, at 89-92.
54. International scholars have neglected the study of how these replacements took
place - be it through wars, peace treaties, decolonization processes, willful unification... -
focusing instead on the outcomes - secession, unification, dissolution... - and trying to
create appropriate legal categories to describe them.
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subjectivity ceases to exist; in this sense, identity is the antithesis of
succession. When, for example, Zanzibar and Tanganyika decided to
unite, at one point - on April 25'h 1964 - they ceased to exist, while an
altogether new subject entered the international community -
Tanzania. 5  On the contrary, in all the other cases, identity persists as
regards to the subjectivity of the predecessor state - Great Britain still
existed as the same subject even after the secession of the Thirteen
colonies;6 neither Russia nor the United States as subjects of
international law were affected in their essence by the transfer of
Alaska.1 This does not mean, however, that all of the obligations of the
predecessor still continue in force as if nothing had happened: some
may have been passed to the successor, some may remain in the domain
of the predecessor, some may be transformed, some may just completely
cease to exist. In other words, it is important to keep in mind that the
modification of a subject of international law does not entail, as such,
the modification of its obligations; nor does the complete disappearance
of a state from the international community unavoidably entail that all
of its obligations cease to exist. For, however tempting this line of
thought might seem, it does not stand a careful legal analysis of state
practice, especially - but not exclusively - as regards financial
obligations."
III. THE DIFFICULT RELATION BETWEEN STATE SUCCESSION AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES
After examining the various 'succession hypotheses', it is
immediately evident that, in the cases of incorporation and unification,
the successor State is deemed to be bound by the financial obligations
undertaken by the predecessors.59  As the problems arising from
55. See DANIEL PATRICK O'CONNELL, 2 STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL LAw 77 (1967); The Acts of Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar 1964, Sec.
4, reprinted in 3 I.L.M. 763, 764.
56. O'CONNELL, supra note 55,. at 88-91.
57. Id. at 39-40. In these cases, the expression - partial succession - seems fit, for
succession takes place only for a portion of the territory of the state, and does not modify
its identity as such.
58. See JAN H.W. VERzIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE Part VII
(STATE SUCCESSION) 3-5 (1974). In recent times, some authors have suggested that the
very "idea of a State's "identity" as some given and pre-existing social relationship looks
like a rather vulnerable piece of political metaphysics". See Martti Koskenniemi, Report
of the Director of Studies of the English-speaking Section of the Centre, Eisemann &
Koskenniemi, supra note 6, at 123. Nonetheless, even though there seems to be little
point in discussing the chronological priority between status and relationship, this note is
based on the hermeneutical tool provided by the distinction between identity of a State as
such, and, on the other hand, the continuity of its rights and duties.
159. See 1983 Convention, supra note 37, art. 39. For a recent case, see Treaty on the
Establishment of German Unity, Aug. 31, 1990, art. 23, 30 I.L.M. 457, 478 and Stefan
Oeter, German Unification and State Succession, 36 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 279-83 (1993).
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succession in the territory of former Yugoslavia do not pose questions of
incorporation or unification (at least until the hypotheses on the future
of Kosovo and Montenegro are limited to two: (i) remaining within the
Yugoslav federation or (ii) becoming an independent sovereign), this
note will not deal with this subject matter. Rather, the problems of
dissolution and secession play a major role in the debate about the
financial obligations now existing upon the new States which have
emerged from the dismemberment of the Federal Socialist Republic of
Yugoslavia. It is therefore necessary to briefly examine the
international practice regarding these phenomena in order to
appreciate the development of normative concepts and legal practice.
There is substantial disagreement among scholars as to whether
the origin of the modern international order can be traced to the Peace
Congress of Westphalia. It is however somewhat interesting, for those
who believe that the year 1648 can be regarded the real turning point in
global relations, to note that one of the peace treaties negotiated in that
occasion - the Treaty of Munster of October 24h 16486 - also included a
debts settlement." The rationale for the passing of public debts from
the predecessor State (France) to its territorial successor (the House of
Austria) was found in the consideration that such debts are basically
obligations under a sort of "droit superdtatique", "une institution de
droit sui generis"62 for which the entire fortune and all sources of income
of the debtor state are responsible within the limits of the territory as it
existed at the moment when the debt was contracted; it is this whole
territory that remains burdened by it. Thus, political changes of the
debtor state have not the slightest influence on the debt itself.
Another explanation that has been proposed is a justification by
generally recognized considerations of aequum et bonum, bona fide.'
When a state contracts a debt, it should not be allowed subsequently to
disallow it and get away with an 'undue enrichment.' Similarly, when a
state acquires foreign territory on behalf of which - or on behalf of the
good government of which - its predecessor has contracted a loan, it is
right and proper that the successor should take upon itself at least a
proportionate part of the loan thus contracted. The principle res transit
cum onere suo would thus seem to provide guidance."
Whichever of these arguments may be regarded as more
60. The text of this treaty may be found in PARRY, THE CONSOLIDATED TREATY
SERIES, vol. 1, 273 (in Latin) and 319 (English trans.) (1969).
61. Id. at arts. 85, 86, 93, 94. See VERZIJL, supra note 58, at 40-1.
62. ALEXANDRE SACK, LES EFFETS DES TRANSFORMATIONS DES ETATS SUR LEURS
DETTES PUBLIQUES ET AUTRES OBLIGATIONS FINANCIERES 84, vol. I (DETTES PUBLIQUES)
(1927).
63. See, e.g., Daniel Patrick O'Connell, Secured and Unsecured Debts in the Law of
State Succession, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 204 (1951).
64. Id. at 42-3.
186 VOL. 30:2
DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA
persuasive, it is a generally accepted rule that the successor state -
especially in the case of universal succession - should not get away with
a kind of unjust enrichment following the principle of tabula rasa (clean
slate). This is obvious at least in the cases of local debts - even more so
when mortgaged on specific territories. But in cases of general State
debts, too, and where no agreement on the matter has been reached by
the ceding and the cessionary states, the argument is persuasive that
an apportionment should constitute the general rule.
This conclusion runs afoul of the only pronouncement by an
international authority specifically on the question of the
apportionment of public debts following a case of state succession. In
fact, Arbitrator Eugene Borel, in his award of April 18, 1925 concerning
the Ottoman Public Debt stated: "De l'avis de l'Arbitre, il n'est pas
possible, malgr6 les pr6cedents d6ja existants, de dire que la Puissance
cessionaire d'un territoire est, en plein droit, tenue d'une parte
correspondante de la dette publique de l'Etat dont il faisait partie
jusqu'alorsr." However, the arbitration itself was not meant to provide
a legal key to the apportionment of the Ottoman Empire Debt, but just
a sort of appeal against the practical application of some previously-
agreed rules; this sentence was, therefore, a mere dictum, with no
practical purpose in the specific case, and not meant to express a
general rule.
Two exceptions are usually mentioned regarding the principle of
compulsory apportionment: the case of the obligations of 'newly
independent states' arising from the process of decolonization and the
case of 'odious debts.' In the first of these exceptions, scholars pointed
out that the practice of most former colonies establishes a specific rule,
which allows these new states to disregard the financial obligations
undertaken by the colonial power.' Thus, in these cases, the new states
were allowed to consider their 'financial record' as a 'clean slate' not
subject to the partition of the whole public debt of the colonial power at
the moment of their independence."
As regards odious debts, these are usually defined as those
65. Sentence Arbitrale rendue par Eugene Borel le 18 avril 1925, 1 REPS. OF INT'L
ARBITRAL AwARDS 532, 572 [hereinafter Sentence Arbitrale]. Most scholars, however,
think that this conclusion is acceptable only if an express treaty stipulation exempts the
cessionary state from any otherwise existing obligation. See VERZIJL, supra note 58.
66. See YILMA MAKONNEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE NEW STATES OF AFRICA
(1983). Such practice, following the 'clean slate' doctrine, was later codified in the 1983
Convention, supra note 38, art. 38.
67. This phenomenon started only in the second half of the Twentieth Century.
Before this period, newly independent states usually regarded themselves bound by part
of the obligations undertaken by the controlling power. For example, in the case of
Ireland, the newly independent republic accepted pro quota the British debt in the Treaty
between Great Britain and Ireland, Dec. 6, 1921, art. 5. See VERZIJL, supra note 58, at
166.
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obligations contracted by a predecessor "contrary to the interests of the
inhabitants" of a territory which is later taken over by a successor
state.0 The general principle - universally accepted - is that of
avoiding the necessity of payment of these kind of obligations by the
successor state, although the real problem usually lies in ascertaining
whether a specific debt falls in this category.69 The problem is obviously
a sensitive one, and there are requests to consider 'odious' any "debt
that has been incurred by a government without the informed consent
of its people, and one that is not used in the legitimate interest of the
State,"" although this is by no means the present position of positive
international law.
Taking into account the fact that the end of the Federal Socialist
Republic of Yugoslavia is usually described as a case of dissolution of a
state, one should take into account other historical cases of
apportionment of public debts in similar circumstances, so as to find the
customary international law to apply in this case.7'
When the UNION OF COLOMBIA was divided into its constituent
states (New Granada, Ecuador and Venezuela) in 1829, the British
Foreign Office took the initial position that "All three States will
continue to be responsible for any Debt due from Colombia, contracted
68. P.K. MENON, THE SUCCESSION OF STATES IN RESPECT TO TREATIES, STATE
PROPERTY, ARCHIVES, AND DEBTS 161 (1991).
69. Three types of odious debts have been defined by different names: hostile, war,
and subjugation debts. In particular, the first of these categories was first invoked as an
'odious debt', during the Spanish-American negotiations in 1898 after the Cuban war.
The American Peace Commission repudiated the liability for the Cuban debt on the
grounds that any obligations incurred by Cuban authorities to Spain for Spain's attempt
to suppress uprisings in Cuba itself were hostile to and incurred without the consent of
the inhabitants of the island; thus, they were deemed not transferable to the United
States. See O'CONNELL, supra note 47, at 459-60. Other attempts to claim 'odious debts'
were made by the Soviet Union as regards the czarist debt. See, e.g., Charles Prince, The
USSR and International Organizations, 36 AM. J. INT'L L. 432-33 (1942). For the
approach taken by U.S. courts, see Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. State of Russia, 21 F.2d 396,
398-401 (2d Cir. 1927) and United States v. National City Bank of New York, 90 F.Supp.
448, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); by the People's Republic of China as regards some of the
imperial debts of the early Twentieth Century, see the case of the Hukuang Railways
Sinking Fund Gold Loan of 1911 in Jackson v. The People's Republic of China, 550
F.Supp. 869, 871-72 (N. D. Al. 1982); by the present Iranian government as regards some
financial obligations undertaken by the overthrown government see United States v. The
Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran Award 574-B36-2; Ina Corp. v. The Government of the
Islamic Republic ofIran, Iran Award 184-161-1, 8 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 373, note 89 (1985). In
all these cases, the claim was not accepted because the question was deemed to be one of
government, not state, succession.
70. See Juliette Majot, The Doctrine of Odious Debts, in FIFTY YEARS IS ENOUGH: THE
CASE AGAINST THE WORLD BANK AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 35 (1994)
71. Apart from the cited Resolutions by UN organs, many national courts have
actually considered the disintegration process of Yugoslavia as a case of dismemberment.
See, e.g., the Austrian Supreme Court decision in the case Republic of Croatia et al. v.
Girocredit Bank A.G. Der Sparkassen, 36 I.L.M. 1520.
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during their Union. If it should be proposed to apportion this debt
between the several States, and that each should be responsible only for
a part, the consent of His majesty's Government, if it has any demands
upon the Government of Colombia, must be obtained to such an
alteration of its Security". 2  Notwithstanding this clear statement
implying joint and several responsibility for all obligations on part of all
of the new subjects, in December 1834 the debt of Colombia was divided
in proportions of 50% (New Grenada), 21.5% (Ecuador) and 28.5%
(Venezuela); after this apportionment among the successor states, the
British Ambassador asked Ecuador to pay only its 'share'.73
The establishment of BELGIUM in 1830 as an independent state has
usually been regarded as a dismemberment of the personality of the
United Provinces of Netherlands. 4 It is interesting to note that the
London Conference, relying on the many precedents in this subject-
matter, passed a resolution to the effect of dividing the debts between
Belgium and the Netherlands in proportion of their respective revenues.
In subsequent agreements, however, Belgium was assigned half of the
'new debts' - those contacted since the union - and the overall of the old
debts of the Austrian Netherlands. 75
On January 1, 1993 CZECHOSLOVAKIA ceased to exist by common
agreement of both its constituent parts and successor states. The
principles for the partition of both the assets and liabilities between the
Czech and the Slovak republics were based on the ratio of two to one,
resembling the proportion of the population of the two newly
independent entities. This did not prevent the International Monetary
Fund from reviewing this criterion as regards its credits, and
'proposing' adjustments according to its own economic - rather than
demographic - standards. Moreover, the old Czechoslovak debts
towards the World Bank - undertaken for well-defined projects and,
thus, easy to identify territorially - were in general treated as localized
debts, and apportioned on a territorial basis."
72. O'CONNELL, supra note 47, at 388. For Article 1 of the Convention of Bogota,
envisaging this apportionment, see PARRY, THE CONSOLIDATED TREATY SERIES, vol. 85, 19
(1969).
73. It is not entirely clear according to which principle the debts of the dissolved state
were apportioned. However, looking at the map of the region, there appears to be a
relation between the territory extension and the share of debt each new state accepted.
See THE ANCHOR ATLAS OF WORLD HISTORY 52 (2d ed. 1978).
74. O'CONNELL, supra note 47, at 157.
75. Id. For the test of the Treaty of Definitive Separation of Belgium from Holland
(signed at London, on Nov. 15, 1831), see PARRY, THE CONSOLIDATED TREATY SERIES, vol.
82, at 255.
76. Paul Williams, State Succession and the International Financial Institutions:
Political Criteria vs. Protection of Outstanding Financial Obligations, 1994 INT'L & COMP.
L. Q. 788-93.
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The dissolution of the UNION OF THE SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS,?
however, is by far the most interesting contemporary example for the
succession of states and the fate of the predecessor's financial
obligations."8 This process can be divided into two different stages.
First, following the unsuccessful coup in Moscow in August 1991,
the three Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania declared
their independence - which was widely internationally recognized.79
These three states actually regard themselves as having restored their
independence that existed before the Second World War, thus denying
to be successors of the USSR or to be bound in any way by its financial
obligations .8
The second phase of the dismemberment of the USSR took place
later in 1991. The first internationally significant act of this phase was
taken in October, when nine of the republics8 ' signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) 2 on October 28, 1991 - well before the official
dismemberment of the USSR - regarding the external debt of the
Union. In this MOU the State-Parties declared themselves jointly and
severally liable for the debts contracted by the Soviet Union
government and by other legally authorized entities;83 moreover, they
authorized the Vnescheconombank to administer the USSR's foreign
debt.8' A press-comuniqu6 by the G-7, dated November 21st 1991, stated
77. On the problems arising from the dissolution of the USSR, see inter alia, Lech
Antonovicz4 The Disintegration of the USSR from the Point of View of International Law,
1991-2 POLISH Y.B. INVL L. 7.
78. It should be noted at the outset that the USSR Constitution of 1977 explicitly
recognized a right to secede for the republics (art. 72).
79. Actually, the three Baltic republics had declared their sovereignty in the late
1980s and early 1990, but had not taken full steps to assert independence. See Urs Saxer,
The Transformation of the Soviet Union: from a Socialist Federation to a Commonwealth
of Independent States, 14 LOY. L.A. INTL & COMP L. J. 581 (1992) - especially notes 4-5
and accompanying text. Given the refusal by many Western countries to recognize dejure
the incorporation of the Baltic states within the Soviet Union in 1940, some authors have
suggested that the recognition of their independence should be construed as a 'revival' of
sovereignty, rather than a recognition of 'new' statehood. See REIN MULLERSON,
INTERNATIONAL LAW, RIGHTS AND POLITICS 119-20 (1994).
80. See Rein Mullerson, The Continuity and Succession of States, by Reference to the
Former USSR and Yugoslavia, 1993 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 473, 480.
81. Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova,
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Apart from the Baltic States, only Azerbaijan, Ukraine,
and Uzbekistan had not signed the MOU.
82. It is worth noting that the MOU is drafted in English; this seems a clear sign of
the relevance of this agreement for the relationship with foreign creditors.
83. "Acknowledgment of indebtedness. The Parties declare themselves jointly and
severally liable for the debt, without prejudice to the original contract." See Patrick
Juillard, The External Debt of the Former Soviet Union: Succession or Continuation?,
DISSOLUTION, CONTINUATION ET SUCCESSION EN EUROPE DE L'EST 67, 75 (Burdeau &
Stern eds.,1994).
84. The Vnescheconombank was the Bank for Foreign Economic Activity of the former
Soviet Union, and it was later transformed into an 'international bank' of the CIS. See
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that these republics, the USSR and the G-7 were agreed that the MOU
had entered into force.
During the famous meeting in Alma Ata, on December 21, the
twelve remaining republics declared that the Union had ceased to exist
and eleven of them went on to establish the Commonwealth of
Independent States 5 (CIS). In the protocol establishing the CIS the
eleven countries stated that "with the formation of the Commonwealth
of Independent States the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics
ceased to exist", but agreed, inter alia, that Russia should take over the
Soviet permanent seat in the Security Council.86 This feature of the
agreement might suggest that the USSR had definitively ceased to exist
and that all the former republics - except for the three Baltic ones - are
to be considered its successors, with the only exception of the
membership of Russia in the United Nations.8 7
In regards to the Soviet debts, the Alma Ata agreement made
reference to the Minsk Treaty' of December 4 - signed by all former
republics with the exception of the Baltics, Georgia, and Ukraine -
which attempted to distribute among the fifteen (former) republics both
the foreign assets and the foreign debts according to the following
percentages: 89
Oeter, supra note 50, at 78.
85. Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan formed the CIS - Sodrujestvo
N'esavisimych Gosudarstv (SNG) in the Russian text of the Alma Ata declaration. The
Minsk Agreement of December 8 between Russia, Byelorussia and Ukraine had already
stated that "the [USSR] as a subject of international law and a geopolitical reality no
longer exists" and actually seemed to foreclose Russia from assuming the international
legal position of the USSR. The first hypothesis of a kind of 'loose confederation' among
the republics - called Soobshestvo Samostoyatel'nych Gosudarstv, Community of
Independent States - had been abandoned after just a few days of discussion.
86. See Yehuda Blum, Russia Takes over the Soviet Union's Seat at the United
Nations, 3 EuR. J. INT'L L. 354 (1992). See also the letter by President Yeltsin to the U.N.
Secretary General, where he expresses the wish to assume the permanent seat in the
Security Council as well as the Soviet seat at the C.S.C.E.. 31 I.L.M. 138.
87. Byelorussia and Ukraine were also members of the United Nations from its
foundation as a result of political and diplomatic arrangements made at the San
Francisco Conference of 1945, while actually Russia was not. In any event, as Russia was
given the Soviet seat, three of the republics of the former USSR did not need to apply for
new membership in the United Nations. On September 19, 1991, Byelorussia officially
changed its name to Belarus. See Konrad Buihler, State Succession, Identity/ Continuity
and Membership in the United Nations, Eisemann & Koskenniemi, supra note 6, at 268-
71.
88. See Hubert Beemelmans, State Succession in International Law: Remarks on
Recent Theory and State Praxis, 15 B.U. INT'L L. J 71, 111-12 (1997). The overall amount
of the Soviet debt was considered to be around $46 billion; some authors suggest a total of
$60-80 billion. Oeter, supra note 50, at 78.
89. The amount of export for the year 1991 is provided in order to give an
understanding of each republic's prospective capacity to serve its debt. GIORGIO
SACERDOTI, DIRiTTO E ISTITUZIONI DELLA NUOVA EUROPA 149 (1995).
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REPUBLIC SHARE OF DEBT EXPORT (in $MM)
Russia 61.34% 35.070 (78.45%)
Ukraine 16.36% 4.584 (10.25%)
Belarus 4.13% 1.601 (3.58%)
Kazakhstan 3.86% 728 (1.62%)
Uzbekistan 3.27% 582 (1.30%)
Azerbaijan 1.62% 292 (0.65%)
Georgia 1.62% 146 (0.33%)
Lithuania 1.41% 1.118 (2.50%)(*)
Moldova 1.29% 146 (0.33%)
Latvia 1.14%
Kyrgyzstan 0.95% 73 (0.17%)
Armenia 0.86% 73 (0.17%)
Tajikistan 0.82% 73 (0.17%)
Turkmenistan 0.70% 218 (0.48%)
Estonia 0.62%
(*) The amount shown is for the three Baltic States as a whole
This formula,' which provided for joint liability in the external
relations but debt management by the Vnescheconombank according to
this scheme within the relations of the republics, was soon abandoned.
Five republics never accepted it formally, while many others just
avoided payments.9
In order to try and find a solution, the heads of states of the CIS, on
March 20'h 1992, during a meeting in Kiev, adopted a Decision on the
establishment of a Commission of representatives with full power to
negotiate and prepare proposals on issues of State succession; this body,
however, was never able to carry out its task.' In light of these failed
multilateral efforts, the Russian Federation has chosen an altogether
different path. It decided to conclude a network of bilateral agreements
90. The key for apportionment of both debts and property seems to have been worked
out well before the formal dissolution of the USSR, and it is thought to be based on ratios
of population, imports, exports, and GNPs of the various Republics in relation to the
Union. See Tatiana E. Ushakova, Pravopreemstvo Respubliki Belarus' v. Otnoshenii
Gosudarstvennoi Sobstuennosti, 1999 BELARUSIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, note 4 and accompanying text.
91. SACERDOTI, supra note 89, at 149.
92. Mullerson, supra note 80, at 479.
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(Zero Option Agreements) to assume the sole responsibility for paying
the old Soviet debt in exchange for all the Soviet assets abroad. There
was a need, however, for the creditors to accepts such a swap
arrangement, and this basically came with the Paris Club meeting of
April 1-2, 1993, at which nineteen creditor countries agreed not to bring
claims against the other successor states so long as the Russian
Federation paid the dues. 93
In the end, it seems that the Russian Federation has accepted not
only the former Soviet debt, but also the old czarist obligations - the
one rejected by the USSR since 1917 and, later, by the USSR. This
decision, prompted also by economic opportunity, may lead scholars to
reconsider the debate on the rejection of czarist debt.' It is likely that,
in this case, the solution was suggested by the extension of the Russian
Federation in relation to the dissolved Union.
These and other examples have lead scholars to think that in cases
of universal succession - when one state ceases to exist and is replaced
by more new entities on the predecessor's territory - these entities
assume a joint and several obligation regarding the predecessor's debts.
Also, there seems to be a rule allowing the apportionment of the total
sums in shares through an agreement among the successors; this
appears to be true at least in cases where all of the new subjects are
deemed to be in the position to satisfy their assigned share.95
The aforementioned cases, however, do not suggest that a general
substantive rule of this kind has already been accepted at the
international level. The only true obligation, in reality, seems to be a
duty of bona fide negotiations among the successor states in order to
reach equitable criteria for a just apportionment in a specific case. This
'duty to cooperate' can be traced back to the case of the Union of
Colombia and emerges as a trend in all of the 'peaceful' dissolutions of
states which took place in the last decade or so. It is also emphasized in
93. Beemelmans, supra note 88, at 113.
94. See Accord sur le r~glement ddfinitif des crgances rdciproques financiares et rdelles
apparues antgrieurerment au 9 mai 1945, 102 REV. GEN. DE DROIT INTER'L PUB. 540
(1998). On the rejection of the debt, see supra note 69 articles and cases.
95. As already mentioned, the 1983 Convention is generally not deemed as a
codification of customary international law. See Schechter, supra note 39, at 259.
Nonetheless, some authors have pointed out that this criticism is exaggerated, at least as
regards articles 40(1) and 41 of the Convention. These articles propose a general rule
applying both for cases of separation and for cases of dissolution, stating that the debts of
the predecessor "shall pass to the successor State in an equitable proportion, taking into
account, in particular, the property, rights and interests which pass to the successor State
in relation to that State debt." See Oeter, supra note 50, at 90 (stating that this rule is
firmly grounded in international practice, and might well become future customary law as
it also respects legitimate interests of all affected sides). For the opposite side, see
RESTATEMENT, supra note 23, which envisages the 'clean slate' doctrine for cases of
secession (§209(2)), and devolution in equitable proportion for successors in cases of
dissolution (§209, Rep. No. 6).
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the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and
in the Soviet Union issued by the European Community in early 1992
that States aspiring to recognition should show "commitment to settle
by agreement [...] all questions regarding state succession and regional
disputes."9
It must be noted that such an obligation does not entail the
possibility, on behalf of the successor states, not to pay the debts, for
example by not agreeing on the apportionment of the shares. In this
respect, not only positions taken by the creditors,97 but also declarations
made by the successor states appear decisive. None of the successors
states in the recent cases tried to invoke the so-called tabula rasa
('clean slate') doctrine denying responsibility for the debts of its
predecessor; 98 in other words, all successors states arising from the
break-ups of Czechoslovakia and the USSR seem convinced of the
existence of a rule of international law that requires the honoring of the
predecessor's financial obligations (opinio juris) - and have actually
acted pursuant to this belief (practice)." There is still a question
whether a recalcitrant successor state could actually be forced in a debt-
apportioning agreement, and this is actually the case posed by the
violent dismemberment of Yugoslavia.
IV. THE DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE FATE OF ITS FINANCIAL
OBLIGATIONS
A. The Legal Questions Posed by the Dissolution of Yugoslavia
If one is to compare the case of Yugoslavia with the one of the
Soviet Union, there is an evident paradox.'0° In the USSR, a union was
96. See Guidelines, supra note 16, at 1487.
97. Some cases decided by Dutch courts regarding the arrest of cargo ships formerly
owned by Soviet shipping lines are interesting on this point. When a number of Dutch
creditors sought to enforce a State guarantee given for triangular barter agreements
against these cargoes, the courts ruled, inter alia, that Russia was vested with the rights
and obligations of the Soviet Union; thus, the creditors could enforce their claims against
the vessels. See Beemelmans, supra note 88, at 116.
98. Id. at 114. 1983 Convention, supra note 37.
99. In the Preamble of the Treaty of Minsk, the parties expressed this concept with
the following words: "conscious of the fact that to guarantee and to pay back the foreign
debt of the Soviet Union is a precondition to future access to the world market"
Beemelmans, supra note 88, at 112 (emphasis provided). This statement could actually
be viewed as an acknowledgment of the need for a careful foreign policy in the
management of the foreign debt in order to get access to future credits rather than a
statement recognizing a law-based duty. But in a system such as international law where
the interaction of claims and counterclaims by the very actors is a way of making the law,
these statements may prove that the international community has actually reached a
general consensus on a specific subject matter.
100. Michael Bothe & Christian Schmidt, Sur Quelques Questions de Succession Posees
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formally dissolved, but one of the former republics (the Russian
Federation) is universally considered the only state subject to most of
the legal relations of the predecessor. On the other hand, in
Yugoslavia, the process is described as a secession of most of the
republics from the Federation, but the identity of the new Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia with the old FSRY is unanimously denied.
Surely enough, the reasons for this different treatment are political
ones, and it is not the purpose of this paper to investigate whether
these policy decisions are justifiable from a legal standpoint.10'
One of the mentioned features of the dismemberment of the
Yugoslav federation is provided by the conflict it provoked." It should
be noted that, contrary to the provisions of the 1977 USSR Constitution,
the 1974 Yugoslav one did not explicitly provided for a right to secede
by the member republics. Nonetheless, the preamble of the latter
declared that "[Tihe nations of Yugoslavia, participants of the right of
self-determination vested in every people, included the right to
separation, have united in order to form a Federal Republic of free and
equal Nations and Nationalities." 103 This provision allowed some
commentators to infer a constitutional right to secession, although most
scholars reached an opposite conclusion, based on the assumption that
the right to self-determination had been 'used up' by willfully joining
the Federation.'04
After the proclamation of independence by Slovenia, Croatia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia, the dissolution was not
immediately perceived as a fact by the international community;'0 '
nonetheless, it became accepted reality sooner than many had
thought,'0 notwithstanding objections by Serbia, which went on
claiming that such a decision amounted to "aggression against
Yugoslavia. °7
On April 27, 1992, a joint session of what remained of the
par la Dissolution de I'URSS et Celle de la Yougoslavie, 96 REv. GEN. DE DROIT INT'L PUB.
811, 825 (1992).
101. However, see the discussion by Bothe. Id. For a brief chronology of facts relevant
to Yugoslavia's succession, see Juan Miguel Ortega Terol, The Bursting of Yugoslavia: An
Approach to Practice Regarding State Succession, Eisemann & Koskenniemi, supra note
6, at 889.
102. This is not the first time that a Yugoslav state is partitioned into more entities
giving rise to a question on how to apportion the national debt. For a description of
similar phenomena of dismemberment in the same geographical are, see infra note 184-85
and accompanying text.
103. See M. BECKMANN-PETEY, DER JUGOSLAWISCHE FODERALISMUS 129 (1990), cited
in Bothe, supra note 100.
104. Id.
105. Badinter Commission, Opinion No. 1, 31 I.L.M. 1494.
106. Badinter Commission, Opinion No. 8, 31 I.L.M. 1499, 1500.
107. Weller, supra note 10, at 588.
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Parliamentary Assembly of the former FSRY, the national Assembly of
the Republic of Serbia and the Assembly of the Republic of Montenegro
adopted a declaration expressing the will of their citizens to proclaim
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, continuing the State, international
legal and political personality of the FSRY. Moreover, and more
interesting for the purposes of this note, they claimed the 'succession' in
the rights and obligations of the dismantled federation based on several
arguments."
There has been considerable discussion on the question of whether
the 'disappearance' of the SFRY was to be considered a dissolution, the
sovereign state of Yugoslavia having ceased to exist, or, rather, a case of
secession where Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia
seceded, thus leaving Serbia and Montenegro as a smaller, but not new,
Yugoslavia. The international community, including the United
Nations and the European Community, determined that the break-up
was actually a complete dissolution.' 9 This determination appeared to
most politicians and scholars a decisive step in order to assess what
kind of liability each of the new republics was to be assigned for the
financial obligations contracted by the defunct federation. The reality
is that there was a great deal of confusion regarding the applicable law
of state succession.
Part of the confusion derived from the fact that, often, the term
'succession' is used not to signify the "replacement of one State by
another in the responsibility for the international relations of
territory," but the transmission of rights and obligations during, or in
consequence of, a phenomenon of succession. Thus, if one is to give the
proper meaning to the terms, when a state declares its willingness to be
considered the same legal personality of another (identity), it is not by
any means 'replacing it' as regards the responsibility for its
international obligation - simply because it is the same state. In other
words, no succession is taking place, and the claim to 'succeed' to the
108. Weller, supra note 10, at 596. A thorough discussion on the fact that different
succession dates seem to apply to each one of the different Republics, and on the
consequences of this fact, is provided by Ana Stanig, Financial Aspects of State
Succession: The Case of Yugoslavia, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 751, 755-58 (2001). The fact that
the Commission was made up only of constitutional lawyers probably explains why it
considered the SRFY as dissolved based on the fact that its federal institutions were
found incapable of functioning as originally designed by the Constitution; this is, however,
a doubtful explanation according to international law.
109. On the steps undertaken by the representatives of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) in order to be accepted by the international community as the same
international subject as the FSRY, see Weller, supra note 10, at 595-96. For a critical
analysis of the position of the international community regarding Yugoslavia, see Yehuda
Blum, UN Membership of the "New" Yugoslavia: Continuity or Break?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L.
830 (1992).
110. 1983 Convention, supra note 37, art. 2 (1) (A). This article is identical with art. 2
(1)(B) of the 1978 Convention.
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right and obligations of the predecessor (in chronological sense) is
pointless. In fact, this state is not a new one, because it is identical
with the 'predecessor' (in chronological sense); arguably, that same
state might claim that the seceding parts of its former territory should
accept part of its financial obligations, in particular the allocated debt -
the part localized in the seceded territory - , and perhaps a portion of
the global (unallocated) debt.
The problem of the identity of a certain state, obviously, arises in
general only during periods of conflicts and sudden changes; if there are
no doubts among the international community about the existence or
the extinction of a state, no doubt about its identity is usually posed."'
Scholars have pointed that there are major differences between the
phenomenon of succession in domestic legal systems and in the
international realm."12  When the international community witnesses
the substitution of a state with another (succession), this change is
different from the phenomenon in domestic law, the latter appearing
more radical than the former. In fact, the word, when used in the
municipal context, means the "acquisition of rights upon the death of
another," 3 while, as we have seen, in international law this expression
signifies the "replacement of one State by another in the responsibility
for the international relations of territory." 4 Thus, a state identical to
itself cannot be considered a successor in a technical sense, although it
might be useful to designate it as such in a chronological sense
(meaning the same state after succession has occurred in relation to
some parts of its former territory)."'
111. See G.J. Lehner, The Identity of Austria 1918/1919 as a Problem of State
Succession, 1992 AUSTRIAN J. PUB. & INT'L L. 63.
112. See, e.g., Rein Mullerson, Law and Politics in Succession of States: International
Law on Succession of States, DISSOLUTION, CONTINUATION, AND SUCCESSION IN EASTERN
EUROPE 5 (Brigitte Stern ed., 1995).
113. See e.g., In re Russell's Estate, 13 Cal. App. 3d 758, 769 (1971).
114. Notwithstanding the clear definition provided by the two Conventions, it must be
acknowledged that most authors do use the term 'succession' to identify not the
replacement of one state with another, but the legal consequences this process entails.
See KRYSTYNA MAREK, IDENTITY AND CONTINUITY OF STATES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 4-13 (1968); JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
400-14 (1979). Also, and with specific regard to the issues arising in Eastern and Central
Europe after 1990, compare Malcolm Shaw, State Succession Revisited, 1994 FINNISH Y.B.
INT'L L. 34, 60-1, with Oeter, supra note 50, at 79-80. There is no uniform interpretation
of the meaning, however, and each author suggests different qualifications for terms like
'identity' and 'continuity' - sometimes regarding them as synonyms, sometimes creating
special categories. This is why, in this note, the term 'succession' will be used to describe
a phenomenon of fact (the replacement of one governing authority by another), while the
legal effects produced as a consequence of the modification will be given altogether
different qualifications. On this issue, see Bifhler, supra note 87, at 191-3.
115. In other words, the United Kingdom after the secession of the Republic of Ireland
is not exactly a successor state (as it is identical to the United Kingdom existing before
the Irish secession), although it might be characterized a successor in order to deal with
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From this reasoning, it follows that it is arbitrary, when confronted
with a phenomenon of identity, to infer the continuation of the rights
and duties of that state. In fact, the history of international law offers
many examples of states that, although remaining the same subject,
lose some of the rights and obligations due to an historical event -
secession or other. For example, the United Kingdom transferred some
of its national debt to the Republic of Ireland when the latter gained its
independence; this, notwithstanding the indisputable fact that the
United Kingdom remained the same subject of international law vis-d-
vis the other states."" On the contrary, succession - the phenomenon
contrary to identity - does not imply per se any discontinuity of rights
and obligations as such. In fact, Turkey may not be realistically
regarded the same subject as the Ottoman Empire; nonetheless, it was
awarded a large share of the predecessor's debts.17 On the other hand,
Russia is probably identical with the former USSER, and it accepted
most of the obligations - as well as of the rights - of the latter.1
18
Therefore, before analyzing the situation now existing in the territory of
the former Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia it must be
absolutely clear that identity of the subjects does not imply persistence of
the legal relations - rights or duties -, while succession of one state from
another cannot possibly imply the necessity of freedom of the new
(successor) state from the obligations of the predecessor."9 The relations
between the two issues (identity of a state and transfer of obligations
and rights) is a far more complex issue, one that should be analyzed in
the framework of the different possible modifications of a state 2' as well
the modifications of its legal rights and obligations that might occur as a consequence of
the secession.
116. See VERZIJL, supra note 58, at 131-4.
117. See Sentence Arbitrale, supra note 65.
118. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
119. A similar theory is the one according to which "Continuation, curiously, appears
thus to be a specific sort of succession". See Patrick Juillard, The Foreign Debt of the
Former Soviet Union: Succession or Continuation? 5 in DISSOLUTION, CONTINUATION, AND
SUCCESSION IN EASTERN EUROPE 5 (Brigitte Stern ed., 1995). See also Matthew Crawen,
The European Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia, 66 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 355, 356
(1995). Confusion still reigns, however, at the diplomatic and legal levels on this point.
See Paul Williams & Jennifer Harris, State Succession to Debts and Assets: The Modern
Law and Policy, 42 HARV. J. INT'L L. 355, 378 (2001); the authors seem here to imply that
a subject (Russia) continuing the legal personality of another subject (USSR) 'inherits' the
former's rights and responsibilities. This seems a rather confusing approach since, if one
subject remains the same, it will not be able to 'inherit' rights and obligations
from.. .itself. Either a subject is different from its predecessor and inherits (some of) its
rights and obligations according to a rule of international law, or it is the same subject,
maintaining some rights and obligations, while losing others, according to a different rule
of international law. In this latter case, incidentally, it will be impossible to speak of the
principle of pacta sunt servanda. Id. at 383, 408-10. In fact, the agreement of the
predecessor with its creditors is res inter alios acta for the successor, as pacta tertiis nec
nocent nec prosunt. A rule of continuity should be based on other, more solid, grounds.
120. Thus, a cession is to be treated differently from a dissolution, and the two are still
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as the different rights and obligations.1 2 1
Thus, this note proposes a clear distinction between two categories:
situations of fact (identity vs. succession) and legal consequences
arising from those same situations (continuity of legal right and
obligations or not). Such a distinction has been recognized by many
authors, although the terminology may be different from case to case.12
Nothing, in the history of international relations, suggests a direct
relationship between these categories, so they should be treated
separately, not mixed together; this, essentially, in order to reach
conclusions of law not based on a theory (deduction), but, after
analyzing the facts, trying to figure out the patterns at the basis of
state action (induction).
The arguments proposed by Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
actually appear in part confusing, in that it was - at the same time -
arguing that there was identity (between itself and the FSRY), but
stressing the need to address a problem of succession. On the other
side, the position of the international community was not clear, either.
The EC, followed by the United States, the UN,' and other
international institutions," believed that it was of utmost importance
to deny the identity of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) with that of
the dissolved FSRY. As for the political reasons underlining this
position, it was arguably important to force the 'new' Yugoslavia to
come to terms with the requirements imposed by the international
community for becoming (or being confirmed as) a 'member of the
club." But if one takes into account only the legal position and
to be distinguished from a secession.
121. Thus, the transfer of obligations arising under multilateral conventions should be
treated differently from the transfer of public debts, or from the rights arising under a
bilateral treaty with a specific place as an object.
122. See e.g., VERZIJL, supra note 58, at 3. The author points that it is necessary to
distinguish succession "in the sense of territorial succession, i.e. the simple historical but
at the same time juridical fact [... I that a territory which in past belonged to State A, by
some political development comes under the sovereignty of State B' and "in the sense of
succession of the new sovereign(s), as a consequence of a territorial succession [... I in
rights and obligations" of the predecessor(s). Also, "whether and to what extent there is
room for admitting the principle of State succession [in the second sense] is highly
controversial alike in the practice and in the doctrine of international law."
123. S. C. Res. 777, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/777 (1992) stated not only that 'the
State formerly known as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has ceased to exist",
but it also recommended the General Assembly to decide that the new country (the 'new'
Yugoslavia) should apply for membership. The General Assembly acted accordingly with
U.N. GAOR 47th Sess., 7th mtg., U.N. Doc. AIRES/777 (1992).
124. The International Monetary Fund announced on December 15, 1992, that
Yugoslavia "had ceased to exist and has therefore ceased to be a member of the IMF"
Press Release, International Monetary Fund, (Dec. 15, 1992). The World Bank made the
same determination. Press Release, World Bank (Feb. 25, 1993).
125. Nonetheless, this high-demanding standard for the acceptance of the 'new'
Yugoslavia within the international community might be criticized if compared with the
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obligations deriving from this stand, this kind of toughness is somewhat
questionable.
If the case of the theory of secession of the republics had been
accepted, thus accepting Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) as
identical with the FSRY, the situation would have resembled the one
occurred in the territory of the former USSR. 12 6 There, the Russian
Federation has not only accepted since the beginning a large part of the
foreign debt of the federation, but has even struggled to assert itself as
guarantor of the payment by the other republics, and has ultimately
'bought up' all other republics' shares. 12 7  Thus, "if classified as a
continuation [rather, identity] then Serbia Montenegro [sic] would be
the only available successor to the former Yugoslavia and would
succeed to the responsibilities for the debts and the rights to the assets
of the former nation".128 It is true that the situation in the territory of
the former Yugoslavia was rather different, especially for the persisting
conflicts featuring Serbia as one of the main actors; nonetheless, this
has not stopped the international community from dealing with the
Serbian leadership in resolving some of these very conflicts,
notwithstanding the arguments about its lack of legitimacy.2 9
ones actually used for Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. For an appraisal of the different
positions regarding identity or succession in the case of Yugoslavia, see Terol, supra note
101, at 892-900 (although, confusingly enough, the author uses the term 'continuity' as a
synonym of 'identity).
126. In this case, some authors suggest that international creditors might have
claimed a "presumption [... I that the responsibility for the general public debt of the
predecessor State remains with the predecessor State after the succession" based on the
Ottoman Public Debt award. See Shaw, supra note 114, at 93. For Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro), to be accepted as identical to the former federation would have
arguably meant to gain some advantage in regard of federal property to apportion. See
Ortega Terol, supra note 101, at 926.
127. On the other side, the Russian Federation has claimed all property of the former
USSR abroad, a claim that was repeated by Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) on the
basis of this theory, and rejected by the other republics. Also, it should be noted that the
other republics have been complaining about the apprehension of the money and gold of
the former federation in Belgrade by the Yugoslavian (Serbian and Montenegrin)
authorities. See Vladimir-Djuro Degan, State Succession Especially in Respect of State
Property and Debts, 1993 FINNISH Y.B. INT'L L. 130, 150.
128. Carsten Eberoth & Matthew Kemner, The Enduring Political Nature of
Questions of State Succession and Secession and the Quest for Objective Standards, 17 U.
PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 753, 799 (1996).
129. In particular, see the agreement widely known as the Dayton Peace Accord.
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with Annexes,
December 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75. The judgments on this instrument have been very
controversial. "In fact, those familiar with the region now almost unanimously agree that
after five years of implementation, [the Accord] has failed to ensure a self-sustaining
future for the country. Peace has been achieved, but at the expense of internal stability,
economic regeneration, and democratization." Miroslav Prce, Revising Dayton Using
European Solutions, 25 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 135 (2001). See also John Malik, The
Dayton Agreement and Elections in Bosnia: Entrenching Ethnic Cleansing through
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In the case of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) a theory of
'dissolution' was thus accepted, and forced on Yugoslavia itself,30 by the
international community. This created an additional problem: a
common ground was to be found, where discussions about succession
could take place, and this proved very difficult to achieve during the
conflicts that waged in the Balkans during most of the Nineties.
B. The Framework Created to Deal with the Succession
On September 7, 1991, the Conference on Yugoslavia was launched
under the aegis of the European Community; this denomination lasted
until the London Conference of August 26 and 27, 1992, when it was
changed to International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY),
which became a joint organ of the European Union and the United
Nations. The famous Arbitration Commission13 ' operates within the
ICFY.
In April 1992, the Working Group on Succession Issues was
established within the ICFY as an institutionalized framework to
facilitate rapid solutions to most of the problems deriving from the
dissolution of Yugoslavia.'3 2  Unfortunately, because of the position
taken by Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) not to participate
meaningfully in this process, this body was not able to reach a
satisfactory solution regarding any of the issues under analysis, among
which the problem of the unallocated financial obligations undertaken
by the former federation.133 In fact, the official position of Yugoslavia
until December 2000 was that the four former republics had
unilaterally and violently seceded, and thus could not enjoy the same
rights as Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in the aftermath of
Democracy, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 303 (2000).
130. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) has long remained of the opinion it
represented the same subject as the former Yugoslavia in all international fora. See its
constitutional provision cited by the ICJ in the case Concerning Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v.
Serb. & Mont.), 1993 I.C.J. 3, 15, 20-3. Later, it accepted the general view, and changed
its opinion. Curiously, this development has led Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to
challenge the jurisdiction of the ICJ in the above-mentioned case. In fact, the Court's
jurisdiction had been based on the assumption that Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
was party to the Genocide Convention as a member of the United Nations. If Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro) was not a member of the U.N., it asserts it could also not be
bound by the Genocide Convention, and, thus, by its article IX - the provision about
jurisdiction. See Press Release 2001112, Yugoslavia Requests a Revision of the Judgment
of 11 July 1996 by which the Court Declared that it had Jurisdiction to Adjudicate in the
Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), International Court of Justice (Apr. 24,
2001).
131. See supra note 12.
132. See Degan, supra note 127, at 147.
133. Id. at 148.
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succession.'s As a consequence of this reasoning, the 'new' federation
proposed, on May 1993, its own Draft Agreement on Succession
between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Successor States,35
which has been rejected by the international community as complex and
unfeasible. Just as an example, it purported to take into account all
federal property and investments from the creation of the common
Yugoslav state (December 1, 1918) - a difficult task itself - without
considering amortization nor the present market value of buildings,
equipment, and commercial enterprises. 136  Moreover, Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro) has been accused of blatant bad faith for
keeping in possession almost all movable and immovable property of
the Federation abroad, for appropriating all monetary gold and other
assets of the National Bank of Yugoslavia, and for keeping
approximately two thirds of the equipment of the former Federal Army
(JNA).13 Thus, there was a general understanding of the lack of a real
'common ground' for a meaningful discussion about the general debts of
the dissolved federation.
The Arbitration Commission, during the elaboration of its
Opinions, has invoked several provisions of the 1983 Convention, in
particular that concerning the date of succession of States,3 and
specific provisions regarding the dissolution of the predecessor state.3 9
But there are some parts of the Opinions rendered by the Commission
that, although not explicitly citing the 1983 Convention, seem to recall
it. Thus, for example, the Commission writes that: "the principles and
rules of international law in general [...] are supplemental, and [...]
States are at liberty to resolve the difficulties that might ensue from
applying them by entering into agreements that would permit an
equitable outcome."'" This sentence echoes the provision of Article 42
of the 1983 Convention, which expresses the duty to apportion
equitably the debts of the predecessor state taking into account, in
particular, the property, rights, and interests which pass to the
successor States in relation to that State debt.'4' Thus, the Commission
134. See Streinz supra note 52, at 229.
135. Id. at 149.
136. In regard to property, Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) regarded itself
entitled to 49% of the whole federal property. See Koskenniemi, supra note 58, at 94. For
a brief analysis of the Serbian proposal, see Oeter, supra note 50, at 92-3.
137. Degan, supra note 127.
138. Badinter Commission, Opinion Nos. 11-15, July 16 - Aug. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M.
1586, 1587, 1594.
139. Id. at 1587, 1592. The provisions of the 1983 Convention regarding dissolution
(art. 41) are substantially identical with those regarding separation (art. 40); this fact
might explain in part the eagerness to rely on its provisions in relation to a controversial
case as the one of the succession of Yugoslavia.
140. Id. at 1589
141. For a comment on the equity principle in the 1983 Convention, see Streinz supra
note 52, at 229.
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points to one of the criterion to be looked at while apportioning the
debts: a balance between advantages and charges.
But the most important Opinion regarding the principles governing
the apportionment of the former Yugoslavia debt is Opinion N. 9.142 The
three arbiters examine the problem from the perspective of the
procedure for negotiating as well as some of the rules of state
succession, stating that the successor states must together settle all
aspects of the succession by agreement, trying to achieve an equitable
solution on the basis of the 1978 and 1983 Conventions as well as of
customary international law."' Not only must Yugoslavia's assets and
debts be shared equitably between successor states, but every dispute
must be settled peacefully according to the principles expressed in the
Charter of the United Nations.
C. The 'equitable' solution
Although the opposition by Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
rendered vain most of the attempts to find a workable solution for the
apportionment of the federation's debts, the Arbitration Commission
has clearly stated in its Opinions some of the standards it thought
necessary to include in future negotiations. Some authors even
suggested a hierarchical order among these standards of procedure;'"
apart from this, probably unnecessary, institutionalization of the
Opinions' content, the fundamental rule successor states should follow
in dealing with the financial obligations of the defunct Yugoslavia is the
need to consult with each other in order to achieve an equitable result." 5
This might seem, at first glance, a rather 'empty' rule - a rule with
no real substance - purporting just to force some kind of collaboration
among successor states. Although this is partly true, several important
specifications should be made. First of all, from a general point of view,
this is an important shift in the questions posed by state succession.
According to this view, the issue before the politicians and the scholars
is not whether there is a positive specific legal rule governing debts
after succession, but whether a successor state is under an 'equitable'
obligation to take steps to correct the fact that it has been unjustly
enriched as a consequence of that process of succession. "' Thus, no
142. Badinter Commission, Opinion n. 9, 31 I.L.M. 1488, 1523-5.
143. This part of the Opinion seems to have been wrongly translated from the original
French into the English by the editors of I.L.M. See Degan, supra note 127, at 168.
144. Degan, supra note 127, at 183. The author distinguishes different rules, some of
which embody general principles applicable to all aspects of state succession (boundaries,
treaties, debts, immovable property.. .), while others appropriate just for some, but not
all, of these subject matters.
145. See Badinter Commission, Opinion n. 9, supra note 142. Following this theory,
see Mullerson, supra note 81, at 493.
146. This remark is based on the early intuition by Michael Hoeflich, Through a Glass
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question arises as to the obligation for the successor to agree on paying
a share of the debt of the dissolved predecessor; the only issue at stake
is constituted by what 'equitable amount' of such a share should each
successor pay.
Second, and more specifically on the point, this duty to collaborate
through peaceful means in order to reach a common solution is evidence
of a broader general trend of customary international law that is being
developed during the second half of the Twentieth Century.4 7  It is
interesting, therefore, to find such a general principle embodied in an
authoritative opinion applicable to a specific problem deriving from
state succession. Third, the Opinion does not limit itself to envisage a
mere duty to hold consultations, but points out that the result of these
consultations should be the achievement of an equitable result.48
This necessary element was later highlighted and partly explained
in Opinion N. 13,49 where the Commission stated that there is no need
to divide assets and liabilities in an equitable proportion, but that the
overall outcome should be a equitable division."' Such equity element,
thus, is clearly not a procedural aspect dictating how a solution should
be reached, 15' but rather an aspect of the solution that the parties
Darkly: Reflections Upon the History of the International Law of Public Debt in
Connection with State Succession, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 39, 46. See also Sandrine Maljean-
Dubois, Le r6le de l'dquitd dans le droit de la succession d'Etats, Eisemann &
Koskenniemi, supra note 6, at 143 (according to whom "La mention de l'6quit6 dans le
contenu materiel du droit tbmoigne de l'impossibilitd de poser des r6ges de fond a priori").
147. See U.N. Charter, art. 33. Commentators stress the necessity for a real effort to
reach an agreed solution. See, e.g., GOODRICH ET AL., CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS
COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 259-65 (3d ed. 1969).
148. In the last few years, some authors have reached the conclusion that even self-
determination itself should be judged on the basis of an "equitable result". In other
words, the way to decide whether one specific people should enjoy a right to secession
under the doctrine of self-determination should be to balance a wide variety of factors in
order to reach a 'just result.' These factors vary from the viability of the newly
independent entity to its degree of internal democracy and the ability to honor
international commitments. See, e.g., Bryan Schwartz & Susan Waywood, A Model
Declaration on the Right of Secession, 11 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 1 (1998).
149. Badinter Commission, Opinion n. 13, 32 I.L.M. 1591, at §2.
150. This part of the Opinion seems to exclude even the existence of a rule assuming
joint and several liability for all successors of a dismembered state, although this rule was
actually invoked by commercial bank creditors in the case of Yugoslavia. See Oeter, supra
note 51, at 88 stating "From the perspective of the successor State [... ] the legal claim of
joint liability must seem an affront, since it lacks any legitimacy in the eyes of the people
concerned. Its legality will be strongly disputed, because it will inevitably be perceived as
beyond any generally accepted idea of equity and fairness." The 'equity' principle in cases
of apportionment of debts and assets of a dismembered state has been considered
customary international law also by the Austrian Supreme Court in Republic of Croatia et
al. v. Girocredit Bank A G. Der Sparkassen, supra note 72.
151. Such as the one provided for in art. 38(b) of the Statute of the ICJ, authorizing it
to decide a case ex aequo et bono. This rule has been emphasized by the World Court in
the case concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 567 (Dec. 22).
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should be looking for.1 52 This, obviously, might be a difficult decision to
reach in the case of the apportionment of assets and liabilities following
the (violent) dismemberment of a federation. It is, thus, a decision to be
made by the countries involved, keeping in mind the specific situation
and the aim of a 'just result'. Nonetheless, some criteria may still help
in further specifying the general rule, especially having regard of some
general principles of international law; 53 for example, the principle
precluding 'enrichment without cause','5 the one assuring all successor
states survival as viable entities (including the effective power to defend
themselves),'55 and the protection of the interests of third parties.156
Some of these principles have been spelled out in a more detailed way
by other authors, but have not yet been tested by judicial bodies or
other recognized authorities.
1 57
An obvious objection to this 'loose rule', at least as stated by the
Commission, is that it cannot work in an international environment
where mutual trust and understanding of the respective positions do
not exist. In particular, a deal to apportion the debts among only some
of the republics would be res inter alios acta for the one(s) not
152. This is in clear analogy with the ICJ ruling in the case concerning the North Sea
Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. & F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20); in the case
concerning the Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 45-7 (June 3), in the case
concerning the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v.
U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12). In these cases, the Court explained that, where there are
no clear rules of international law, a judge should look at various equitable criteria
seeking to achieve an equitable result (and not rendering a decision ex aequo et bono). See
ROBIN CHURCHILL & VAUGHAM LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 184-91 (1999). Also, "[en
l'absence de "systhme de normes dbfinissable ex ante., le droit se dissout en un -ensemble
ex post de solutions d'espoce [.]" Maljean-Dubois, supra note 146, at 183.
153. 'General principles of law recognized by civilised nations', Statute of the Int'l
Court of Justice, Oct. 24, 1945, art. 38.
154. On this principle and its meaning for succession, see O'CONNELL, supra note 47,
at 243-4, 266-77. Such a principle seems to imply that an equitable division of the assets
of the dissolved federation is one of the elements to be taken into account to decide the
apportionment of the liabilities (as earlier stated in Opinion No. 11, supra note 138). See
also JENNINGS & WATTS, supra note 36, at 221.
155. Degan, supra note 127. This principle might include the projected capacity of
each newly independent republic to pay its share. See Shaw, supra note 114, at 96. Some
authors have suggested that adherence to this principle would imply that the only
republic economically viable (namely, Slovenia) would be bound by all liabilities. See
Oeter, supra note 50, at 85.
156. Shaw, supra note 114, at 92.
157. A rather fancy, yet interesting, analysis of the specific criteria according to which
Quebec might be forced to assume part of the Canadian public debt upon secession is
exposed in Daniel Blum, The Apportionment of Public Debt and Assets During State
Succession, 29 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 263 (1997). The author suggests different
approaches: per capita product, gross domestic product, historical benefits, historical tax
shares; although quite simplistic if taken separately, these approaches could very well
serve in determining the overall 'just' result. In fact, these criteria have been taken into
account by several international treaties and agreements, and cited by scholars, together
with some others. See O'CONNELL, supra note 47, at 454-56.
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participating, and international law is quite clear in requiring the
consent to be bound to an international agreement.158 However, the
Badinter Commission held that all successor states of Yugoslavia had
an obligation to cooperate actively and in good faith; a refusal to do so
would entail in itself state responsibility towards other successor states
for damages.159 Thus, the other successor states, if damaged by bad
faith inaction of one (or more) of the other successors, would actually
have the opportunity to take counter-measures in accordance with
international law.60 Thus, an equitable result among the 'active' states
could be reached - without prejudice to the rights of the 'recalcitrant'
state(s) - and countermeasures could force this solution on bad faith
one(s).'
Notwithstanding this theoretical solution, though, it seems quite
unlikely that, in a case of violent and disputed break-up as the one of
Yugoslavia, newly independent states could actually act against one
another through the usual peaceful countermeasures without
dangerously heightening the regional tensions. There seems to be the
need to find a more flexible way to deal with the 'bad faith' actor, one
that would force a just solution without increasing the chances of
violent rejection. Thus, the solution adopted by Slovenia, and later by
other republics, to start dealing with the creditors on a bilateral basis
actually seems to be the only feasible 'countermeasure' to be taken. A
bilateral agreement, excluding the other successors from the procedure,
might look prima facie against the principles laid down by the
Commission; but in cases when the 'succession route'6 is foreclosed by
paralyzed negotiations, a 'direct negotiations route' with different
groups of foreign creditors might be the only realistic way to balance
the need of the successor to regain international credibility and the
eagerness of the creditors to agree on some apportionment.'6 This
158. "[A] treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third state without its
consent." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 34, 1155 U.N.T.S.
341. This Convention is overwhelmingly regarded as a rule of customary international
law by scholars. For cases of treaties creating regimes valid erga omnes, none of which
applicable in this case, see MAURIZIO RAGAZZI, THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL
OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES 24 (1997).
159. Badinter Commission, Opinion n. 12, 31 I.L.M., 1488, 1590.
160. Id.
161. Beemelmans, supra note 88, at 117-18. The approach taken by the Commission,
therefore, tries not only to set up a legal framework in order to find solutions to the
continuation of legal rights and duties of successors, but also to provide means of
implementation for these rules. For a comment about the role international institutions
may play in the elaboration and implementation of universal principles regarding state
succession, see Marco Martins, Note: an Alternative Approach to the International Law of
State Succession: Lex Naturae and the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, 44 SYRACUSE L. REv.
1019, 1049-58 (1993).
162. The expression is found in Mojmir Mrak, Succession to the Former Yugoslavia's
External Debt: the Case of Slovenia, Mrak, supra note 28, at 165.
163. Id.
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means, however, that there must be a deal between the creditors and
the debtor(s) not only on the necessity to apportion the debt pro quota to
each successor (abandoning the theory of joint and several liability of all
former republics), but also pro rata towards the different creditors.'"
D. The Apportionment of the Financial Obligation of Yugoslavia
The data provided by the central bank of the former Yugoslavia
(NBY) show that the total long-term debt of the Federation at the end of
1991 was $15.99 billion. Of this amount, $3.79 billion was debt
incurred for the use of the federation ('non-allocated' debt),"n while
$12.2 billion had been contracted for the use of individual republics
('allocated' or 'localized' debt).168 According to the Federal Constitution,
in fact, the republics had important fiscal and financial authority, and,
consequently, this subdivision between portions of debts is quite
relevant.67 For our purposes, the problems posed by allocated debts are
minimal, because there is substantial agreement that this type of
financial obligations is 'running with the land', and the successor state
is internationally bound to respect the previous agreement."n So,
Serbia alone is bound by at least $5 billion in local debts (undertaken
before dissolution by its republican government or other local entities),
Croatia $3 billion, Slovenia $2 billion, and Bosnia-Herzegovina $1.5
billion.' 69
164. See Oeter, supra note 50, at 96-7. The author points out that, in case of
apportionment of the debt in shares to be paid by one successor, the creditors gaining a
portion of debt against the economically more potent successor - like Slovenia in the
Yugoslav case - would be the winner, since it is the only one having a realistic possibility
of seeing its share of debt paid in the long run, thus the necessity to ration any individual
debt according to the procedures used in national insolvency and bankruptcy procedures.
For a discussion about the 'equity' principle in this dilemma, see Koskenniemi, supra note
58, at 95.
165. Mrak, supra note 28, at 160. The author cites data from the NBY and the Bank
of Slovenia.
166. It should be noted that the overall foreign currency reserves in the hands of the
Central Bank of Yugoslavia in 1991 allegedly amounted to $4 billion. This strange
situation had been created by the fact that foreign currency reserves were centralized,
while the use of debts was not. Oeter, supra note 50, at 87. Of the total debt, $683
million was owed to the International Monetary Fund, $2.14 billion to the World Bank,
$4.15 billion to the Paris Club (15 States), $4.3 billion to commercial banks; the rest
comprised guaranteed private debts and other multilateral debts. See Stanig, supra note
110, at 758-63.
167. See Mrak, supra note 28, at 160.
168. The only chance to avoid this conclusion would be to invoke the exceptions for
newly-independent states (in cases of decolonization) or for odious debts. Neither of the
options, however, was pursued by the republics of the former FSRY. In any case, the fact
that the IMF conditionality severely limits the sovereign's freedom of action and
autonomy has led some authors to suggest a legal argument based on the theory of odious
debts. See Majot, supra note 71.
169. See Oeter, supra note 50, at 87. There is no indication of the local debts of
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As for the general debt of the former federation, it is interesting to
note that no successor has invoked the 'clean slate' doctrine.70 This fact
is usually explained with the necessity, for the newly independent
republics, both to gain membership in the major international financial
institutions and to please the creditors - public and private ,alike - in
order to secure the much-needed resources. 7 ' As suggested before, all
republics, Slovenia in primis,72 started negotiating on a bilateral basis
their shares of debt, based on the first apportionment imposed by the
International Monetary Fund.7 3 Negotiations with the World Bank,
7
1
the Paris Club member states, and with the London Club of commercial
banks followed the one with.the IMF.
7 5
International World Bank Key
Monetary Fund Key
Bosnia-Herzegovina 13.20% 21.40%
Macedonia.
170. Such a theory was developed in the context of decolonization, where newly
independent countries emerged, after decades or centuries of colonial oppression,
sometimes without any financial viability; moreover, most of the debt incurred by the
colonial power was seen as 'odious debt' raised to exploit the natural resources of the
country and to suppress its revolts. On the process of decolonization and the problems
posed by succession, see Karl Zemanek, State Succession after Decolonization, 116
RECUEIL DES COURS, 187-228 (1965).
171. One of the major causes of the crisis of the federation had been an economic and
financial breakdown during the Eighties, so all of the successors of Yugoslavia were
aware of the need to secure new loans and reschedule the old debts. See Mrak, supra note
28, at 161.
172. Slovenia even specified in its Constitutional Law of 1991 its willingness to take
over the corresponding part of the [Yugoslav] national debt whose immediate beneficiary
is not ascertainable. See Oeter, supra note 50, at 100.
173. See IMF, Quota Calculations for the Successor Republics of Yugoslavia, Dec. 7,
1992 cited in Mrak, supra note 28, at 160.
174. The World Bank apportionment was arguably the easiest one, because most of its
loans are specifically targeted at financing single projects. Thus, it was relatively simple
to locate these projects and request the republics to accept the relative shares. See Oeter,
supra note 50, at 98. On the basis of interim agreements with the Yugoslav successor
states and the physical location of World Bank projects, the World Bank apportioned the
outstanding debt of the former Yugoslavia (around $2 billions) as follows: Macedonia -
7.5% ($ 153.98 million), Croatia - 7.6% ($155.19 million), Slovenia - 7.8% ($160.59
million), Bosnia-Herzegovina - 21.4% ($ 439.24 million), Serbia-Montenegro - 55.7%
($1,141.05 million). See World Bank, Bank Portfolio of Loans in the Former Yugoslav
Republics, Nov. 25, 1992.
175. This debt, under the New Financial Agreement, was divided internally among the
Republics in 1991, but a 'joint and several liability' clause bound each of them for the
entirety of the debt; thus, during the tensions of the early Nineties, all successors stopped
repaying their shares, since they were benefiting the overall debt, and not their portions.
See Mrak, supra note 28, at 166-8, 180. For a general discussion about the solutions
adopted by the different financial institutions, see also Andrea Gioia, State Succession
and International Financial Institutions, Eisemann & Koskenniemi, supra note 6, at 356-
75.
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Croatia 28.49% 7.60%
Macedonia 5.40% 7.50%
Serbia/ Montenegro 36.52% 55.70%
Slovenia 16.39% 7.80%
Slovenia has also accepted to pay 18% of the total unallocated debt
of the former Yugoslavia to commercial banks in 1995.7 This shows
that joint and several liability of all former republics - a rule never
accepted by most international actors - has been abandoned even by
private investors and lenders who would have been the ones most
benefiting from its application. 177 According to 1998 data,7 1 the total of
Slovenia's debts amounted to $4,488 million ($2,212 public or publicly
guaranteed and $2,166 private non guaranteed), but the IMF still
excluded a part of the non-allocated debt not yet formally assumed by
the Slovenian government. The other republics, with the notable
exception of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), have also acceded to
similar agreements with commercial creditors.
179
The general situation is still rather confused today, but the latter
developments in the foreign and internal policies of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro) have boosted hopes among both creditors and the
other former republics that concerted solutions to the remaining
problems are possible, and an agreement has been recently signed - but
not yet ratified - to this effect. The focus seems now to have shifted
from the discussion on whether an apportionment should take place - a
fact that is presently accepted by all republics of the former Yugoslavia
- to the one on which key should the parties follow for the
apportionment. This seems a great step towards stability in the
176. See Mrak, supra note 28, at 168. This apportionment has provoked a series of
lawsuits in U.S. courts, because it excluded some creditors. Yucyco, Ltd. v. Republic of
Slovenia, 984 F. Supp. 209, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). In dicta, this U.S. court also points out
that the rule according to which the successor is held liable for a share of the
predecessor's debts is far from established. Id. at 219. Such theory is also expressed in
767 Third Ave. Assoc. v. Consulate Gen. of Socialist Fed. Republic of Yugoslavia, 218 F.3d
152, 158 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that international law did not support the landlords' claim
that the successor States were automatically liable to the landlords).
177. See Oeter, supra note 50, at 101. Another problem was also posed: as the
commercial debt was sold and bought on the world markets, Slovenia asked that
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) - as well as its entities, whether private or public -
be excluded from the benefit of any agreement reached by the (other) successor States and
creditors. Slovenia argued that these entities had bought shares of the debt on the
secondary market at a much lower price and had actually become lenders. Thus, the 18%
share of Slovenia is calculated if Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) entities are
excluded. See Stanig, supra note 110, at 762-63.
178. IMF data available at http://www.imf'org/external/country/index.htin.
179. Stanig, supra note 108, at 762-63.
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Balkans and the peaceful resolution of one aspect of the succession of
former Yugoslavia; this aspect is perhaps small in comparison with the
wars and violence that created so much sufferings in the region, but is
still relevant for the future of investments, and economical recovery, in
the region. In fact, at a meeting in Belgrade on December 12, 2000 the
central bankers of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Slovenia, and
Croatia seemed to accept the key laid down by the International
Monetary Fund, whereas Bosnia and Herzegovina insisted on a key
more respectful of the social product and numerical size of the
population."'0 Notwithstanding the present difficulties, in other words,
the discussion has in fact passed on to the issue of deciding how to
apportion the debt, and the debates on whether to pay or not seem to
have been left aside as intellectual exercises of no actual interest.
An historical remark needs to be made. The independent states
now emerged after the dissolution of the federation are not new to the
phenomenon of succession, and other similar events that took place
during last century deserve attention, since they probably contributes
in shaping the legal perceptions and expectation by local scholars and
politicians. The first example is provided by the Treaty of St.
Germaine-en-Laye, providing, inter alia, for the apportionment of the
debts among the successor states of the Austro-Hungarian Empire after
the First World War. 8' According to article 203,182 each of the successor
states was to assume the portion of secured debt on immovable property
falling under its sovereignty;83 as regards unsecured debt, the
apportionment of the total debt existing on July 28, 1914, was to be
accomplished on the basis of the ratio between the average of the three
financial years 1911 to 1913 of such revenues of the distributed
territories. Thus, a key was determined that took into account the
likely effective possibility to pay for each and all the new independent
countries; the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (later,
Yugoslavia) was deemed liable for a part of the total Austro-Hungarian
debt, according to the revenues of the acquired territories.'
1
180. See Press Release, United Press International (Dec. 12, 2000).
181. Treaty of Peace between the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan and the United
States (the Principal Allied and Associated Powers), and Belgium, China, Czechoslovakia,
Cuba, Greece, Nicaragua, Panama, Portugal, Roumania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State
and Siam, and Austria, Sept. 20, 1919, in PARRY, supra note 60, at 9; see also 14 AM. J.
INT'L. L. SUPPL. 1 (1920). On the legal questions posed at that time by the creation of the
Yugoslav state, see Paolo Fedozzi, La situation juridique et internationale du Montdndgro,
1922 J. DU DROIT INT'L 549 and MAURIZIO UDINA, L'ESTINZIONE DELL'IMPERO AUSTRO-
UNGARICO NEL DIRrIO INTERNAZIONALE (1933).
182. PARRY, supra note 61, at 81; see also 14 AM. J. INT'L L. SUPPL., supra note 181, at
81.
183. PARRY, supra note 61, at 81.
184. Id. at 82. For an analysis of this apportionment, see Miroslav Ploj, La reparation
de la dette publique d'avant-guerre d'apres les traites de paix de Saint-Germain et de
Trianon, 1937 ANNUAIRE DE L'AssOc. YOUGOSLAVE DE DROIT INT'L 83. A brief analysis of
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In 1941, the Yugoslav kingdom was divided after the defeat against
Germany and its allies. The existing debts were apportioned according
to the following shares: Croatia 42%, Serbia 29%, Italy, Hungary, and
Bulgaria 8% each, Germany 5%.185 Such an apportionment took into
consideration only the ratios of population and territorial extension, two
highly questionable keys, at least if used alone. However, such a
division of Yugoslavia appears in retrospective an ephemeral
phenomenon, and is probably not as relevant as the case of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire.
E. The Challenges Faced by the Successor States
All of the former Yugoslav republics are admittedly facing
difficulties and problems related with their past within the federation
and the troubles of its dissolution. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
is, at the present moment, itself facing highly disruptive tensions -
most of which can be related to its unfortunate period under the
repressive regime of Milosevic.
The first of these issues facing the new government - related both
to the other successor states and to international creditors - is to
reschedule, and eventually to pay, all of the dues to international
creditors. In order to do so, the most urgent legal problem in the past
months has appeared to be to be that Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) needed to find a way to reach an effective and sustainable
apportionment of the unallocated debts of the former Yugoslavia. This
required to give up the claim of being the sole successor of the Federal
Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, 8" and to negotiate in good faith to find
an agreement.'87 Moreover, in order to 'please' international investors
and institutions, Yugoslavia seems ready to accept as a fait accompli
the bilateral agreements reached by the other former republics, and
perhaps even to accept some concessions. 88
In the light of the necessity for the FRY to find its place in the
international community, and in the Balkan region in particular, it
became possible to overcome these problems, according to an 'equitable
solution' that took into account viability as well as the present
situation, not differing much from previous examples, such as the
partition of debts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Some of the choices
the formation of Yugoslavia in the 1920s as a 'contradictory State' is provided by Svetozar
Stojanovig, The Destruction of Yugoslavia, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 337, 337-9 (1995).
185. See O'CONNELL, supra note 47, at 390.
186. The new federal government headed by Mr. Kustunica seems to have given up the
previous position held by Mr. Milosevic, thus paving the way to negotiations. See IMF
Approves Yugoslavia's Membership in Fund, AGENCE FRANcE-PRESSE, Dec. 20, 2000.
187. Such negotiations are taking place under the aegis of the International Monetary
Fund and between the central bankers of the republics.
188. See supra note 176, for the example of Slovenia.
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- the acceptance to be one of the successors of the former federation on
an equal footing with the other ones and the need for bona fide
negotiations - seem actually to have been cornerstones of President
Kustunica's policy since the beginning of his term in office, in October
2000. As for the other ones - the acceptance of shares- of the
unallocated debt and the modes of payment of the allocated debt - these,
too, look acceptable, and an important agreement to this effect has been
signed in Vienna on June 30, 2001.19 This agreement took into account
the deals entered into by four republics - starting from Slovenia - and
built upon them a consensus acceptable for the fifth one (the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia), which had seemed the 'rogue' state of the
region until that moment. Apart from the technical details, which will
be more clear once the ratification instruments are passed by the five
countries and the implementation begins, it is interesting to describe
briefly the section of the Agreement on debts.
The financial liabilities of former Yugoslavia were divided into
three main categories in the Agreement on Succession Issues.
ALLOCATED DEBT (external debt whose beneficiary was located in the
territory of a specific successor State or a group of successor States)
remains with the successor State on the territory of which the final
beneficiary is located. 19 As for the SRFY's EXTERNAL OFFICIAL
(UNALLOCATED) DEBT to members of the Paris Club (as well as
commercial debt to banks of the London Club), the agreement takes into
account the deals concluded by Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia,
Macedonia, and Slovenia, and states that Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) will assume responsibility for all of its unallocated debt
and its share of the unallocated debt claims; an agreed solution shall be
found by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the members of the
two 'Clubs.' On the other side, the successor States shall terminate any
189. During a meeting in May 2001 with the international mediator sir Arthur Watts,
the central bankers of the republics agreed to apportion the assets of the Former
Yugoslavia according to the IMF key with minor variations. Some of the assets are held
by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS); according to this agreement, Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro) received 36.52 per cent, Croatia 28.49, Slovenia 16.33, Bosnia
and Herzegovina 13.26 and Macedonia 5.40. Immovable assets abroad (consular and
diplomatic properties) should be divided according to a slightly different key: Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro) 39.5 per cent, Croatia 23.5, Slovenia 14.0, Bosnia and
Herzegovina 15.0, Macedonia 8.0. Other financial assets (including 46 tons of gold,
various foreign currency deposits, and securities - totalling around $1 billion) whether
held by the SFRY or the National Bank of Yugoslavia are to be apportioned according to
the following proportions: Bosnia-Herzegovina 15.5 per cent, Croatia, 23.0, Macedonia 7.5,
Slovenia 16.0, FRY 38.0. Immovable property located within the territory of the SFRY
shall pass to the successor State on whose territory that property is situated; exceptions
are made for tangible movable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of one
of the successor States and which originated from the territory of the State. See the text
of the Agreement on Succession Issues between the Five Successor States of the Former
State of Yugoslovia in 41 I.L.M. 3 (2002) [hereinafter Agreement on Succession Issues].
190. Agreement on Succession Issues, supra note 189, art. 2(1)(b).
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existing legal proceedings or financial claims against each other - and
avoid instituting new proceedings or claims, whatever the outcome the
resolution by FRY of those claims.' 91 .
The third group is constituted by all the claims against the SFRY
not otherwise covered by the Agreement on Succession Issues; these
will be notified by each successor state and subsequently considered by
the Joint Committee established under the Agreement itself.'
2
Moreover, there are some small exceptions to the above-mentioned
rules; for example, the debts of former Yugoslavia under the Agreement
between SFRY and Italy on February 18, 1983 on the Final Settlement
of Reciprocal Obligations are to be independently assessed under article
8 of the Agreement.
Two major problems, however, may stand in the way of
normalization of the internal and international relations of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro); these are the possible secession of
Montenegro from the - new - federation, and the fate of Kosovo. Apart
from the economical and political roots and likely consequences of these
situations, scholars should start dealing with the possible juridical
problems that may arise in relation with them, in order to be prepared
should the necessity arise.19 3 Both these cases should be dealt with
through a clear perception of the state of the law as well as the policy
issue before each government in order to avoid, at least in part, the
tragedies experienced in the region in the past decade.
CONCLUSIONS
The law of state succession is still in flux,'" but some trends are
clearly emerging, at least in regard to financial obligations. More
important, these trends do not develop only from the cases of succession
of the past decade; in fact, a pattern seems to govern the fate of public
debts of a country which dissolves or experiences the loss of a portion of
its territory, a pattern that goes back at least to the Nineteenth
Century. With the two exceptions of separation in the context of
decolonization - under which, probably, the future of East Timor will be
assessed - and the case of 'odious debts,' the clear general rule is that
debts ought to be paid. This seems a foregone conclusion in the
contemporary world, a world where countries compete with each other
191. Agreement on Succession Issues, supra note 189, at art. 2(2).
192. Id. at Annex F.
193. Some scholars have pointed that, as a professional category, international
lawyers have a task that is not understood by most: to act as a lobby in support of those
very principles they have contributed to write and defend. See Susan Woodward, Are
International Institutions Doing Their Job?, 90 Am. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 471, 472 (1996).
The cases of Montenegro and Kosovo would pose a clear opportunity for international
lawyers to do just that.
194. See Oeter, supra note 50, at 73.
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primarily in trustworthiness before financial institutions and private
investors, and not primarily through the actual use of force anymore.
The case of Yugoslavia, actually, seems to show that the international
community, although still slow in some circumstances to stop the
misuse of force, will foster an economical - and political - breakdown of
those countries that are not able to show financial credibility.
In particular, the cases of the Soviet Union and of the FSRY testify
that new states emerged from the dissolution of both federations are
compelled to negotiate and find a solution in good faith, under two
different sets of threats. For on the one hand, if they fail to do so, the
foreign creditors - international financial institutions, foreign
governments, and privates alike - will immediately stop investing and
loaning; most of the times, this threat, although not expressed, is
powerful enough to force compliance. On the other hand, however, bona
fide countries that find it impossible to reach an apportionment deal
because of the bad faith of other successors may lawfully negotiate
bilateral agreements with creditors. Thus, the former countries are not
prevented from entering in the international financial community, and
some of their major concerns for future development is avoided;
moreover, they enjoy a legitimate form of reprisal that might dissuade
bad faith conduct on the part of other successor states. In other words,
the general rule of 'succession negotiations' among successors may be
superseded by direct negotiations between a debtor and its creditors, so
as to avoid the problems posed by delayed solutions.
This is actually the one lesson that can be learned from the decade
of conflicts in the Balkans: unless solutions can be found on a
multilateral basis among interested parties, taking into account the
rules of international law as expresses by the Arbitrary Commission in
this case, 195 each party may be allowed to take what unilateral actions it
deems necessary to protect its basic interests - provided at least that it
does so in the least harmful way for other countries. The picture,
however, is not even this simple. The role of multilateral international
banks and other financial institutions appears decisive,'9 and a primary
concern for 'new' states after a phenomenon of succession is constituted
195. It is not clear whether the Opinions delivered by the Commission, applicable to
the fate of Montenegro as one of the constituent republics of the former Federal Socialist
Republic of Yugoslavia, would be applicable to Kosovo too. In fact, the Arbitration
Commission was meant to deal with the problems arising in connection with the secession
of the republics, and Kosovo is not in such a position, together with Vojvodina. See
Ragazzi, supra note 12, at 1491. Nonetheless, the principles set forth by such an
authoritative body may well be regarded as expressing the present status of customary
international law in all cases of secession based on self-determination claims.
196. See supra note 76 and accompanying text, for the relation between the
International Monetary Fund and the new states created by the dissolution of
Czechoslovakia.
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by their financial necessities before the international community." It
seems, therefore, that policy decisions taken by successor states and
creditor entities create a network of expectations, claims, and
counterclaims shaping the normative environment in which those same
actors play. In other words, the global perspectives that have lead to
the creation of an 'exception' for countries emerging out of the
decolonization phenomenon - allowing them not to be bound by the
burden of debt when becoming independent - now have radically been
rejected. Newly independent states established during the last decade
of the Twentieth Century have not even tried to suggest the 'clean slate'
doctrine as the applicable rule to their cases; they relied, on the
contrary, on centuries of past experience since the Treaty of Minster
and confirmed by the cases of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman
Empire debts after the First World War; this trend clearly suggests that
the successor states should, in general, pay the debts of the
predecessor.'9 8
The problem then arises as to how the debts should be divided
among the successor states. In this respect the trend of compulsory
negotiations is clearly emerging, and the present Yugoslav case with
the recent developments clarifies some of its aspects, but it is probably
too soon to be able to delineate the exact content of this rule. In any
event, unilateral solutions seem still acceptable whenever a clear injury
to the interests of some successor states can be shown as a consequence
of bad faith conduct by other successors; they simply seem more 'just'
than the opposite solution of waiting for the conflict situations to cool
off. Where an agreement can actually be reached, instead, States
should probably at least take into account some important factors, such
as: the special connections between an area and the debts related to it;
a general relation between debts and property accepted by a successor
State; the share of the successor state in contributing to the wealth of
the predecessor, when the former was part of the latter; the views
adopted by multilateral financial institutions on the apportionment and
membership.
One other remark needs to be made. The only realistic alternative
to the 'unilateral' - though respectful of the rights of the others -
approach as described above would be a strong effort to integrate in a
larger context. This appears especially true in the present Balkan
situation. In fact, such an 'integration project' could be carried on in
two different ways, although both, admittedly, are rather unlikely
197. See supra note 93 and accompanying text, for the case of the Russian Federation
in relation with the other republics of the former Soviet Union.
198. In this case, there seems to be very little difference between the consequences of
secession and dismemberment; thus, however one defines the extinction of the Austro-
Hungarian and Ottoman empires (dissolution or secession of some provinces), the result
does not change in respect to the continuity of financial obligations.
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under the present conditions. One way would be an expeditious
integration of the whole region within the European Union. This
approach would require - among other critical elements - the strong
political will of the present and future Member countries of that entity;
its advantages, however, would be the creation of a common space
where freedom of movement, protection of regional identities, and an
overall more democratic environment aimed at easing the present
tensions, in the medium and long run.9
The other way would be the one undertaken by the founding
members of the European Communities themselves back at the middle
of the last century: through strong political will and leadership, some of
the peoples that had waged the most disruptive wars against each other
in the past centuries decided to put aside the desire for endless revenge
and to share some of the resources - coal, steel - that had been objects
of dispute among them.2 00 Both of these approaches, however, imply
that secessions and separations are acceptable only if the parties
involved strive to develop a strategic vision of regional integration; in
other words, small nations based on common language, culture, or
religion appear to be viable in the contemporary world only through
integration at a higher level.2 1
199. For a similar approach, see Jacques Rupnik, Kosovo: Dilemmas of the Protectorate,
9 E. EUR. CONSVL. REV. 48, 49 (2000). "Between the impossible task of maintaining
Kosovo within Yugoslavia and the improbability of independence in the short term, a
third interim option could be developed: an evolving protectorate, where international
involvement would gradually be reduced to a minimum, while building up a maximum of
self-government [... Respect for these conditions [...] would open prospects for regional
and European integration". Id. at 50.
200. Admittedly, this path, too, seems impossible - at least at the present moment;
many commentators have stressed that this might have been the view in 1945 as regards
the cooperative efforts among France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux. See, e.g., Daniel
Dombey, EU Ancestor to Fade Away, FIN.TIMES, Apr. 18, 2001, at 2 (stressing the
historical significance of the European Coal and Steel Community set up with the famous
treaty of April 18, 1951).
201. In this sense, two examples from the Balkan region can be taken from the latest
news. First, Macedonia is looking forward to closer integration with the European Union,
hoping to join sooner than most neighbors, or at least to benefit from economic aids. See
Judy Dempsey, EU Deal with Macedonia Could be Model for Balkans, FIN. TIMES, Apr.
10, 2001, at 2. Second, on April 15, 2001, Yugoslav foreign minister Goran Svilanovic
announced that Yugoslavia intends to enter the Schengen visa regime (the one linking
together many continental European countries party to the EU) in two years' time. Apart
from the actual chance of implementing these plans, both these policy statements show
the willingness of Yugoslavia and Macedonia to disenfranchise themselves from the
difficulties of the present situations through a cooperative effort at the regional level.
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I. INTRODUCTION
During this century, petroleum' has been one of the most important
commodities in the modern world, referred to as "critical to national
strategies and crucial to international politics." 2  As the modern
petroleum industry emerged in developing countries, where ownership
of petroleum almost universally belongs to the state,' international oil
companies with the necessary capital and expertise controlled
petroleum exploration and exploitation.4  Even though almost all
petroleum producing countries today have state-owned oil companies,
this situation has not changed substantially.5 This reality demands
that the international oil company and the state reach some agreement
6
about the development of those resources.
Exploration and exploitation of petroleum resources places the
international oil company in a uniquely complex business arrangement
with a foreign country. This arrangement links the government, who
owns the resources, with the companies, who have the technology,
capital and equipment necessary for development, in a sector where the
1. For the purposes of this paper the term "petroleum" will be used as a synonym for
both oil and gas.
2. ZHIGUO GAO, INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CONTRACTS: CURRENT TRENDS AND
NEW DIRECTIONS 1 (1994).
3. BERNARD TAVERNE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE REGULATION OF THE PETROLEUM
INDUSTRY 11 (1994). The exceptions to this rule, where ownership of underground
petroleum belongs to the owner of the land, usually occur in developed countries such as
the United States and the Netherlands. Id.
4. See GAO, supra note 2, at 1. See generally Ernest E. Smith & John S.
Dzienkowski, A Fifty-Year Perspective on World Petroleum Arrangements, 24 TEX. INT'L L.
J. 13 (1989) (surveying international petroleum arrangements since the beginning of this
century).
5. See Smith & Dzienkowski, supra note 4, at 35. See also Oil.com, at
http://www.wn.com/?t=oilcom/left/production.txt (last visited Oct. 14, 2000) (sampling
current worldwide petroleum explorations).
6. The term "agreement" in this context can mean many things, including
production sharing agreements, licenses, concessions, service contracts, participation
agreements and joint operating agreements. See R. Daniel Vock, Petroleum Development
Agreements: Form and Drafting, J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 251, 251 (1990)
(describing the complexity of agreements generated in the petroleum industry). See also
SAMIR MANKABADY, ENERGY LAW 25-73 (1990); Smith & Dzienkowski, supra note 4, at 35.
VOL. 30:2
2002 STABILIZATION CLAUSES IN INT'L PETROLEUM TRANSACTIONS 219
stakes, risks and possible profit margins all can be very high.! The
questions of how to contribute to this "partnership" and how to allocate
the profits are fundamental issues in the arrangement among the
foreign country and the international oil company."
Since these petroleum agreements require a large initial outlay of
capital, and long-term investment in projects including exploration,
appraisal and development 9 that must be recouped from earnings, these
investments expose the international oil company to substantial risk for
an extended period.' ° Simultaneously, because petroleum prices are
unpredictable, an apparently profitable agreement for the country can
look undesirable after it is entered, especially if the international oil
company's work proves highly productive." These factors combine to
encourage the foreign government to seek adjustments to long-term
agreements in response to both political pressure and changed
circumstances. 2 On the other hand, the international oil company tries
to avoid the renegotiation of the agreement, the effect of subsequent
changes to the country's law, or even outright nationalization of the
company's assets.'
3
Over time, companies have tried to deal with the risks involved in
petroleum transactions either by: spreading risk; insuring against risk;
defending against the risk; structuring and managing risk; or creating
contractual mechanisms for risk management." When a company tries
to "spread the risk" it usually tries to form joint ventures to create a
united and stronger front against an interventionist host country." A
company can also try to "insure against the risk" by buying an
insurance policy to protect the company from contractual changes in the
agreed upon financial regime, including foreign exchange guarantees.'6
7. See Christopher T. Curtis, The Legal Security of Economic Development
Agreements, 29 HARV. INT'L L. J. 317, 317-18 (1988). See also GAO, supra note 2, at 1.
8. See GAO, supra note 2, at 1.
9. See Thomas W. Waelde & George Ndi, Stabilizing International Investment
Commitments: International Law Versus Contract Interpretation, 31 TEX. INT'L L. J. 215,
227 (1996).
10. See Curtis, supra note 7, at 318. As a general rule, petroleum projects involve ten
years or more of exploration in areas such as geological surveys, drilling, and appraisal.
WORLD MINERAL EXPLORATION: TRENDS AND ECONOMIC ISSUES 2-11 (John E. Tilton et al.
eds., 1988).
11. See Waelde & Ndi, supra note 9, at 227.
12. Id. at 233
13. Id.
14. Id. at 233-34.
15. See Ivan K. Fong & John Kent Walker, International High-Technology Joint
Ventures: An Antitrust and Antidumping Analysis, 7 INT'L TAX & BUS. LAw. 57, 61
(Winter 1999). See also Joel Davidow, Special Antitrust Issues Raised by International
Joint Ventures, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 1031, 1037 (1985). See generally Roger L.M. Dunbar,
International Renegotiations: The Case of the Dominican Republic and Falconbridge, 15
NAT. RESOURCES F. 258, 263-68 (1991).
16. See Jorg-Dietrich Wirmistich, Coverage of Political Risk by National Agencies:
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"Defending against the risk" is a strategy that requires the foreign
company to try to use economic, financial, and political persuasion and
leverage to discourage governments from abrogating investment
agreements. 7 Companies have also tried to "structure and manage"
through actions that include association with the host state, low
visibility in the project, and flexibility in investment to be able to adapt
to changing pressures and expectations." Finally, the oil company can
try to reduce risk by contract through clauses that provide for
international arbitration, choice of law, and offshore accounts, as well
as with stabilization clauses.19
Out of this broad field of risk management devices,2 ° this article
focuses on the use of stabilization clauses to protect the international oil
company. Part II defines and describes the types of stabilization
clauses. It also reviews the risks stabilization clauses are intended to
reduce, including financial and non-financial concerns. Part III reviews
the criteria used to apply and interpret stabilization clauses, both under
municipal law and principles of international law, and Part IV surveys
how those criteria have been applied to stabilization clauses in eight
arbitrations. Part V concludes with some general observations about
the treatment of stabilization clauses in those arbitrations.
II. STABILIZATION CLAUSES DEFINED
An international oil company may try to minimize risk through
contract provisions." Many risks are difficult or impossible to control
by contract, such as commercial (price volatility), financial (interest rate
volatility), geological (no deposit found), technical (failure of the
installations to perform as planned), managerial (labor problems) and
natural disasters.2 Stabilization clauses address one specific type of
risk that a contract can affect: political risk.2  This part will describe
The German Investment Scheme, in PROMOTION OF DIRECT INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 123 (1986). See also John C. Kinna, Investing in Developing Countries:
Minimization of Political Risk, 1 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 89 (1983). See generally
Douglas A. Paul, New Developments in Private Political Risk Insurance and Trade
Finance, 21 INT'L LAW. 709 (1987).
17. See Kinna, supra note 16, at 95-99. See also Jurgen Voss, The Protection and
Promotion of Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries: Interests,
Interdependencies, Intricacies, 31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 686, 686-88 (1982).
18. See Waelde & Ndi, supra note 9, at 234.
19. Id.
20. See GAO, supra note 2, at 201-240. See generally Taverne, supra note 3.
21. See Waelde & Ndi, supra note 9, at 221.
22. Id.
23. See Curtis, supra note 7, at 346. See also Eli Lauterpacht, Issues of Compensation
and Nationality in the Taking of Energy Investments, 8 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L.
241, 243-44 (1990). Stabilization clauses are only one type of provision used by foreign
companies in an attempt to protect their investment. Arbitration and choice of law
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that risk and then review the types of stabilization clauses available.
A. Risks
A central question about the security of a petroleum transaction is
the nature and degree of risk to which the investment is exposed.24
Long-term resource and energy projects such as oil and gas exploration
and mining have a serious need for stability that goes beyond short-
term projects. 5 Key financial requirements of these investors include
rapid investment recovery through accelerated depreciation and
amortization, long loss carry-forward periods, reasonable royalty rates
responsive to mineral prices and a flexible system of income or cash-
flow based taxation triggered only after investment recovery.26
To avoid financial uncertainty about these requirements,
companies frequently ask for assurances of stability of the status quo.
27
Sometimes these promises are made as administrative orders or
regulations, however they are more frequently made through legislation
211
or in specific contract provisions.
Other non-financial concerns are also important to foreign
companies. 29 The greatest worry, of course, is that the foreign country
would expropriate or nationalize the company's operation.0 This can
occur directly, through legislation, or indirectly, through interference
with the investors' freedom to control the enterprise and make a profit."'
clauses are also frequently used. See N. Stephen Kinsella & Paul E. Comeaux, Political
Risk and Petroleum Investment in Russia, CURRENTS 48 (Summer 1993)[hereinafter
Political Risk in Russia]. See also N. Stephen Kinsella & Paul E. Comeaux, Reducing the
Political Risk of Investing in Russia and Other C.I.S. Republics: International Arbitration
and Stabilization Clauses, RUSSIAN OIL & GAS GUIDE 21 (April 1993)[hereinafter
Reducing Risk in Russia].
24. See Lauterpacht, supra note 23, at 242.
25. See Waelde & Ndi, supra note 9, at 266.
26. Id. at 224.
27. Id. at 226.
28. See PETER FISCHER & THOMAS W. WAELDE, COLLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL
CONCESSIONS AND RELATED INSTRUMENTS 195, 481 (1981). Since resource projects are
usually funded to a considerable extent by external loan financing, these financiers have
as their core concern the ability of the company to repay its debt. Accordingly,
stabilization of the fiscal and foreign exchange regimes are essential requirements that
lenders want to see in concession agreements. See generally Grover R. Castle, Project
Finance: The Alternative That Can Leverage Borrowing Power, 5 NAT. RESOURCES F. 196
(1981); Z. Mikdashi, Oil Funding and International Financial Arrangements, 9 NAT.
RESOURCES F. 283 (1985).
29. See Waelde & Ndi, supra note 9, at 230.
30. See Lauterpacht, supra note 23, at 242-43. See C.F. Amerasinghe, Issues of
Compensation for the Taking of Alien Property in the Light of Recent Cases and Practice,
41 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 22 (1992) for a thorough discussion of compensation for
expropriation.
31. Lauterpacht, supra note 23, at 242-43.
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Similarly, companies want protection from changes in labor law
that could result in increased employment costs, government
intervention in production decisions,32 unexpected increases in energy
and infrastructure usage costs, 3 changes to accounting rules which
would result in increased taxes, unexpected obligations to provide
infrastructure, or mandated local service and supply contracts.34
Currently, the issue of most concern in this area is the imposition of
new environmental obligations by subsequent regulation, or by
administrative or judicial rulings interpreting existing law.35
B. Types of Stabilization Clauses
A concession agreement differs from a standard contract in that one
of the parties is a sovereign state. 36 A state has sovereign power over
property and can change its laws. To reduce the tension between these
powers and the imposition of a contractual limitation on them, an oil
company can ask the country for specific assurances that can be
enforced under international law.37
Stabilization clauses "specifically seek to secure the agreement
against future government action or changes in law," either legislative
or regulatory.3 8 More specifically, a stabilization clause is a specific
commitment by the foreign country not to alter the terms of the
agreement, by legislation or any other means, without the consent of
the other contracting party.39
Stabilization clauses can be divided into a number of categories.0
32. Examples would include orders to reduce production or damaging the asset base
of the investment through mandated overproduction.
33. Examples include railroad and pipeline charges.
34. See Waelde & Ndi, supra note 9, at 230.
35. Id. at 230-31.
36. See e.g. Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO), 27 I.L.R.
117 (1963) (an arbitration relating to the interpretation of a concession agreement
between the government of Saudi Arabia and the Standard Oil Company of California).
See also Michael E. Dickstein, Revitalizing the International Law Governing Concession
Agreements 6 Int'l Tax & Bus. Law 54, 54 n.1, 68 (1988); Paul E. Comeaux & N. Stephan
Kinsella, Reducing Political Risk in Developing Countries: Bilateral Investment Treaties,
Stabilization Clauses, and MIGA & OPIC Investment Insurance, 15 N.Y.L. ScH. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 1, 16 (1994)[hereinafter Developing Countries].
37. See Comeaux & Kinsella, Developing Countries, supra note 36, at 18; Curtis,
supra note 7, at 345-46.
38. Curtis, supra note 7, at 346.
39. See Michelle Flores, A Practical Approach to Allocating Environmental Liability
and Stabilizing Foreign Investment in the Energy Sectors of Developing Countries, 12
COLO. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 141, 159-61 (2001).
40. See KEITH W. BLINN, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM EXPLORATION AND
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By agreeing to a stabilization clause, the foreign government purports
to alienate its right to unilaterally change the rights promised to and
relied upon by the foreign oil company.41 A clause that provides the
government may not unilaterally modify or terminate the contract has
been called an "intangibility clause."42 Another variety, usually called a
"stabilization clause stricto sensu," states that the governing law of the
contract shall be that of the contracting state at the time the contract
was executed, thereby preventing the application of subsequent changes
in the contracting state's law. 43  Another type of stabilization clause
provides that the agreement shall be performed consistently with "good
will" or in "good faith," thus precluding unilateral modification or
termination." For example, since international law does not prohibit
expropriation but does require some type of compensation, a
stabilization clause can help give the company some type of protection
in the event of appropriation.4 5 These clauses may appear in either a
broad form or a narrow form that stabilizes only limited aspects of the
contract, such as the applicable tax regime .4
III. APPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION OF STABILIZATION CLAUSES
When a dispute arises between a foreign oil company and its host
state over a concession agreement, the choice of law governing the
dispute, especially as it relates to the validity of a stabilization clause,
is very important. Because the interpretation of a stabilization clause
in an international agreement can involve strands of arguments from
international public law, national law, and possibly an international lex
mercatoria, the resulting issues are arguably some of the most complex
in international business law.47
Traditionally, most disputes related to concession agreements were
EXPLOITATION AGREEMENTS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND POLICY ASPECTS 284, 302 (1986)
(remarking that there are three different types of stabilization clauses). Curtis, supra
note 7, at 346 (stating that there are four different types of stabilization clauses).
41. Coneaux & Kinsella, Developing Countries, supra note 36, at 23. See also Curtis,
supra note 7, at 321.
42. See Curtis, supra note 7, at 347.
43. See id. at 346-47.
44. Curtis, supra note 7, at 346-47.
45. STEPEHN M. SCHWEBEL, JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 401-15 (1994)
(discussing the UN Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources).
There is general recognition that states have the right to nationalize, "expropriate or
requisition these natural resources as long as the owner is paid appropriate
compensation." G.A. Res. 1803, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 15, U.N. Doc.
A/5217 (1962) [hereinafter General Assembly Resolution]. See also Amerasinghe, supra
note 30, at 32-36 (discussing the impact of UN Resolutions on the understanding of what
is "appropriate" compensation).
46. SCHWEBEL, supra note 45; General Assembly Resolution supra note 45;
Amerasinghe supra note 45, at 33. See also BLINN, supra note 40, at 302-04.
47. See Waelde & Ndi, supra note 9, at 237.
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thought to be controlled by the domestic law of the nation granting the
concession.48 More recently, a theory has developed in which the
contract is considered to be "internationalized" because it contains a
stabilization clause, and is thus not subject to the law of the host
nation.49 The question of whether municipal law governs the contract or
whether the contract has been internationalized has caused much
dispute between developed and developing countries. 50
Developing nations - generally the states granting the concession -
argue that their national law governs the concession and that
international law should not apply because the cancellation of a
contract with a private party is a prerogative implicit in the concept of
national sovereignty."1 When the government's actions do not constitute
a breach of contract under that state's law, even if they are inconsistent
with the contract, then the government has the right to modify its
contract with or without compensation to the private contracting
party. 12 Thus, if a stabilization clause in an international petroleum
agreement is subject to municipal law, it will likely be declared
invalid .
Proponents of a nation's right to "permanent sovereignty" are found
in the views of several "formidable commentators" and pronouncements
from the U.N. General Assembly supporting the notion of permanent
sovereignty.' This idea is embodied in the following pronouncement:
"[t]he description of this sovereignty as permanent signifies that the
territorial State never loses its legal capacity to change the status or
the method of exploitation of those resources, regardless of any
arrangement that may have been made."5
The proposition that municipal law governs an international
petroleum concession, however, has not had much support unless there
is no ambiguous or specifically contradictory provision in the contract.
56
Developed countries - whose corporations tend to be the private
contracting parties - insist that sovereign states must follow their
contractual promises and that international law governs disputes about
those promises, so a breaching party must either specifically perform its
48. See Michael E. Dickstein, Revitalizing the International Law Governing
Concession Agreements, 6 INT'L TAx & Bus. LAW. 54, 54 (1988).
49. Dickstein, supra note 48, at 54.
50. Id. at 55.
51. Id.
52. Dickstein, supra note 48, at 55. See also E. NWOGUGU, THE LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 188-89 (1965).
53. See Waelde & Ndi, supra note 9, at 239.
54. See Dickstein, supra note 48, at 62-63.
55. See Edouardo Jiminez de Arbchaga, State Responsibility for the Nationalization
of Foreign Owned Property, 11 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 179-180 (1978).
56. See Waelde & Ndi, supra note 9, at 238.
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obligations or pay monetary compensation equal to the full prospective
value of the contract. 7
International law is not per se applicable to every concession
agreement.58 To gain such protection the oil company must seek to
"internationalize" the contract. 9 The doctrine of internationalization,
also called transnationalization, delocalization, or denationalization, is
intended to ensure a form of binding dispute resolution which is not
under the control of the state party.60
An express choice of law provision may settle the question."' When
there is no express choice of law provision, three different theories have
been commonly used to prevent the application of the law of the foreign
state.62 These are the vacuum theory, the internationalization theory
and the theory of lex mercatoria.63
The internationalization theory states that some contracts are by
their very nature internationalized and thus subject to international
law.r The rationale is based on the mutual consent of the contracting
parties. Mutual consent has been accepted as a universal and well-
established principle about the autonomy of the will of the parties to the
contract.65 The internationalization of a concession agreement on this
basis had gained adherents over past decades, persuading many
arbitrators that a contract becomes internationalized because at the
time of negotiation that was what the parties consented to.6
57. Dickstein, supra note 48; Kinsella & Comeaux, Reducing Risk in Russia, supra
note 23, at 24.
58. See John Crawford & Wesley Johnson, Arbitrating with Foreign States and Their
Instrumentalities, 5 INT'L FIN. L. REV. 11, 12 (1986).
59. See Waelde & Ndi, supra note 9, at 241.
60. Id.
61. See Derek William Bowett, State Contracts with Aliens: Contemporary
Developments on Compensation for Termination or Breach, 59 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 49, 50
(1988). Parties can expressly chose to submit their contracts to either general principles
of law or international law. See Curtis, supra note 7, at 331. General principles of law
are a set of legal principles or rules shared in substance by the world's major legal system,
such as pacta sunt servanda. Many scholars consider public international law to be
different than those general principles of law. These differences will not be discussed in
this paper. For a thorough review of the subject, see generally Reese, The Law Governing
International Contracts, in INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 3 (H. Smit, N. Galston & S.
Levitsky eds. 1981).
62. See Bowett, supra note 61.
63. Id. at 50-53.
64. This was the view adopted by the arbitrator in Texaco v. Libyan Arab Republic
(TOPCO), 53 I.L.R. 389 (1977). This case will be further discussed in infra Part IV(B)(2).
65. See F.V. Garcia-Amador, State Responsibility in Case of Stabilization Clauses, 2
J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POLY 23, 30 (1993).
66. Id. at 30-31. See also Bowett, supra note 61, at 51.
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IV. INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS INTERPRETING STABILIZATION
CLAUSES
This part reviews international arbitrations concerning petroleum
concessions including a stabilization clause. Although these cases are
very complex and have many other interesting features, the focus is
solely on the features involving the stabilization clause.
A. Early Cases
1. Lena Goldfields, Ltd. v. U.S.S.R.67
On February 12, 1930, an almost insolvent English company began
arbitration proceedings against a hostile and large foreign state under
an ad hoc arbitration clause contained in a written concession
agreement signed by both parties.' The relationship started when
Lena Goldfields was incorporated in 1908 for the express purpose of
acquiring seventy percent of the shares of the Russian Lena Goldfields
Company, which had been created in 1855 to develop gold mining along
the river Lena and its tributaries in Siberia. 9 The relationship went
well until July 1918 when the new Soviet government nationalized all
mining properties without compensation, including the Lena's Russian
interests. In 1925, after two years of difficult negotiations between the
Soviet government and Lena Goldfields, the company ratified a
concession agreement which gave Lena Goldfields the exclusive right to
mine gold and other metals in the Urals and parts of Siberia. 71 The
concession period was to run in part for thirty years and in part for fifty
72years.
In October 1925, Lena Goldfields began operations on its
concession.73 By 1929, however, the Soviet government adopted a
number of policies that discouraged concessions agreements with
foreign capitalists. 74  As a result, Lena Goldfields was subjected to
67. Lena Goldfields Arbitration, ANNUAL DIGEST OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
CASES (H. Lauterpacht ed. 1929-1930). See also A. Nussbaum, The Arbitration between
the Lena Goldfields, Ltd. and the Soviet Government, CORNELL L.Q. 31, 42 (1950-51)
(reproducing the Lena award since the original English version has been lost).
68. See V.V. Veeder, The Lena Goldfields Arbitration: the Historical Roots of Three
Ideas, 47 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 747 (1998) (giving a thorough review of the case and its
history).
69. Veeder, supra note 68, at 756-57.
70. Id. at 757.
71. Id. at 758.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 761.
74. Id.
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increasingly hostile treatment and was not able to meet the production
requirement of the concession agreement.75 Because the Soviet Union's
official harassment caused Lena Goldfields to not be able to carry on its
concessions, and because all attempts to negotiate settlement failed,
Lena Goldfields referred the matter to arbitration under an arbitration
clause within the agreement. 6
This case is the first arbitration that involved a choice-of-law clause
and a stabilization clause." Article 89 of the agreement was the choice
of law provision which stated that the "parties base[d] their relations
with regard to this agreements on the principle of good will and good
faith, as well as on reasonable interpretation of the terms of the
Agreement."8 Article 76 contained the stabilization clause under which
the Soviet Government promised to make no alteration in the
agreement by order, decree, or other unilateral act, or at all, except with
Lena's consent. 9
As a result of the interaction between the clauses of the agreement,
the Court of Arbitration determined for the first time that a contract
between a private party and a sovereign state might be
internationalized.80 The tribunal held that the agreement between
Lena Goldfields and the Soviet Government, while governed by Russian
law in respect to ordinary matters, was subject to the general principles
of law insofar as the contractual provisions safeguarding the company's
position were concerned. 8' The court did not elaborate, however, on the
relevance of Article 76, the stabilization clause of the concession
agreement.8' The significance of this award cannot be discounted
because it was the first time an arbitration panel held that other law,
besides national law, could govern the contractual relationship between
a foreign company and a private party.
2. Sapphire International Petroleum Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil
Co. (NIOC) "
Sapphire was the next well-known major arbitration involving a
stabilization clause.4 A concession by the Iranian government
contained a choice-of-law clause similar to Lena Goldfields' in which
75. Veeder, supra note 68, at 762.
76. Id. at 762-63.
77. See Garcia-Amador, supra note 65, at 37.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See Christopher Greenwood, State Contracts in International Law-The Libyan Oil
Arbitrations, 53 BRIT. Y.B. INTL L. 27, 41 (1982).
82. See Garcia-Amador, supra note 65, at 38.
83. 35 I.L.R. 136 (1967).
84. See Garcia-Amador, supra note 65, at 38.
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parties agreed to carry out the provisions in accordance with principles
of good faith and good will."' The stabilization clause stated that:
no general or statutory enactment, no administrative measure or
decree of any kind, made either by the government or by any
governmental authority in Iran (central or local), including NIOC, can
cancel the agreement or affect or change its provisions, or prevent or
hinder its performance. No cancellation, amendment or modification
16
can take place except with the agreement of the two parties.
The arbitrator held first that the agreements contained no express
choice of law provisions." As a result, he decided that the agreement
between the parties should be construed in light of the provisions
currently stipulated to in other, similar Iranian agreements. He then
stated that the legal security of the investments, responsibilities, and
considerable risks of the foreign company, "could not be guaranteed...
by the outright application of Iranian law, which... is within the power
of the Iranian state to change."89 The arbitrator thus found that general
principles of law applied to the agreement, rather than Iranian law
alone.' The arbitrator, however, ignored the stabilization clause of the
concession agreement and refused to find that the State of Iran had
violated the clause, although the tribunal did find that where a
concession is prematurely terminated there is a duty to compensate.9 1
This decision is sometimes cited for the proposition that parties to
economic development agreements may specify that their contracts will
be governed by general principles of law.92  There are other
explanations, however, for why the arbitrator so ruled. For example,
the alleged violations of the agreement did not include any violation of
the specific obligations listed in the paragraph where the stabilization
clause is found.93
3. Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco)9
In 1954, the government of Saudi Arabia concluded an agreement
with Saudi Arabian Maritime Tankers, Ltd. and its owner, Aristotle
Onassis, under which the company was given a thirty year right of
85. 35 I.L.R. at 140.
86. 35 I.L.R. at 140.
87. Id. at 173.
88. Id. at 174-75.
89. Id. at 171.
90. Id. at 175.
91. See Amnerasinghe, supra note 30, at 37.
92. See Curtis, supra note 7, at 331-32.
93. See Garcia-Amador, supra note 65, at 39.
94. 27 I.L.R. 117 (1963).
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priority for the transport of Saudi Arabian oil.95 This concession was in
direct conflict with that of the Arabian American Oil Company
("Aramco"). Aramco held an oil concession agreement, granted by Saudi
Arabia in 1933, which gave Aramco the exclusive right to transport the
oil it extracted from its concession area in Saudi Arabia."
As a result of this conflict, there was an arbitration in 1955
between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Aramco held in Geneva
under an ad hoc submission agreement." There was a stabilization
clause in the Aramco concession agreement. The tribunal concluded
that "[bly reason of its very sovereignty within its territorial domain,
the State possess the legal powers to grant rights [by] which it forbids
itself to withdraw before the end of the concession."98 In 1958, the
tribunal ruled in favor of Aramco, stating that the government was
bound by its agreement with Aramco. 9 The agreement with Onassis's
company thus violated that agreement. The importance of this case is
that it was the first after Sapphire to recognize the validity of
stabilization clauses under international law.1 "6
B. Libyan Nationalization Cases
Despite earlier arbitral decisions, the legal status of contracts
between states and foreign companies remained "so obscure and
controversial" that any new arbitral or judicial decisions created a great
deal of interest."' Three Libyan cases that arose after the Libyan
Government's nationalization of foreign companies' interest under long-
term oil concessions created this type of interest.1 "2
95. See ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 373 (3d ed. 1999).
96. Id. at 373.
97. Id.
98. 27 I.L.R. at 168. See also Mobil Oil Iran, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 16 Iran-
U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3 (1987) (Brower J. concurring) ("Contemporary international
precedents have concluded that such contractual [stabilization] provisions preclude a
sovereign during the stated period from exercising the rights it otherwise possess under
international law to take an alien's property for a public purpose, and without
discrimination and for a just compensation").
99. 27 I.L.R. at 169.
100. See Waelde & Ndi, supra note 9, at 246.
101. See Greenwood, supra note 81, at 27.
102. There has been much academic commentary on these arbitrations and the many
issues presented by them. This Article focuses only on how the arbitral tribunal
interpreted the stabilization clause. For a thorough review of the procedures and arbitral
awards, see id. at 27-28; Robert B. von Mehren & P. Nicholas Kourides, International
Arbitrations Between States and Foreign Private Parties: The Libyan Nationalization
Cases, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 476 (July 1981); Robin C.A. White, Expropriation of the Libyan
Oil Concessions - Two Conflicting International Arbitrations, 30 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1
(1981); Note, Unilateral Action by Oil-Producing Countries: Possible Contractual
Remedies of Foreign Petroleum Companies, 9 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 63 (1985-86).
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The companies who were parties to these agreements, "in an
attempt to ensure contractual stability, had included clauses providing
that Libyan legislation was not to affect them without the consent of all
parties, as well as elaborate choice of law clauses designed to prevent
the contracts from being governed exclusively by Libyan law."1 3 Two of
the most difficult questions associated with contracts between private
parties and a foreign state were raised by these cases: (1) what is the
degree to which such parties are able to choose the law governing the
agreement; and, (2) whether nationalization can be rendered unlawful
through the drafting of these agreements.'"
The Royal Libyan Government granted the concessions subject to
the arbitral cases between 1955 and 1968. Each concession gave the
exclusive rights for fifty years to search for, extract and sell oil from
specific areas of Libyan territory.'05  All relevant provisions were
negotiated in identical terms since they were based upon a model
concession set out in a schedule to the Libyan Petroleum Law of 1955.'(
Three relevant provisions were designed to protect the interest of
the oil company.' 7 The first was a choice-of-law provision which sought
to remove the concession from the realm of Libyan law. Clause 28(7) in
its final form stated:
This concession shall be governed by and interpreted in accordance
with the principles of law of Libya common to the principles of
international law and in the absence of such common principles then
by and in accordance with the general principles of law, including such
of those principles as may have been applied by international
tribunals.'w
The second important provision was clause 16, the stabilization
clause, which excluded the contract from the ambit of any subsequent
changes in Libyan law. Clause 16 in its final version read as follows:
1. The Government of Libya will take all steps necessary to ensure
that the Company enjoys all the rights conferred by this Concession.
The contractual rights expressly created by this concession shall not be
altered except by mutual consent of the parties.
2. This Concession shall throughout the period of its validity be
construed in accordance with the Petroleum Law and the Regulations
103. See Greenwood, supra note 81, at 27-28.
104. Id. at 28.
105. See von Mehren & Kourides, supra note 102, at 478-79.
106. Id. at 478.
107. See Greenwood, supra note 81, at 28.
108. The history of the concession is reviewed in the Texaco Overseas Petroleum
Company and California Asiatic Oil Company v. The Government of the Libyan Arab
Republic, 53 I.L.R. 389 (1978). Clause 28(7) is reproduced in 53 I.L.R. 297, at 303.
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in force on the date of execution of the agreement of amendment by
which this paragraph 2 was incorporated into this concession
agreement. Any amendment to or repeal of such Regulations shall not
affect the contractual rights of the Company without its consent.'09
Finally, clause 28 provided that all disputes would be submitted to
arbitration unless the parties arrived at a friendly settlement."' The
clauses specified that either party had the right to institute arbitration
proceedings."' Clause 28(3) took into consideration the possibility that
one party might seek to frustrate the arbitration clause by refusing to
appoint an arbitrator, stating that in that event the President of the
International Court of Justice would appoint a sole arbitrator."
Between 1971 and early 1974, the Libyan government nationalized
the interest and properties of foreign oil companies in Libya."3 "Three
separate arbitral tribunals adjudicated the lawfulness of these
nationalizations and the remedies available to the companies. Even
though the awards were generally favorable to the foreign companies,
"the arbitrators reached different conclusions despite the close
similarity between the cases.""'
1. BP Exploration Company (Libya) Ltd. v. Government of the
Libyan Arab Republic." 6
The BP case involved a single concession originally granted to
Nelson Bunker Hunt in 1957."' In 1960, Hunt assigned to BP an
undivided one-half share of its interest."8 BP carried out exploration
work and found oil in large quantities."9 BP then acted as operator for
Hunt and itself. 20 In 1969, the Royal Government was overthrown and
a revolutionary regime was established.' 2' The new government
109. 53 I.L.R. at 322.
110. Id. at 302.
111. Id. at 302.
112. Id. at 402-04.
113. See Patrick M. Norton, A Law of the Future or a Law of the Past? Modern
Tribunals and the International Law of Expropriation, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 474, 479 (1992).
114. Id. at 479.
115. See Greenwood, supra note 81, at 28.
116. 53 I.L.R. 297.
117. Id. at 298.
118. See Greenwood, supra note 81, at 29.
119. Id.
120. Id. There was subsequent litigation between Mr. Hunt and BP in both the United
States and England. This litigation is outside the scope of the paper, but for a detailed
discussion of the agreements between the parties, see B.P. Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd v.
Hunt (No.2) [1979] 1 W.L.R. 783; Hunt v. Coastal States Gas Producing Company, 570
S.W. 2d 503 (1978).
121. B.P. Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd v. Hunt (No.2) [19791 1 W.L.R. 783, at 792.
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promised to honor the concessions granted by its predecessor. 122 In
December of 1971, however, in retaliation for what was regarded as the
UK's failure to prevent Iran's occupation of three islands in the Persian
Gulf, the Libyan government nationalized BP's entire interest in the
concession. 123 Shortly after the nationalization law, BP wrote the
Libyan government to request arbitration. 124  After Libya failed to
respond, under clause 28(c), BP asked the President of the
International Court to appoint a sole arbitrator. 125 Libya took no part in
the proceedings and an award was rendered against the country.
26
The arbitrator determined that the agreement was a contractual
relationship belonging to the category of administrative contracts and
that by virtue of the stabilization clause, Libya had limited its "freedom
to change or terminate the concession by unilateral act unless it could
be shown that the changes was truly in the public interest."2' Thus,
while not expressly making reference to the stabilization clause in
clause 16 either in the passage of the award or in its final decisions, the
arbitrator did hold that nationalization constituted a fundamental
breach of the concession and amounted to a total repudiation of the
agreement.
121
2. Texaco Overseas Oil Petroleum Co./California Asiatic Oil Co. v.
Government of the Libyan Arab Republic (TOPCO).2 9
The Texaco / Calasiatic ("TOPCO") case had a similar background to
BP's case. Between 1955 and 1968, Texaco and Calasiatic, both United
States corporations, obtained fourteen oil concessions from the Royal
Libyan Government. 30  In 1973, the revolutionary government
nationalized fifty-one percent of the companies' interest in the
concessions.' When the companies commenced arbitration
proceedings, their remaining forty-nine percent interests were also
nationalized. 32  Libya did not respond to the companies' request to
submit to arbitration, but when the companies under clause 28(3) asked
the President of the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") to appoint a
sole arbitrator, the Libyan government opposed such appointment in a
122. See Greenwood, supra note 81, at 29.
123. Id.
124. 53 I.L.R. 389, 390.
125. Id. at 399.
126. Id.
127. See White, supra note 102, at 5-6.
128. 53 I.L.R. at 329.
129. 53 I.L.R. 389 (1979).
130. See Greenwood, supra note 81, at 30.
131. Id.
132. 53 I.L.R. at 393-8.
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memorandum.'33 Libya objected to the arbitration procedure, stating
that the disputes were not subject to arbitration because the
nationalizations were acts of sovereignty. 134  After considering the
memorandum, the President of the ICJ named a sole arbitrator. 135 A
preliminary award was rendered in November of 1975, followed by an
award on the merits in January 1977.36
The TOPCO arbitrator looked at the whole issue in greater detail
and reached different conclusions about why TOPCO was entitled to
compensation.3 He first rejected the notion that the concession
agreement is an administrative contract." He then proceeded to
examine the nature and implications of the stabilization clause.' 39 First,
he stated that Clause 16 did not "in principle impair, the sovereignty of
the Libyan State" since all its sovereign legislative and regulatory
powers are preserved, as this power can be exercised with respect to
persons with whom the state has no contractual obligations.'40 On this
point he held that:
the recognition by international law of the right to nationalize is not
sufficient to empower a State to disregard its commitments, because
the same law also recognizes the power of a state to commit itself
internationally, especially by accepting the inclusion of stabilization
clauses in a contract entered into with a foreign private party.1
4
'
He then turned to the validity of stabilization clauses and reached
the following conclusion:
Thus, in respect of the international law of contracts, a nationalization
cannot prevail over an internationalized contract, containing
stabilization clauses, entered into between a State and a foreign
private company. The situation could be different only if one were to
conclude that the exercise by a State of its right to nationalize place
that State on a level outside of and superior to the contract and also to
the international legal order itself, and constitutes an act of
government which is beyond the scope of any judicial redress or any
criticism.
142
The importance of the TOPCO arbitration is: (1) the arbitrator
internationalized the contract; and, (2) he interpreted the stabilization
133. See von Mehren & Kourides, supra note 102, at 489.
134. Id. at 489.
135. Id.
136. 53 I.L.R. 389 (1979).
137. See White, supra note 102, at 6.
138. See id.
139. Id.
140. 17 I.L.M. 1, 24-25 (1978).
141. Id.
142. 17 I.L.M. at 25.
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clause as a basis to do so. In other words, the arbitrator held that when
the contract is internationalized, the parties act as equals and the state
host is bound by the guarantees it has offered to the investor.1
3
3. Libyan American Oil Co. (LIAMCO) v. Government of the
Libyan Arab Republic. "'
The last arbitration involving the Libyan nationalizations was the
LIAMCO case. This case was identical to TOPCO, except that the
company was one of the smaller independent oil companies whose
participation had been encouraged by the Royal Libyan Government.
145
LIAMCO was a Delaware corporation that owned an undivided twenty-
five and one-half percent interest in three concessions at the time of the
Libyan revolution."6 Fifty-one percent of the LIAMCO interests were
nationalized at the same time the TOPCO nationalizations took place. 7
Again, when LIAMCO commenced arbitrations its remaining interests
were nationalized."" The arbitration proceedings followed the same
pattern as the TOPCO arbitration, with Libya refusing to participate in
the case. 4 1 The President of the ICJ, at the request of LIAMCO, named
a sole arbitrator and the award was given on April 12, 1977.'50
In analyzing the stabilization clause, the sole arbitrator found that
the clause was "justified not only by the said Libyan petroleum
legislation, but also by the general principle of the sanctity of contracts
recognized also in municipal and international law."". He went on to
state that since LIAMCO's concession agreements were binding they
could not validly be terminated unless there was "mutual consent of the
contracting parties, in compliance with the said principle of the sanctity
of contracts and particularly with the explicit terms of Clause 16 of the
Agreements.""' The conclusions of the award, however, were not
consistent with the views of the arbitrator concerning the validity of the
stabilization clauses. It is thus difficult to evaluate how the
stabilization clause influenced the award."1
3
143. See White, supra note 102, at 11.
144. 62 I.L.R. 140 (1977); 20 I.L.M. 1 (1977).
145. 62 I.L.R. at 155.
146. Id. at 155-56.
147. Id. at 162.
148. Id. at 165.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 165-220.
151. 62 I.L.R. at 31.
152. Id. at 62.
153. See Garcia-Amador, supra note 65, at 44.
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C. Other Cases Involving Stabilization Clauses
1. AGIP v. Popular Republic of Congo."
On January 12, 1974, all the oil distribution sector in the Congo
was nationalized.155 This measure affected all companies in the sector,
except for AGIP, who a few days earlier negotiated with the government
the sale of fifty percent of AGIP's capital.5 ' The agreement between
AGIP and the government contained several stabilization clauses 5 7 and
an arbitration clause. On April 12, 1975, the President of Congo
ordered the nationalization of AGIP.1"8 Following this order, the army
occupied the company's headquarters and seized all of its assets, files
and accounting records."59
AGIP filed an application for arbitration." Like the TOPCO
arbitrator, the tribunal held that stabilization clauses freely accepted
by the Government "do not affect the principles of its sovereign
legislative and regulatory powers, since it retains both in relations to
those, whether national or foreigners, with whom it has not entered into
such obligations."161 Hence, the stabilization clauses were held to be
valid and enforceable under international law.162
2. Government of the State of Kuwait v. American Independent
Oil Co. ("Aminoil")13
In 1948, the ruler of Kuwait granted a sixty-year oil concession to
Aminoil, a United States corporation." This concession agreement
included a stabilization clause that stated:
The Skaikh shall not by general or special legislation or by
administrative measures or by any other act whatever annul this
Agreement except as provided in Article 11. No alteration shall be
154. 21 I.L.M. 726 (1982).
155. See Garcia-Amador, supra note 65, at 44.
156. 21 I.L.M. at 727.
157. In one of the stabilization clauses, the government adopted measures to prevent
the application to the Company of future amendments to the law affecting the structure
and composition of the Company's bodies. See Garcia-Amador, supra note 65, at 45.
158. 21 I.L.M. at 729.
159. See Christopher Koa, The International Bank for Reconstruction & Development
& Dispute Resolution: Conciliating and Arbitrating with China through the International
Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 439, 459 (1991).
160. Id.
161. 21 I.L.M. at 735-36.
162. See Waelde & Ndi, supra note 9, at 245.
163. 21 I.L.M. 976 (1982).
164. George Delaume, Comparative Analysis as a Basis of Law in State Contracts: The
Myth of the Lex Mercatoria, 63 TuL. L. REV. 575, 606 (Feb. 1989).
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made in the terms of this Agreement by either the Shaikh or the
Company except in the event of the Shaikh or the Company jointly
agreeing that it is desirable in the interest of both parties to make
certain alterations, relations or additions to this Agreement.
16
In 1961, a supplemental agreement was negotiated which amended
the 1948 concession. 166 In 1977, after several years of trying to modify
the agreement and increase Aminoil's payments, Kuwait enacted a law
that terminated the concession agreement. 167  In 1979, the parties
agreed to submit their dispute to an ad hoc tribunal. 68
Aminoil claimed that the concession agreement was wrongfully
terminated because there was a stabilization clause and termination of
the agreement was a violation of international law. 169  Because the
concession agreement was renegotiated several times, the tribunal
found that the "stabilization clauses, as no longer possessed their
former absolute character." 70 The tribunal, however, did not find that
stabilization clauses would not prevent termination, if such clauses
were still considered binding. Additionally, the tribunal expressly
rejected Kuwait's contention of permanent sovereignty.'
V. CONCLUSION
Nations with substantial petroleum reserves, without the financial
capacity to develop these resources, continue to rely on foreign oil
companies to undertake the financial and technological development,
exploration and production of these resources. This is particularly true
with the emergence of new independent states in Central and Eastern
Europe. Petroleum concession agreements thus continue to be used by
private parties and foreign companies.
Stabilization clauses will continue to be used in concession
agreements to protect foreign companies from subsequent unilateral
actions by the foreign state. To meet this challenge, it is important for
companies and host countries to understand how, when and why
stabilization clauses have been used in the past and how arbitral
awards have treated stabilization clauses. The decisions discussed in
this article show that such clauses are taken seriously by arbitrators.
The precise language used in the clauses has not been particularly
significant; rather, they are generally analyzed from a policy-based
perspective that considers the limitation on sovereignty expressed by
165. 21 I.L.M. at 990-91.
166. Id. at 991.
167. Id. at 998.
168. See Delaume, supra note 164, at 607.
169. Id..
170. 21 I.L.M. at 1024.
171. See Garcia-Amador, supra note 65, at 48.
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such a clause in light of all the circumstances surrounding the
transaction.
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An important issue facing environmental law today is the
appropriate allocation of responsibility for addressing environmental
problems at different levels of decision-making in a multi-jurisdictional
system. The thirteen essays found in Environmental Law, the Economy,
and Sustainable Development are the product of a colloquium on
comparative and international environmental law at New York
University's Villa La Pietra in Florence. Focused on the United States,
the European Union, and the international community, the authors
provide a comparative analysis of environmental regulation in multi-
jurisdictional systems together with related issues.
Each of the three systems addressed differs significantly in
cultural, economic, institutional, legal, and political terms, but all share
structural similarities and address related issues in instituting
measures to protect the environment while simultaneously promoting
economic growth. Moreover, each system addresses environmental
interdependencies that transcend their component constituencies -
* Affiliate professor at the Institute of International Studies, Bradley University. He
holds a doctoral degree from the Graduate School of International Studies, University of
Denver and is an independent scholar focused on Third World development issues.
239
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
states in the United States, member states in the European Union, and
nations in the case of the international community. These
transjurisdictional questions vary from cross border issues, like acid
deposition or water pollution on the one hand, to global problems, such
as ozone depletion and climate change on the other.
There can be no doubt, as Richard B. Stewart points out in the
introduction, that economic and environmental interdependencies,
trade flows, and capital mobility have important implications for
environmental regulation in multi-jurisdictional settings. Industrial
firms face intense competition on national, regional, and international
levels; consequently, they are deeply and rightly concerned about the
costs imposed on production methods and processes by stringent
environmental regulations. Afraid the cost of compliance with tough
environmental standards will disadvantage companies vis-A-vis
competitors, industrialists and environmentalists alike worry that a
"race to the bottom" in regulation can result. The U.S. chemical
industry has proved something of an exception in this regard, as Ronie
Garcia-Johnson has pointed out, as it has often exported
environmentalism to associated industries and firms around the world.
The essays in Environmental Law, the Economy, and Sustainable
Development focus on six related but distinct clusters of regulatory
concerns. First, contributors address the question of where decision-
making responsibility for environmental regulation should reside in a
multi-jurisdictional system. A second cluster of issues centers on the
appropriate structure for decision-making institutions as well as the
procedures necessary for developing legal rules governing the
regulation of environmental risks. Third, contributors explore issues
surrounding the selection of regulatory instruments for environmental
protection.
The relationship between trade measures and environmental
protection constitutes a fourth set of issues examined. The fifth cluster
of issues deals with risk assessment and risk management. Finally, the
contributors employ a wide variety of methodological approaches to
analyze environmental regulation in multi-jurisdictional settings. Most
contributions draw on economic methodologies; however, public choice
analysis is also used to examine the economic and political forces
shaping government policy decisions. Others employ more traditional
legal and institutional analyses yet acknowledge the significance of
economic considerations in environmental protection regulation.
This is an important book. It provides an informed and readable
discussion of the many facets of environmental regulation in multi-
jurisdictional regimes. A real strength is the balanced representation of
contributors from a wide range of American and European
backgrounds. Stephen Breyer and Veerle Heyvaert, in discussing the
regulation of risk in institutions, state in their concluding paragraph
that their chapter "does not aspire to firm conclusions." (p. 352) The
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same could be said for many of the chapters in this book. On the
contrary, their real contribution, through the identification of core
issues, is to frame future dialogue on environmental regulation in
multi-jurisdictional systems.
David Victor, author of The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol and the
Struggle to Slow Global Warming, is the Robert W. Johnson, Jr. Senior
Fellow for Science and Technology at the Council on Foreign Relations
in New York City. He argues that the science behind global warming is
real and convincing; consequently, the dangers associated with global
warming, like rising sea levels and catastrophic climate changes, merit
serious efforts to control emissions. That said, he views the architecture
- strict emission targets and trading - of the Kyoto Protocol as fatally
flawed, arguing persuasively that the issue of global warming demands
a very different solution. In so doing, he touches on many of the multi-
jurisdictional issues raised in the Revesz, Sands, and Stewart volume.
As Victor emphasizes, emission levels vary with economic growth
and technological change; unfortunately, neither can be planned by
governments according to precise targets. Since they cannot plan
emission levels, governments can never be certain they will be able to
comply with emission targets like those set in the Kyoto Protocol. The
proposed solution, in terms of the Protocol, was a system of emission
trading that would allow governments (and companies) to trade
emission credits and debits. Developing a system of emission trading,
Victor suggests, would necessitate the creation of permits worth some
two trillion dollars, the largest single invention of assets by voluntary
international treaty in the history of the world. He contends that
international law does not provide an effective vehicle to secure such
assets since states dissatisfied with their allocation can refuse to join
the scheme or later withdraw. The Kyoto agreement also fails to provide
for adequate monitoring and enforcement. The enforcement mechanism
outlined in the Protocol would enable countries to sell tens of billions of
dollars worth of emission permits and later withdraw with no penalty.
In short, Victor feels the incentives for nations to cheat on their Kyoto
obligations would be strong but the mechanisms in place to prevent or
deter cheating would be weak.
If the international community is serious in an attempt to slow
global warming, the author believes it must recognize the flaws in the
Kyoto Protocol and replace it with an approach that makes less use of
emission trading. In The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol, he outlines an
alternative strategy that combines the advantages of emission trading
with a "safety valve" to enable participating governments to issue new
emission permits at an agreed upon price. Victor argues this approach
would cap the cost of compliance with international limits on
greenhouse emissions while at the same time facilitating agreement
between governments on how best to share the burden.
The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol is a clear, concise, and well-
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written analysis of a complex and poorly understood issue. Given the
George W. Bush administration's rejection of the Kyoto Protocol, its
publication is timely as Victor's analysis encourages dialogue about the
most appropriate response to global warming. This book should be of
interest to the growing community of policy makers actively engaged in
the search for workable solutions to the question of global warming. It
is also recommended to atmospheric scientists, biologists, and foresters
concerned with greenhouse gases as well as economists and political
scientists concerned with related environmental issues. Finally, it
provides legal scholars with a thought-provoking analysis of the
difficulties involved in employing international treaties as the
regulatory device for complex international behavior like a global,
tradable emission permit system.
The U.S. chemical industry and its multinational subsidiaries have
suffered a serious public image problem since Rachel Carson published
the Silent Spring in 1962. Warning about DDT and other toxins, Carson
described in a best-seller the devastating impact of agricultural
chemicals on interconnected natural systems. Firms in the industry,
over the next four decades, struggled to contend with increasing
regulations and civil society attacks. Today, the chemical industry
continues to be generally perceived, rightly or wrongly, as one of the
worst polluting industries in the world. It is also an industry prone to
occasional catastrophes, such as the Bhopal spill in 1984 in which a
leak from a Union Carbide plant located in India resulted in the death
of more than 2000 people.
Given the recent history of the chemical industry, Ronie Garcia-
Johnson, an Assistant Professor of Environmental Policy at the
Nicholas School of the Environment at Duke University, takes an
unorthodox stance when she argues the chemical industry, given its
poor environmental record, has special incentives to promote shared
environmental standards. In Exporting Environmentalism: U. S.
Multinational Chemical Corporations in Brazil and Mexico, a book
based on a University of Michigan Ph.D. dissertation, she examines the
role of governments, nongovernmental organizations, and advocacy
groups in promoting environmental ideologies. Where activists and
researchers often assume anti-environmental and anti-regulatory
stances on the part of corporations, she takes the opposite tact, focusing
on the transnational promotion by the chemical industry of
environmental ideas and practices.
Garcia-Johnson uses a comparative study of multinational chemical
corporations in Brazil and Mexico, based on field research in both
countries, to examine the flow of ideas, values, and strategies from
parent companies in the United States to their subsidiaries in Latin
America. She carefully selected these two states on the grounds that, if
multinational corporations were exporting ideologies and practices
related to the environment, it would likely occur between these two
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regional powers and the United States. Not only is the United States
tightly linked to both Brazil and Mexico, it has frequently exported
ideologies to them in the past. Moreover, both states have large
chemical industries that include domestic and foreign producers.
Under the banner "Responsible Care," the U.S. Chemical
Manufacturers Association in the 1980s developed a program to stress
environmental responsibility and public accountability in the industry.
Designed to limit government intervention as well as to reduce
pollution, adherents to the program conducted regular self-evaluations
and then publicized reports on their alleged progress. Multinational
chemical corporations later exported the Responsible Care approach to
their own subsidiaries as well as to host country firms.
They took this action, according to Garcia-Johnson, for three
interrelated reasons. First, to avoid a competitive disadvantage,
multinational corporations sought to raise the environmental health
and safety standards of domestic companies in their host countries.
They did so because companies in countries with less stringent
environmental regulations, or with stringent laws but inadequate
enforcement capacity, could produce goods at a lower cost, and thus
enjoy a competitive advantage over producers operating in countries
with more stringent and enforced laws. Second, the multinational
corporations expected to realize a competitive advantage if domestic
industries adopted the same environmental standards as the United
States because the latter was generally in the temporal and
technological lead. Finally, there was widespread recognition that host
countries tended to hold the industry responsible for individual
environmental problems and not just the specific companies involved.
To minimize host country intervention, multinational corporations
encouraged domestic chemical corporations in Brazil and Mexico to
adopt multinational standards.
Garcia-Johnson's research clearly, demonstrates that the U.S.
chemical industry has exported environmentalism to industry
associations and firms around the world. In the process, chemical
producing companies and their industrial allies have influenced
international policies and agreements related to the chemical industry.
Finally, she demonstrates the full extent to which the involvement of
multinational corporations in environmental politics has shifted from
the reactive to the proactive and preemptive.
The global chemical industry is a special business case; therefore,
there are comparative limits to this study in terms of its applicability to
other industries inside or outside the United States. That said,
Exporting Environmentalism is an intriguing and thought-provoking
analysis of an important global industry that invites consideration and
comparison with others. It makes a real contribution to our
understanding of how and why multinational companies promote
environmentalism.
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